Conditional activation of associative semantic structures:forming and transmitting impressions of personality by Nunes, Ludmila Duarte da Silva
UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA 
 
FACULDADE DE PSICOLOGIA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONDITIONAL ACTIVATION OF ASSOCIATIVE 
SEMANTIC STRUCTURES: FORMING AND 
TRANSMITTING IMPRESSIONS OF PERSONALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
Ludmila Duarte da Silva Nunes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOCTORATE IN PSYCHOLOGY 
Specialty in Social Cognition 
 
 
 
2012 
 
UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA 
 
FACULDADE DE PSICOLOGIA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONDITIONAL ACTIVATION OF ASSOCIATIVE 
SEMANTIC STRUCTURES: FORMING AND 
TRANSMITTING IMPRESSIONS OF PERSONALITY 
 
 
 
 
Ludmila Duarte da Silva Nunes 
 
 
 
Thesis supervised by Professor Doutor Leonel Garcia-Marques 
(Universidade de Lisboa) and co-supervised by Professor Henry 
L. Roediger, III, (Washington University in St. Louis), especially 
elaborated for obtaining the degree of Doctor in Psychology, 
Specialty in Social Cognition. 
 
 
 
2012 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The present work was sponsored by a Doctoral Grant (Ref. 
SFRH/BD/48569/2008) of the Science and Technology Foundation (FCT), 
Portugal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
According to Gertrude Stain “silent gratitude isn’t very much to anyone”, so it is now time to thank 
(almost) all who played a role in the preparation of this dissertation. 
 
First of all, I want to thank Leonel Garcia-Marques for being such a great advisor and having the 
ability to keeping my scientific curiosity alive. I am also thankful for all the effort you put on this project, 
while having to deal with me and my doubts (I know it was not always easy). Above all, thanks for 
trusting me. 
I am also grateful to Roddy Roediger, who showed me a lot about Academia and allowed me to 
be part of one of the most exciting working environments I have ever experienced. Thank you for being 
my co-advisor and teaching me about how the greatest Science is usually the most simple. 
All my colleagues and professors from University of Lisbon and the Washington University in 
St. Louis were essential for the making of this thesis. Because I am lucky enough to have received 
support from too many of you, I will just mention your labs. From the Washington University in St. 
Louis, I want to thank everyone in the Memory Lab, for “adopting” me and always making me feel at 
home; the Memory and Cognition Lab, especially Kathleen McDermott; and Mitch Sommers, Mark 
McDaniel, Ian Dobbins, and SimineVazire for sharing their knowledge in a brilliant way. I am also very 
thankful to the “Portuguese team” – I want to show my gratitude to my colleagues from the lab in the 
University of Lisbon and also to those from other Labs who form the Social Cognition group; J. Frederico 
Marques and Mário Ferreira for being directly responsible for some of my academic choices; Tammy 
Garcia-Marques, Tomás Palma, André Mata, and Rui S. Costa, for being colleagues and “teachers” 
whenever I needed to deal with statistics or find obscure papers, or convincing myself I could finish this. 
I am also very grateful to my colleagues Andrew Butler, J. F. Marques, Mário Ferreira, Nate 
Rose, Rui Mata, and Yana Weinstein – it has been a pleasure working with you. 
I also want to thank some of my friends who always knew what to tell me or do when I needed 
them. Megan Smith, Andrée-Ann Cyr, Nate and Denise Rose, Pooja Agarwal, Yana Weinstein and Jon 
Jackson – thank you so much for showing me friendships easily cross oceans. Peter, Marta C., Teresa R., 
Teresa G., Nikola V., Luana F., Marília P., David R., Ricardo F., David K., Tânia R., thank you for 
everything, but especially for trying to teach me how to deal with my frustrations. Isabel, Joaninha, Joana 
M., Teresa G., J. e M., Carla, PZ, Pedro, Nuno T., Nuno e Rita S., Nuno M., yes you deserve all the 
scones I can bake, having you as friends is a gift. Marta J. and Conrad, you spoiled me with cupcakes, 
tough love, and meows, and this would not have been possible without your support. Ana V., thank you 
for being the best sister ever. Also, those who accompanied me through the process of writing this thesis 
– those who stayed and those who left; those who made me cry and those who made me laugh - those are 
the ones who really taught me about impression formation and memory and I am grateful for it. 
Finally, I want to thank my parents. Obrigada por me ensinarem que liberdade e 
responsabilidade são a mesma coisa. Obrigada por estarem sempre aqui e agora. Mãe, acho que a pessoa 
que mais me ensinou merece que esta tese seja também sua, por isso, este trabalho é teu. 
 
 iv 
 
Abstract 
In the presented line of research we intended to systematically study the importance of 
memory to the formation and transmission of impressions of personality. We consider 
that impressions of personality are grounded in associative structures (e.g., Asch, 1946), 
which should be prone to similar memory distortions that other associative memory 
structures are (e.g., Roediger& McDermott, 1995). These distortions, which are a 
performance cost of flexible structures that allow us to adapt to the world (e.g., Howe, 
2011), should also influence the transmission of information. More specifically, when 
information is retrieved from memory and transmitted serially between people, the 
information should be progressively changed by individual memory distortions, which 
must reflect previous representations of the transmitted concepts (Bartlett, 1932). In a set 
of five studies we investigated the susceptibility of the associative structure underlying 
impression formation to memory biases, using an adaptation of the DRM paradigm 
(Roediger& McDermott, 1995); the organization of personality traits in memory and the 
classic impression formation effects of centrality and primacy; and the pattern of 
distortions implied in serial transmission of personality traits. Our results pointed that a 
paradigm typically used to study memory can be adapted to study impression formation 
and that the beliefs that people hold about others’ personalities can be represented by an 
associative memory structure that is susceptible to memory distortions. Also, the 
organization of personality traits in memory seems to be responsible for classic 
impression formation effects, such as the centrality and primacy effects. Interestingly, by 
showing that some of these effects only occur when the impression formation goal is 
active, we obtained evidence for the conditional nature of the activation of the memory 
structure implied in impression formation. Moreover, we verified that serial transmission 
of information leads to systematic and predictable changes, with both information loss 
and intrusions. 
 
Keywords: impression formation, memory, DRM paradigm, repeated reproduction, serial 
reproduction 
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Resumo 
Sempre que alguém nos é apresentado ou descrito, formamos uma impressão sobre a sua 
personalidade. Este processo deverá ocorrer mesmo que a informação inicial seja escassa 
e levar a uma impressão unificada do alvo em causa (Asch, 1946). Mas, qual a relação 
entre as impressões formadas e a representação prévia dos traços de personalidade em 
memória? Esta relação tem sido pouco explorada e, no presente trabalho, sugerimos que a 
informação sobre traços de personalidade está armazenada em memória numa estrutura 
associativa que, tal como outras estruturas associativas de memória, como a memória 
semântica, está sujeita a enviesamentos e erros de memória (e.g., Deese, 1959; 
Roediger&McDermott, 1995). A ideia que os traços de personalidade estão associados 
entre si numa representação que reflecte as crenças partilhadas sobre que traços de 
personalidade normalmente co-ocorrem foi denominada “teoria implícita da 
personalidade” (Bruner &Tagiuri, 1954). A representação da teoria implícita da 
personalidade como uma estrutura bidimensional, composta por quatro quadrantes que 
resultam do cruzamento de duas dimensões – intelectual e social – com dois pólos 
avaliativos – positivo e negativo – foi depois proposta por Rosenberg, Nelson, e 
Vivekananthan (1968). Partindo desta ideia que a teoria implícita da personalidade é uma 
estrutura de memória associativa sujeita aos mesmos enviesamentos de memória que 
outras estruturas de memória associativa, propomos estudar os efeitos clássicos de 
formação de impressões, como os efeitos de centralidade e primazia, adaptando um 
paradigma habitualmente utilizado para estudar falsas memórias semânticas, o DRM 
(Deese, 1959; Roediger&McDermott, 1995). Para tal, desenvolvemos um conjunto de 
três estudos, nos quais se pretendeu explorar a susceptibilidade da teoria implícita da 
personalidade a falsas memórias e a tradução do efeito de primazia e do efeito de 
centralidade em falsas memórias. Como referido, usou-se uma adaptação do DRM. No 
DRM clássico, apresenta-se uma lista de palavras semanticamente associadas a uma 
determinada palavra que nunca é apresentada – o item crítico – e verifica-se que, em 
testes de recordação livre ou reconhecimento, o item critico é tão falsamente recordado 
quanto os items apresentados são veridicamente recordados. Uma das explicações para 
este efeito prende-se com a dispersão automática da activação através das associações 
entre os items apresentados e que deverá convergir para o item crítico, activando-o de 
modo a ser incorrectamente julgado como tendo sido apresentado. Posto isto, e se a teoria 
implícita da personalidade pode ser representada através de uma estrutura associativa de 
traços de personalidade, efeitos semelhantes deverão ser obtidos quando traços de 
personalidade são apresentados. Porém, a activação da teoria implícita da personalidade 
poderá ser condicional ao objectivo de formação de impressões de personalidade, levando 
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a que os efeitos sugeridos ocorram apenas quando este objectivo de processamento está 
activo. Assim, ao longo dos vários estudos que apresentamos, manipulamos sempre o 
objectivo de processamento, dando aos participantes instruções de simples memorização 
ou de formação de impressões, pondo a hipótese de que os efeitos de falsas memórias 
expectáveis dada a configuração da teoria implícita da personalidade ocorreriam apenas 
quando o objectivo de formar impressões de personalidade fosse activado. Para tal, num 
primeiro estudo apresentamos traços de personalidade de um determinado quadrante e 
medimos, num teste de reconhecimento, o números de falsos alarmes quanto a traços 
desse quadrante por comparação ao número de falsos alarmes a traços de personalidade 
dos outros quadrantes. Verificou-se que os traços de personalidade do quadrante da lista 
apresentada eram mais falsamente reconhecidos do que os traços de personalidade de 
outros quadrantes, sendo, tal com previsto, esta diferença maior para participantes 
instruídos a formar impressões de personalidade. É de referir que não se encontraram 
diferenças entre participantes instruídos a memorizar a informação e participantes 
instruídos a formarem uma impressão de personalidade quanto à memória verídica para 
os traços apresentados. Num teste inclusivo subsequente, no qual os participantes eram 
instruídos a aceitar não só os traços apresentados mas também aqueles que partilhavam 
características com os traços apresentados, obteve-se o mesmo padrão de resultados. Os 
resultados obtidos sugerem então que é possível estudar falsas memórias de personalidade 
recorrendo a esta adaptação do DRM e que a activação da teoria implícita da 
personalidade é condicional à activação do objectivo de formação de impressões de 
personalidade. O padrão semelhante de resultados no teste de reconhecimento e no teste 
inclusivo sugerem que as diferenças entre as condições de formação de impressões e 
memória se devem a tipos de processamento distintos, com os participantes instruídos a 
memorizar a lista a revelarem um défice de processamento relacional não evidenciado 
pelos participantes instruídos a formar impressões de personalidade. No estudo seguinte 
procuramos encontrar um efeito de centralidade (Asch, 1946) em falsas memórias de 
personalidade, introduzindo apenas um traço considerado central dada a sua localização 
na representação bidimensional da teoria implícita da personalidade (Rosenberget al., 
1968) numa lista composta por traços de um quadrante da dimensão oposta. Neste caso, 
medimos a diferença entre falsos alarmes da dimensão e valência do traço central e traços 
da mesma dimensão mas valência oposta. A existir, o efeito de centralidade revelar-se-ia 
num maior nível de falsas memórias relativas a traços que partilhassem tanto a dimensão 
como a valência com o traço central. Foi precisamente este resultado que obtivemos, mas 
apenas quando os participantes eram instruídos a formar impressões de personalidade e 
eram testados num teste inclusivo ou num teste de reconhecimento com pressão temporal. 
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Deste modo, o efeito de centralidade parece ocorrer desde que a monitorização seja 
suprimida, dado que a centralidade dos traços parece conferir-lhes uma distintividade que 
facilita o processo de monitorização e a rejeição de traços associados ao traço central (e.g. 
Gallo, 2004). É de salientar que este efeito é especialmente inovador, dado que se 
obtiveram falsas memórias de vários traços de personalidade com a apresentação de 
apenas um traço de personalidade, o que não pode ser explicado pela teoria habitual de 
dispersão de activação, e que terá de ser explicado por um processo de divergência 
associativa ou processamento temático (e.g., Reyna&Brainerd, 1995). Num terceiro 
estudo, explorou-se um paralelo do efeito de primazia (Asch, 1946) em falsas memórias 
de personalidade. Seguindo o procedimento das experiências anteriores, manipulou-se 
agora a constituição da primeira e da segunda parte das listas apresentadas. No caso de 
uma das experiências, verificou-se que quando as listas eram compostas por traços da 
mesma dimensão mas a primeira parte era constituída por uma maioria de traços positivos 
em relação a traços negativos, os falsos alarmes relativos a traços da valência 
maioritariamente representada na primeira parte da lista eram mais frequentes do que os 
falsos alarmes relativos a traços da valência maioritariamente representada na segunda 
parte da lista. Isto poderá ser considerado um efeito de primazia mas, dado que o mesmo 
não acontece quando os traços maioritariamente representados na primeira parte da lista 
são negativos, parece-nos mais estarmos na presença de um efeito de positividade do que 
de um efeito de primazia. Numa outra experiência, na qual se manipulou a valência e a 
dimensão da primeira e da segunda parte da lista apresentada, verificou-se a ocorrência de 
um efeito de positividade semelhante, indicando que este parece ocorrer entre dimensões, 
o que apoia uma teoria de consistência avaliativa (e.g., Brown, 1986) apenas quando esta 
consistência ocorre no sentido da positividade. Em ambas as experiências, os referidos 
efeitos ocorrem apenas quando os participantes formavam impressões de personalidade. 
Assim, os resultados destes três estudos apontam para a existência de uma representação 
de traços de personalidade numa estrutura associativa cujas propriedades influenciam as 
impressões feitas e levam à existência de efeitos de primazia e centralidade que se 
reflectem em falsas memórias. Apesar de ser uma estrutura de memória associativa 
altamente flexível que partilha com outras estruturas de memória associativa, como a 
memória semântica, a mesma tendência a originar enviesamentos, a teoria implícita da 
personalidade parece ter a característica especial de ser activada apenas quando o 
objectivo de processamento activo é o de formação de impressões de personalidade. Por 
fim, apresentamos ainda dois estudos nos quais se explorou a transmissão serial de traços 
de personalidade, sob instruções de memorização ou de formação de impressões. Nestes 
estudos, os participantes eram divididos em grupos de quatro, constituindo uma cadeia de 
 viii 
 
reprodução serial, sendo que o primeiro elo da cadeia recebia a lista original de traços de 
personalidade e era-lhe pedido que a recordasse, e o produto da sua recordação livre era 
então usado como lista de estudo para o segundo elo, cujo produto de recordação livre era 
depois usado como lista de estudo para o terceiro elo, e assim sucessivamente. Cada elo 
era também instruído a recordar repetidamente a mesma lista, por quatro vezes. Assim, 
comparamos a acumulação de alterações individuais com a acumulação de alterações 
colectivas, verificando que a reprodução serial levava a mais erros de omissão de traços e 
de intrusões de traços relacionados, mas que reflectiam os padrões individuais de 
alteração. As correlações entre a localização dos traços na teoria implícita da 
personalidade e os seus índices de sobrevivência nas cadeias de reprodução serial e de 
reprodução repetida também foram calculadas. Em suma, os resultados obtidos nos cinco 
estudos apresentados apontam para a possibilidade de estudar processo de formação de 
impressões de personalidade recorrendo a um paradigma habitualmente usado no estudo 
de falsas memorias semânticas; e apoiam a ideia que a teoria implícita da personalidade 
funciona como uma estrutura de memória associativa, sujeita a enviesamentos individuais 
e colectivos tal como outras estruturas de memória associativa, mas com a característica 
especial de ser activada condicionalmente à activação de um objectivo de processamento 
relevante, como o objectivo de formação de impressões de personalidade. 
 
Palavras-chave: formação de impressões, memória, paradigma DRM, reprodução 
repetida, reprodução serial 
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Memory believes before knowing 
remembers. Believes longer than 
recollects, longer than knowing even 
wonders. 
William Faulkner 
 
 
Somewhere I have heard this before  
In a DReaM my memory has stored. 
Kurt Cobain  
 
 
A few more details, enabling the listener 
to repeat his version in turn, then 
nothing to talk about (…) 
Harper Lee  
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
You are meeting your friend Jane and she starts describing her childhood 
friend, Mike. Almost immediately you form an impression about Mike who you have 
never met. You will take the information Jane is giving you and make some 
inferences in order to achieve a coherent impression about Mike’s personality. But 
how does the way Jane conveys you the information influence the impression you are 
forming? And are you a passive receiver or does the previous representation you hold 
about others’ personalities play a role in the shaping of the impression? Now imagine 
that you want to tell your own childhood friend, John, about Mike. Will you convey 
the actual information that has been passed to you by Jane? And what if John wants to 
share the same information with someone else? How will this shared information 
differ from the original information conveyed by Jane?  
Research in impression formation and memory has already provided some 
hints useful to answer these questions (e.g. Hamilton, 1989). However, to our 
knowledge no one has ever systematically studied these issues. And it is precisely 
what we proposed to do in the research program reported here. Taking into account 
previous studies, we believe that impressions of personality are grounded in 
associative structures (e.g., Asch, 1946) and, consequently, the impressions we form 
about others’ personalities will reflect the organization within those associative 
structures. As associative structures, the structures serving impressions formation 
processes should also be prone to memory distortions already identified in other 
associative structures, such as semantic structures (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). The referred distortions rather than being a memory impairment can be seen as 
a performance cost of the usage of highly flexible structures that allow us to navigate 
the world and adapt to it (e.g., Howe, 2011). But, despite these cognitive similarities 
to other associative structures, we believe that the activation of the associative 
structure underlying impressions formation processes is conditional to that processing 
goal and whenever there is another processing goal, a default semantic structure 
should be activated and it should lead to differences in the pattern of memory 
distortions within the activated structure in each case. The study of the patterns of 
memory distortions is in accordance with the idea that memory processes are mainly 
reconstructive processes, as Sir Frederic Bartlett (1932) suggested. Plus, we also 
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borrowed from Bartlett (1932) the notion that transmission of information must suffer 
an accumulation of individual biases across the transmission chain. More specifically, 
when information is retrieved from memory and transmitted serially between people 
within a serial reproduction chain, the information should be progressively changed 
according to predictable patterns that reflect the conditions of transmission and, more 
interestingly, the previous representations of the transmitted concepts. Thus, we 
became interested in seeing what would occur when the transmitted information 
actually had social relevance, like what occurs with the transmission of impressions of 
personality. If in the story we told you initially it is not very important if you did not 
get the correct impression from Mike and may have even confounded his personality 
with your own childhood friend’s, or if the last person receiving information about 
Mike got a completely different impression about him, in certain situations such as 
work environments or spreading of important news, these alterations may have a large 
impact in some people’s lives. Gossip and rumor are a byproduct of alterations that 
occur during the social transmission of information (Allport & Postman, 1947) and 
we propose to study these alterations using a socially relevant material – impressions 
of personality. 
In sum, we will be presenting a set of five studies designed to investigate (1) 
the susceptibility of the associative structure underlying impression formation to 
memory biases; (2) the role of the organization of personality traits in memory in the 
pattern of biases obtained, which should be related to the classical effects obtained in 
impression formation literature (e.g., Asch, 1946); (3) the possible conditional nature 
of the activation of the referred associative structure; and (4) the pattern of distortions 
implied in the serial transmission of socially relevant information, such as 
impressions of personality. 
Before presenting the actual experiments and discuss the obtained results, we 
will start by presenting a review of the literature that has already dealt with these 
issues. So, in this introduction, we will start by reviewing the main studies that tried 
to elucidate the cognitive processes underlying impression formation – from Asch 
(1946) and his identification of those that still are considered the classic effects in 
impression formation (centrality and primacy effects) to Anderson (e.g., 1967) who 
proposed a different theory, passing by the attempts to map an implicit theory of 
personality and finishing with the debate between Peabody (1990) and Brown (1986) 
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on the weight of evaluative and descriptive aspects of personality traits for the 
impression formed. Then we will review the studies on serial reproduction of 
information, which started with Bartlett’s (1932) attempts to study the reconstructive 
nature of memory and was summarized by Allport and Postman (1947) in their book 
on psychology of rumor. Finally, we will report the most significant studies on 
memory distortions, mainly on false memories, including the work with the DRM 
paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and the main effects obtained 
with it (for a review, see Gallo, 2004) as well as the main theories used to explain 
those effects. After the review of the literature on these three main themes, we will be 
able to introduce our research line in more detail and to provide a theoretical 
framework for the interpretation of our results, in the general discussion.  
 
1. IMPRESSION FORMATION  
The way we form impressions about others has been studied for more than 60 
years. Asch (1946) was the first author to systematically study how impressions of 
personality are formed, but the whole idea that impressions of personality are a rich 
study subject had been developed earlier by authors as Allport & Allport (1921) who 
were more interested in the accuracy of impressions formed than in the process 
involved in their formation. The fact that this line of research had assumed a relevant 
role in Social Psychology (Asch, 1946) and later in Social Cognition (e.g., Hamilton, 
1989) and Social Neuroscience (e.g., Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2005) is not very 
surprising since impression formation occurs automatically and on a daily basis. 
As we live in complex societies and do have to frequently interact with each 
others, forming impressions about others help us navigating the social world. It is our 
impressions of others that give us information about the social behaviors we should 
adopt and what type of interactions we should initiate, maintain, or terminate. These 
impressions tip us about who to trust, whom to vote for, if a given person is right for 
the job, whether that used cars salesman is presenting us with a bad or a good deal. 
But how do we form these impressions? If they have such a prominent role in guiding 
our social behavior they must have proved to be somehow accurate and “economic” 
in the sense that they must form easily and in the absence of complex information. 
Actually, it is quite amazing how we can go beyond very few bits of information 
provided and form an integrated impression about someone’s personality (e.g., 
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Thorndike, 1920; Asch, 1946). Thus, it seems fair to assume that the process of 
forming impressions of personality rely on previous representations that people hold 
about others personalities and their strong expectations about which personality 
characteristics usually go together (Bruner, Shapiro, & Tagiuri, 1958).  
The beliefs people hold about how personality traits usually combine in 
someone was dubbed as the implicit theory of personality and it can be seen as an 
associative structure. The implicit theory of personality thus represents the personality 
traits most commonly used to describe others and the relationships between those 
traits (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekanathan, 1968). If we assume that this 
representation is accurate we can think of the implicit theory of personality as an 
associative memory structure, prone to the same effects found within other associative 
memory structures and possible to be studied by methods similar to those used to 
study other associative memory structures, as we will propose in this research line. 
But how do we form impressions about someone’s personality in the first place? 
Is it a gestaltic process by which we combine information, sharpening some 
characteristics and leveling others (Asch, 1946)? Or do we apply mathematical rules 
to combine someone’s characteristics and average them until forming an impression 
of personality (Anderson, 1967)? Despite its early beginning, this debate about the 
process of forming an impression of personality is still open and benefitting from 
research on memory and other cognitive processes (Hamilton, 1989). In the present 
study, we will review some of these theories about the processes involved in forming 
impressions of personality but we will focus more on how the results obtained in 
those experiments can be related to memory processes and affected by the same 
biases that affect associative structures of memory such as semantic memory. 
In this chapter we will start by reviewing the first study that focused the process 
of forming impressions of personality and not only on the accuracy of the impression 
(Asch, 1946). Then we will turn to the attempt to provide theoretical background to 
the study of impressions of personality and the notion of implicit theory of personality 
(Bruner et al., 1958). After this conceptualization we will review Anderson’s (1962; 
1967; 1969) application of a mathematical model to impression formation and then 
we will turn a more theoretical conceptualization of the implicit theory of personality 
and its mapping, focusing on the relations between personality traits (Rosenberg et al., 
1968). After this we will review the debate about the weight of different 
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characteristics of personality traits themselves in impression formation – descriptive 
and evaluative characteristics (Peabody, 1967; Brown, 1986). Finally we will try to 
come up with a general view of the structure of impressions of personality and the 
way personality traits are represented in memory. 
 
1.1. In the beginning was the Gestalt: Asch and his seminal study 
In 1946, Solomon E. Asch was the first researcher to systematically study how 
we make impressions about other people. In his seminal paper, Asch explored some 
impression formation effects that triggered the interest of other researchers during the 
past six decades. By conceiving impressions as coherent and integrated 
representations of persons and proposing that inferential processes come to action 
when people form impressions, Asch (1946) prompted an entire research field 
interested in identifying the processes underlying impression formation. However, 
before identifying those processes, two basic questions had to be answered: (1) how is 
it possible to form a unified coherent representation of someone’s personality 
departing solely from individual personality traits and (2) which principles guide this 
integration of traits. These two questions reflect exactly what Solomon Asch (1946) 
tried to answer with a set of ten experiments. The general procedure used consisted in 
presenting participants lists of adjectives, i.e., personality traits, about a given target, 
and then ask them to write comments on which impression they formed about the 
target; after this task, participants were presented with a checklist composed of pairs 
of opposed personality traits (e.g., frivolous-serious) and were asked to give more 
information about their impression of the target by choosing the traits that were most 
in accordance with the formed impression about the target, given the initial list of 
adjectives; participants were also asked to rank the chosen traits according to their 
importance for the impression. 
Asch clearly had a gestaltic view of the way impressions of personality are 
formed and his experiments explored the principle that the whole is more than the 
sum of the parts. Only by showing participants individual personality traits, Asch 
(1946) was able to having them forming unified representations that reflected a whole 
impression of personality that was more than the simple sum of the presented traits 
but was affected by factors such as the order of their presentation or the simple 
inclusion of a different trait. In Experiments 1 to 3, Asch (1946) shows how some 
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traits are more central or peripheral (the centrality effect) and how that quality can be 
changed just by changing the context, i.e., the other presented traits; in Experiments 4 
and 5, Asch illustrates how the importance of traits and their value can be changed; in 
Experiments 6 to 8, Asch demonstrates the primacy effect by which the first presented 
traits guide the entire impression formation process, changing the way the following 
traits are perceived; in Experiment 9, Asch shows how complete impressions can be 
made based solely in three personality traits, or even only one; and, finally, in 
Experiment 10, some of the qualities that allow for judgments of similarity or 
difference between persons were analyzed.  
The centrality effect is perhaps the most intriguing effect described by Asch. 
Asch (1946; Experiment 1) departs from the idea that some personality traits play a 
basic role in impression formation, being weighted more heavily than others, more 
secondary, traits. To test this assumption, Asch had two groups of participants hearing 
one of two target descriptions; each description consisted exactly of the same 
personality traits with the exception of a trait included in the middle of the 
description. So, one group heard the traits “intelligent – skillful – industrious – warm 
– determined – practical – cautious” whereas the other group heard the traits 
“intelligent – skillful – industrious – cold – determined – practical – cautious”. After 
hearing the traits, participants were asked to write a brief sketch about the target’s 
personality. Then, participants were presented with a checklist of 18 pairs of opposite 
personality traits (e.g., generous-ungenerous; unhappy-happy; important-insignificant; 
ruthless-humane; strong-weak) and instructed to chose, from each pair, the trait that 
was most in accordance with the view they formed about the target. Results showed 
that participants presented with the description that included the trait warm formed 
impressions far more positive than the ones presented with the description that 
included the trait cold. More interestingly, in the checklist, certain traits choice 
reflected a drastic reversal according to which description was presented while other 
traits choice was unaffected. For instance, when warm was included in the list, 91% 
of the participants chose generous from the pair generous-ungenerous, but when 
warm was replaced by cold, the same percentage was reduced to 8%; but 
approximately 90% of participants chose reliable from the pair reliable-unreliable, 
independently of whether warm or cold was included in the list. According to Asch, 
these results support the idea that there are central and peripheral traits that contribute 
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more and less, respectively, to an impression of personality. In a following 
experiment, Asch (1946; Experiment 2) omitted the words warm and cold from the 
descriptions but added the pair warm-cold to the checklist and verified that 41% of 
the participants judged the target as warm whilst the other 59% judged the target as 
cold and based the other trait judgments on this inference thus showing similar 
choices to participants that in Experiment 1 had been presented with the “warm” 
description and the “cold” description, respectively. Again, this result seems to 
support the notion that the traits warm and cold are so important that even when they 
are not presented, they are inferred in order to construct a unified impression. In a 
third experiment, Asch (1946; Experiment 3) used the same procedure he had used in 
Experiment 1 but instead of the traits warm and cold he manipulated the inclusion of 
the traits polite and blunt, and found that this manipulation had virtually no effects in 
the judgment of a target. These traits are thus considered peripheral and to contribute 
less to the formation of an impression of personality.  
In the following two experiments, Asch (1946; Experiment 4 and Experiment 5) 
illustrated the possibility of changing the interpretation of the central traits warm or 
cold simply by changing the traits accompanying them (Experiment 4); or by 
presenting lists composed three opposite traits and two similar traits and asking 
participants to write down the synonyms of the presented traits (Experiment 5). When 
accompanied by traits such as obedient, weak, shallow, unambitious, and vain, the 
trait warm was interpreted as submissive; and when accompanied by traits such as 
vain, shrewd, unscrupulous, shallow, and envious, the trait warm was interpreted as 
fake. A similar modification occurred for the trait cold when accompanied by 
different sets of traits. Also, the traits warm and cold lost their central quality; as they 
were reinterpreted, and their content was changed due to the accompanying traits used 
in the descriptions, making them lose importance in the overall impression formed. 
These results alert to the fact that a central trait only plays a central role in impression 
formation in comparison to the other traits possessed by the target. However, Asch 
(1946) states that this is simply a change of functional value within someone’s 
description and that central traits do not suffer changes in their general evaluation, 
being this the reason why they must be reinterpreted within targets’ description that 
do not match the usual meaning of the central trait. 
The primacy effect is another of the effects Asch (1946; Experiments 6 to 8) 
 8 
thoroughly studied. Asch defined this “primacy effect” as a directional effect by 
which the first personality traits presented about a given target would guide all the 
impression formation process and the following traits interpretation, thus it should be 
possible to alter an entire impression about someone described exactly by the same 
traits by just changing the order of the traits presentation. In Experiment 6, Asch 
presented a group of participants with the traits “intelligent – industrious – impulsive 
– critical – stubborn – envious” and another group with exactly the same traits but in 
reversed order, “envious – stubborn – critical – impulsive – industrious – intelligent”. 
The first series of traits starts with positive traits such as intelligent and industrious 
and proceeds with less positive ones whereas the other series starts with more 
negative traits and ends with the positive ones. Asch found that when positive traits 
were presented first the impression formed about the target was much more positive 
and dominated by the impression derived from those traits than when participants 
heard exactly the same traits but the positive traits only appeared later. Actually, in 
this Experiment, participants presented with the series starting with “intelligent” 
evaluated the target as an “able person who possesses certain shortcomings which do 
not, however, overshadow his merits” (Asch, 1946, p.270); on the other hand, 
participants presented with the traits in reversed order evaluated the target as “a 
problem, whose abilities are hampered by his serious difficulties”. Besides this, for 
the first series, some more negative traits are interpreted as positive qualities whereas 
they are interpreted as fully negative when the presentation is reversed. Moreover, in 
the checklist, positive traits were selected more often when participants had been 
presented with more positive traits earlier. Plus, in a within condition, where 24 
participants were first presented with the reversed series and afterwards with the 
series starting with “intelligent”, 14 participants claimed their impression suffered a 
change. Asch argued that these results show that primacy guides the development of 
an impression and exerts continuous effects on the encoding of latter traits. However, 
it must be noted that, according to Asch (1946), this concept of primacy is not the 
same that is usually found in memory studies (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1964) in which the 
first items of a series are better remembered than the following ones and that is 
usually compared to the recency effect, which is an advantage in memory for the 
latter items in a series. Asch refers that this primacy effect does not depend only on 
the temporal position of the traits but also on the functional relation between them. 
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Nevertheless, the idea that the primacy effect in memory depends only on the 
temporal position of the items in a series and that it is based on mechanisms similar to 
the ones involved in the recency effect has been challenged by authors such as Endel 
Tulving (2007), who proposed that all sorts of primacy effects are distinct from the 
recency effects and are based in a very specific mechanism – the camathotic 
encoding. But we will get to this idea later, when the primacy effect is discussed in 
depth. Yet, Asch gathered more evidence for this primacy effect in impression 
formation in two more experiments. In Experiment 7, Asch (1946) used a procedure 
similar to the one used in Experiment 6, but instead of a gradual change in the merit 
of the presented traits he presented a more negative trait in the beginning or the end of 
each series. Again, the results pointed to a more negative impression when this more 
negative trait was presented in the beginning of the series, and it should be noted that 
this was the only dubious trait presented. Finally, in Experiment 8, the first series 
presented in Experiment 6 was split in two and presented as describing two targets, 
one was “intelligent – industrious – impulsive” and the other was “critical – stubborn 
– envious”; after the separate presentation and the usual impression sketch and 
checklist procedures for each target, participants were informed that the two lists 
described a single target and that they should now form an impression corresponding 
to the entire list of traits. This group of participants found very difficult to integrate 
the two descriptions in one single impression because the two sets of traits seemed 
completely contradictory; on the other hand, a control group that had been presented 
with the same traits as only one target description did not report difficulties in 
forming an impression. Taken together, the results of these three experiments suggest 
that the first presented personality traits contribute more to the impression formation 
process than the latter ones because they guide the direction of the impression and the 
inferences made about the target, while the meanings of the latter presented traits are 
selected to be more congruent with the first presented traits (Asch, 1946). 
In two final experiments, Asch (1946; Experiment 9 and 10) proposes to 
observe in a more extreme way the formation of a global impression. To do so, Asch 
presented only one personality trait and then asked participants to select from the 
same checklist used in the previous experiments the traits from each pair that better 
described the target person described by that given trait. The traits used were “cold” 
and “warm”. The results indicated that the differences between the two targets were 
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even more remarkable now than in Experiment 1. Asch also made participants 
characterize the targets with a different checklist and found that even physical 
characteristics were differently attributed to the warm target and to the cold targets, 
for instance, the warm target was short and stout whereas the cold target was tall and 
thin. The fact that the judgments in this Experiment were more extreme than the 
judgments in Experiment 1 made Asch consider that the central traits warm and cold 
had been highly influenced by the other presented traits in Experiment 1, despite their 
centrality. In a final experiment, Asch (1946; Experiment 10) investigated which 
conditions influence judgments of similarity and difference between sets of traits. 
Participants were presented with four sets of three traits each and were instructed to 
pick the set that was more similar to the first set in the series. The sets were built in a 
way that one of the characteristics remained the same in all four sets (helpful) and the 
other two characteristics (skillful and quick) either changed separately (skillful and 
slow; clumsy and fast) for two of the sets or at the same time for the fourth set (clumsy 
and slow). Thus, the fourth set was the most distant from the first set and the other 
two sets were equally distant from the first set. Strikingly, the results showed that the 
first set is considered to be more similar to the third set in 87% of the cases, whereas 
the second set is considered to be more similar to the fourth set in 85% of the cases. 
This is not compatible with a simple judgment based on the number of identical traits 
per set, because if so sets 1, 2, and 3 should be considered equally similar. So, the 
suggested explanation for these results is that some traits resemble more or less other 
traits depending on which traits they are accompanied by. So, quick accompanied by 
helpful and skillful is more similar to slow accompanied by helpful and skillful than it 
is similar to itself when accompanied by helpful and clumsy. Thus, this last 
experiment not only shows how judgments of similarity are affected by the totality of 
traits involved in the targets’ descriptions but also reinforces the idea that traits 
meanings can change because of the other traits used to describe the same target.  
Taken together, the set of results obtained by Asch (1946) seem to support his 
idea that the process of impression formation obeys to gestalt rules, in the sense that 
when forming an impression about someone, we try to come up with an unified 
impression in which the whole is more than the sum of the parts, as the interplay 
between each part, i.e., between each personality trait, defines the meanings attributed 
to each one of the traits. So, personality traits do not have an intrinsic meaning or 
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quality but are defined in accordance to the context. Even if we consider that there are 
more central and more peripheral traits, they only possess those characteristics in 
comparison with the traits also attributed to the same target. 
 
1.2. From the Gestalt to the Implicit Theory of Personality 
 The gestaltic integrative view of impression formation suggested by Asch 
(1946) assumes that an impression about someone’s personality is unified and 
integrates all the information available. This view points to a reinterpretation of any 
single bit of information about someone according to the context, i.e., according to all 
the other bits of information available, however it does not specify how any previous 
experience with forming impressions may affect the impression formation process 
itself. More specifically, Asch does not explain how the relations between personality 
traits are shaped and how people made the stable inferences they did in his 
experiments. Moreover, it seems that for Asch the context (the set of traits used and 
its ordering) explains all the impression formation process. But is it really likely that 
people form impressions about others without any previous notions? 
 According to Bruner and Tagiuri (1954), the reason why people are able to 
make inferences about other people’s personality and thus show the effects reported 
by Asch (1946) is because they hold an implicit theory of personality. This term was 
dubbed by Bruner and Tagiuri (1954) to describe the beliefs that people have about 
which personality traits tend to co-occur within the same individual, this is which 
categories do people generally use to describe others when making impressions, and 
Cronbach (1955) made the use of the term implicit theory of personality more 
mainstream. This idea that people hold an implicit theory of personality has been 
supported by research showing that perceivers have strong expectations about which 
personality traits "go together" (Bruner et al., 1958); and in perceivers' judgments, the 
correlations between such traits that "go together" tend to be overestimated (Berman 
& Kenny, 1976), being as persistent when perceivers judge strangers as when they 
judge familiar targets (Passini & Norman, 1966).  
 The existence of an implicit theory of personality, conceived as the set of 
expectations that people have about which personality traits should co-occur, goes 
against the idea that impressions of personality are perceptually based, as could be 
suggested by Asch’s (1946) studies. More specifically, instead of being perceptual 
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inferences, impressions of personality seem to be more related to conceptual thinking. 
If this is true, Asch’s effects should be predictable. Bruner and colleagues (1958) 
showed precisely how some of these effects could be predicted. They asked subjects 
to make inferences about personality traits and not persons, and showed that the types 
of inferences made for each trait are strong predictors of the inferences made for 
combinations of those traits (i.e. global personality impressions). Some authors (e.g. 
Wishner, 1960) would say that the predictability of Asch’s (1946) effects is somewhat 
at odds with his theory, which assumed that personality traits are seen in their 
interaction and placed within the unified impression of personality (Asch, 1952). In 
fact, Wishner (1960) argues that an essential claim made by Asch (1946; 1952) is the 
unpredictability of the final impression from any prior knowledge about the traits 
used in the description and their relation. This argument is essentially based on 
Asch’s rejection of any mathematical model that could explain the interaction 
between personality traits and their contribution to a final integrated personality 
impression. Asch considered that such predictability would reduce the impression 
formation process to an elementarist view opposite to the gestaltic principle that the 
whole is more than the sum of the parts. However, as will be discussed later on this 
introduction, Asch’s gestaltic view is not incompatible with the existence of an 
implicit theory of personality. 
 Wishner (1960) proposes a reanalysis of impressions of personality, trying to 
move away from Asch’s gestaltic view and supporting a more elementarist view of 
the impression formation process. However, more than supporting an elementarist 
view of the impression formation process, which can be discussable, Wishner’s 
(1960) study is important because it is one of the first studies that can be used to 
conceive more formally the implicit theory of personality and which principles rule it. 
Wishner assumes that the intercorrelations between personality traits presented to 
describe the target and personality traits in the checklist used by Asch (1946) 
determine the ratings made by the subjects. These intercorrelations exist prior to the 
exposure to the stimulus list and the checklist and thus the obtained ratings can be 
predicted. To test this idea, Wishner calculated the intercorrelations between most of 
the traits used by Asch and calculated the fit of the predictions derived from those 
correlations to Asch’s (1946) results and to Mensh and Wishner’s (1947) replication 
of Asch (1946). Wishner (1960) also created new stimulus lists and checklists to more 
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directly test his hypothesis. 
 More precisely, Wishner started by posing the question about how people 
actually combine personality traits when forming impressions about real persons. To 
answer this question, 214 students were asked to rate eight different instructors in 
fifty-three pairs of personality traits. Each pair was composed of two antonyms, 
exactly like Asch’s checklist traits, and accompanied by a scale ranging from one to 
six. As an example, an instructor could be rated in the pair “blunt-polite” with one, 
meaning “very blunt”; two, meaning “moderately blunt”; three, meaning “somewhat 
blunt”; four, meaning “somewhat polite”; five, meaning “moderately polite”; or six, 
meaning “very polite”). Then, the best estimates of the correlation between any two 
traits were calculated. These correlations were used to reinterpret Asch’s (1946) 
centrality (warm-cold) effect. The pair warm-cold correlated most highly with the 
traits in the checklist that showed the greatest impact of the warm-cold manipulation 
(Asch, 1946; Mensh & Wishner, 1947) and was relatively uncorrelated with the other 
stimuli-traits. Thus, the relation between the stimulus traits and the traits to be rated 
seems to be a good predictor of the centrality effect. So, if we vary one of the stimuli 
traits, which is fairly uncorrelated with the other stimuli traits, the effects of this 
variation are a function of the correlation between the manipulated traits and the traits 
used in the responses to be made. As these predictor-correlations were obtained in an 
experimental setting very different from the ones Asch (1946) and Mensh and 
Wishner (1947) used, it seems fair to assume that, at least, the centrality effect can be 
predictable.  
 Interestingly, Wishner (1960) also verified that the traits in the checklist that 
suffered the least impact of the manipulation warm-cold are the traits more highly 
related to the other traits presented in the target’s description. For instance, the traits 
highly related to the presented trait intelligent did not change with the manipulation. 
Thus an intelligent-unintelligent manipulation should also have impact on some trait 
ratings, and intelligent-unintelligent may also be seen as central traits, depending on 
the manipulation and the checklist used. Wishner (1960) tested this idea by 
introducing either the trait intelligent or the trait unintelligent in the stimulus list; 
because he was also interested in testing order effects, such as the primacy effect, the 
changed trait could appear in the first, third, or sixth position within the list. Wishner 
had participants hearing the stimulus list once, asked them to form an impression of 
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that target’s personality, and then presented them the same list, and finally asked 
participants to rate the target in pairs of antonymous traits. The results obtained 
supported the idea that the correlations between the manipulated traits and the traits in 
the checklist drive the centrality effect. Also, there were no order effects, which 
Wishner took as evidence against a gestaltic view of the process of forming 
impressions of personality. However, the fact that the list was heard twice and an 
impression was formed in between the presentations can be enough to explain the 
absence of order effects (Baddeley, 2000; Marshal & Werder, 1972).  
 In a different experiment, Wishner (1960) transformed the peripheral traits 
“blunt-polite” into central traits by manipulating the traits used in the checklist, 
adding evidence to the idea that the centrality effect depends on the intercorrelations 
between the traits studied and tested. Nevertheless, like what had happened in the 
experiment with the “intelligent-unintelligent” manipulation, the high relations of the 
other presented traits with the manipulated traits seems to play a role. These relations 
prevent some differences in the checklist ratings of other traits which are also highly 
related to the manipulated ones. Wishner (1960) points that these results do not 
provide clear support to the elementaristic view of impressions formation but Asch’s 
gestaltic view also cannot handle them. For Wishner, the interactions between traits 
are too complex and all of them must be taken into account when making predictions 
about impressions formation. In another set of experiments, Wishner tried to 
overcome the complexity of interactions between traits by using simplified lists, but it 
seems to us that an approach in which those complex relations are mapped and then 
taken into account is more useful and will help clarifying the main impression 
formation effects. This was exactly the approach that Rosenberg and colleagues 
(1968) used, as we will see further in this introduction. But first, the elementaristic 
view of the impression formation process deserves a more detailed description. 
 
1.3.  Norman Anderson and the mathematics within the personality 
 Norman Anderson departed from Asch’s view that the impression formation 
process was driven by gestaltic principles and tried to create a mathematical model 
that would explain and predict the main effects found in impression formation 
experiments. Anderson then developed a model of algebraic integration based on the 
averaging of the personality traits used in a target’s description. It should be noted 
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that Anderson did not advocate a simple elemantaristic view by which the addition of 
the presented traits would be enough to predict effects such as the primacy or the 
centrality effect.  
 According to the Information Integration Theory (Anderson, 1969), the effects 
obtained by Asch (1946) and further replicated (e.g. Mensh & Wishner, 1947) all 
depend on the way the personality traits used to describe the target are integrated. 
Thus, it must be assumed that each presented trait has a value and the overall 
evaluation will be obtained by combining those values according to a given 
mathematical rule (Anderson, 1965). The most obvious rule would be adding the 
values of each stimulus, as supported by experiments showing that an increase of the 
size of the stimuli set leads to a more extreme evaluation (e.g., Anderson, 1965; 
Willis, 1960). However, this effect may also be handled at a quantitative level by an 
averaging rule (Anderson, 1967). To clarify the two types of rules, imagine that 
popular is considered a moderately positive/desirable trait and reliable is considered a 
highly positive/desirable trait; if we adopt an adding rule, a person who is both 
popular and reliable would be evaluated as more positive than a person who is only 
reliable; however, if we consider an averaging rule, a person who is only reliable 
should not be evaluated as less positive than a person who is both popular and 
reliable. In various experiments, Anderson obtained evidence for an averaging model 
(e.g., Anderson, 1967).  
 In his experiments, Anderson usually used a subset from the set of 555 
personality trait adjectives rated on likableness on a seven-point scale by one hundred 
judges. These adjectives were then divided in four sublists according to their “value”: 
H (high) for traits ranging between 5 and 5.45 (e.g., truthful and reasonable); M+ 
(moderate plus) for traits ranging between 3.45 and 3.74 (e.g., painstaking and 
persuasive); M- (moderate minus) for traits ranging between 2.22 and 2.54 (e.g., 
unpopular and dependent); and L (low) for traits ranging from .72 and 1.00 (e.g., 
spiteful and abusive). Anderson then picked traits from each of these sublists to form 
sets of usually two to six traits, obeying to different combinations of values. These 
sets were then presented as describing a target and participants were instructed to 
think of them as equally important and asked to rate the target in a likableness scale. 
In one of his experiments, Anderson (1965) compared targets described by two HH 
traits with targets described by four HHM+M+ traits and found that targets described 
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by the two HH traits were regarded as more likeable (M = 72.85) than targets 
described by the four HHM+M+ traits (M = 71.11). This result is clearly at odds with 
a simple adding rule of information integration, and provides support for the 
averaging model of impression formation. This pattern was replicated with other sets 
of traits. However, for adjectives of equivalent value, sets of four adjectives produced 
a more polarized response than sets of two adjectives. This effect size effect 
(Anderson, 1965; 1967) may seem incompatible with an averaging model of 
impression formation, but if an initial impression is considered and it is also 
combined in the weighted average with the presented stimuli, the obtained results are 
easily handled by the model (for a complete demonstration, see Anderson, 1967). 
Thus, the averaging model of impression formation proposed by Anderson does not 
consider the response as an average of the stimuli values alone, but an average of the 
initial impression with the stimuli values. 
By claiming that a mathematical model can account for the main effects in 
impression formation and therefore predict them, Anderson seems to give support to 
the elementaristic view of impression formation. However, we must note that the only 
way his model can account for effects such as the set size effect is by considering an 
initial impression. This “initial impression” may be compared to an implicit theory to 
which the presented traits are added and then averaged, thus it would not be 
completely strange if we consider that the way the stimuli are averaged depends on 
pre-existent beliefs about personality traits and the way they are usually combined. 
Noticeably, the primacy effect, as explained by Anderson’s averaging model, gives 
support to the proposed integrative view.  
 More specifically, the primacy effect is obtained by presenting the same traits in 
different serial orders (Asch, 1946; Anderson & Barrios, 1961), thus, a simple 
averaging rule would not explain the differences obtained in the likableness ratings of 
the target. According to Anderson, the average used has to weight more the earlier 
traits in the stimulus set because the information received earlier is more influential 
for the impression formation, possibly because a diminish of attention as the 
presented series of traits progresses (Anderson & Barrios, 1961). This diminished 
attention hypothesis was tested by Anderson and Hubert (1963) who asked 
participants not only to rate the likableness of the target but also to be prepared to 
recall the presented traits. These recall instructions made participants attend the later 
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traits as well as the earlier ones and were enough to make the primacy effect 
disappear. This, according to Anderson and Hubert (1963), supported the notion that 
the traits presented earlier are more attended than the traits presented later, originating 
the primacy effect. On the other hand, Asch (1946) explained primacy by using the 
concept of “direction” and claiming that the first presented information will be more 
important to form an impression about someone because it is the least predictable and 
thus will receive more attention, resulting in the selection of meanings for the later 
presented traits. Clearly, as mentioned above, and argued by Brown (1986, p. 408), 
the diminished attention hypothesis and the evaluative averaging proposed by 
Anderson and the meaning change hypothesis proposed by Asch are not that much in 
conflict and all can be combined. This leads us to question if the elementaristic view 
applied do the impression formation processes by Anderson is that different from the 
gestaltic view applied to the same processes by Asch. As Brown (1986) mentioned 
they do not seem that different when explaining the primacy effect. Accordingly, the 
other effects may be equally well explained by both accounts. However, both 
accounts seem to have problems handling separately all the types of impression 
formation effects. But if we try to reconcile the two views and think of impression 
formation effects as deriving from processes that not only take into account the 
presented elements – personality traits – but also the relation between those elements 
(as suggested by Asch, 1946); and that these effects may be predictable according to a 
simple set of rules of information integration (Anderson, 1969), we may come closer 
to a definition of the impression formation process that encompasses the importance 
of a previous structure of beliefs about personality and how a target’s description is 
viewed in light of that previous structure. Thus, the implicit theory of personality 
plays an important role, as it can be seen as the structure setting the rules for the 
averaging process proposed by Anderson (1965) and, at the same time, the structure 
guiding effects such as meaning change and ruling the gestaltic integration proposed 
by Asch. If this is true, instead of pitting a gestaltic view against an elementaristic 
view of impressions formation, the mapping of the implicit theory of personality, with 
the correlations between personality traits and their spatial location according to each 
other, may be more useful in explaining and predicting the extensively replicated 
effects in impression formation such as the primacy effect or the centrality effect.  
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1.4. The implicit theory of personality as a map 
Asch’s seminal study (1946) and the subsequent replications of his results (e.g., 
Mensh & Wishner, 1947) as well as the conceptualization of an implicit theory of 
personality (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954) originated an increasing interest in clarifying 
the theoretical questions behind Asch’s effects. Part of the attempts to provide 
theoretical background to the impression formation effects reported felt into pitting 
elementaristic views of the impression formation process against more gestaltic views 
of the same process. However, the two discrepant theoretical frameworks do not seem 
powerful enough to provide an integrated explanation of the majority of the reported 
effects (Brown, 1986). Therefore, an emphasis in the study of the structure of general 
beliefs and expectations about others personality, i.e., the implicit theory of 
personality, and how it can predict the major impression formation effects seems 
more effective in shedding some light on the processes involved in forming 
impressions of personality. 
After Wishner’s (1960) efforts to study the correlations between the personality 
traits and how those correlations could predict effects such as the centrality effect, 
research relying on data reduction techniques such as multidimensional scaling 
(Rosenberg et al., 1968) and cluster analysis (Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Rosenberg & 
Sedlak, 1972) obtained generally convergent results in defining the semantic structure 
underlying impressions of personality. 
Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) developed the idea of mapping the 
multidimensional structure of personality impressions because the evaluative 
dimension did not seem enough to represent the structure of personality impressions 
and, to that date, most studies used only the evaluative dimension to study the 
impression formation processes, accessing it by using likableness ratings (e.g., 
Anderson, 1965, 1967; Fishbein & Hunter, 1964). Plus, using only likableness ratings 
to study the effects Asch obtained using the checklist procedure did not seem enough. 
Therefore, Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) mapped the multidimensional structure 
of personality impressions, providing a geometrical representation of the personality 
traits used in describing people so that the distance between each pair of traits in the 
space of the representation corresponds to the empirical measure of those traits 
psychological relatedness. This psychological relatedness may be either interpreted as 
trait similarity, which should reflect the degree to which two traits can be synonyms, 
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and could be obtained by similarity ratings; or trait co-occurrence, which should 
reflect the degree to which two traits are seen as usually co-occurring in the same 
individual. As the implicit theory of personality is based on the beliefs people have 
about which personality traits usually go together in the same individual, the second 
type of psychological relatedness, based on co-occurrence was more appropriate than 
a simple measure based on trait similarity.  
The procedure used by Rosenberg and colleagues consisted of four steps: 1) 
selection of traits; 2) trait sorting and disassociation measure; 3) trait ratings; and 4) 
multidimensional scaling. First, the traits selected were a total of 64: 11 traits used by 
Asch (1946) and Wishner (1960) to describe the targets, 28 traits used by Asch (1946) 
in the checklists and that Wishner (1960) found to correlate significantly with at least 
one of the previous 11 traits, and 25 other traits chosen to equilibrate the list in terms 
of values on the evaluative dimension. After the traits had been selected, sixty-nine 
participants were asked to sort the selected 64 traits in terms of describing people, this 
is, to sort the traits according to which traits they thought that usually go together in 
the same individual and each trait could not be assigned to more than one person. 
After the sorting of the traits, a disassociation measure was calculated, based on a 
“disagreement score” for each pair of traits, reflecting how many participants 
attributed those two traits to different persons. It should be noted that an “agreement 
score” could also have been used, reflecting how many participants ascribed the pair 
of traits to the same person. A different set of 43 participants was given the list of 64 
traits in one of two random orders and was asked to rate the traits in a seven-point 
scale, in which each extremity could be good-bad, hard-soft, or active-passive. Then, 
using a computer program developed by Kruskal (1964), the traits disposition in space 
was calculated. This program calculates the appropriate dimensionality for a set of 
objects by presenting a one-dimensional solution, a bi-dimensional solution, a tri-
dimensional solution and so on until the fit is satisfactory, i.e. when the measure of 
the goodness of fit, named stress, is as small as possible and it will not change much 
by adding more dimensions. Please note that stress of 0% would denote a perfect 
monotone relationship between the dissimilarity measure used and the distance 
between the objects. According to Kruskal a stress smaller than 10% would be 
satisfactory. Rosenberg and colleagues analysis showed that a bi-dimensional solution 
had a stress of 9% and a tri-dimensional solution had a stress of 6%, with smaller 
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decrements of stress as more dimensions were added. Thus the bi-dimensional 
solution seems a satisfactory one1. By using linear and non-linear multiple-regression 
methods, the axes which correspond to the rated properties (good-bad, hard-soft, or 
active-passive) were located in the trait space. Along each of these axes, the 
correlation between the external ratings and the values of the traits is maximized. 
However, the rated properties could be subject to a different interpretation, since the 
traits seemed to be grouped in terms of social and intellectual desirability. To test this 
alternative interpretation, Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) collected new evaluative 
ratings of the traits in terms of intellectual and social desirability. As predicted, the 
correlations of these two properties with the best-fitting axes were very high (.95 for 
social desirability and .91 for intellectual desirability) which suggests that the two 
properties provide a better interpretation than the previous three properties 
(Rosneberg et al., 1968). However, the two axes corresponding to the social and 
intellectual desirability are not quite at right angles, i.e., they are not orthogonal. This 
nonorthogonality means that the two types of positive (good) evaluation are 
associated and so are the two types of negative (bad) evaluation. Given this lack of 
orthogonality, Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) point to the issue of dealing with 
connotative and denotative meanings and the fact that the denotative meanings of 
social and intellectual may not be independent, as the intellectual traits are relevant to 
some social activities and some social traits may be important for intellectual 
activities. 
The mapping of the implicit theory of personality allows for further 
explanations of the main impression formation effects. For instance, the centrality 
effect can be reanalyzed in light of the multidimensional scaling of the personality 
traits. This is precisely what Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) did (see Figure 1). The 
qualitative impressions formed can hardly be related to the locations of the traits in 
the multidimensional space, but the choices in the checklist traits can easily be related 
to the locations of checklist traits relative to the locations of the presented stimulus 
traits. Thus, the location of the checklist trait pairs most affected by the change of the 
trait warm to the trait cold relative to the location of the presented stimulus may 
clarify the centrality effect. The manipulated traits – warm and cold – are located in a 
                                                        
1 Although Rosenberg and colleagues (1968, p. 291) also analyze the tri-dimensional solution, 
they fail to find three denotative properties in addition to intellectual and social desirability 
found in the bi-dimensional solution. 
 21 
very neutral point of the intellectual dimension but in very polarized locations of the 
social dimension (warm in the positive pole, and cold in the negative pole), whereas 
the other presented stimuli all are located in the positive end of the intellectual 
dimension and relatively neutral to the social dimension. Also, the checklist trait pairs 
which choice is unaffected by the warm-cold manipulation are mainly from the 
positive end of the intellectual dimension. On the other hand, the checklist trait pairs 
which choice is most affected by the warm-cold manipulation are all in the extremes 
of the social dimension. Of course, when the trait included in the description of the 
target belongs to the positive extremity of the social dimension (warm), the chosen 
traits also belong to the positive extremity of the social dimension; and when the trait 
included in the description of the target belongs to the negative extremity of the social 
dimension (cold), the chosen traits also belong to the negative extremity of the social 
dimension. This reanalysis is in line with Wishner’s (1960) suggestion that the 
correlations between the stimulus traits and the checklist traits drive the centrality 
effect. Wishner (1960) also used his correlational method to build new stimulus lists 
and checklists and showed that some of the effects described by Asch could be 
predicted by manipulating only the correlations between presented traits and checklist 
traits. However, the mapping of personality impressions can also be used for the same 
ending, with the advantage that it is a more succinct representation of perceived 
relations between personality traits than the matrix of intercorrelations used by 
Wishner (1960) and that it also contains more information about the traits such as the 
dimension they belong to and their valence, and allows for the immediate choice of 
more polarized or neutral traits for each dimension. Of course that using this 
configurational representation to provide an explanation for the centrality effect 
carries consequences for the definitions of “central trait” and “peripheral trait” 
themselves. According to Asch (1946), the centrality of traits depends on the other 
traits in the stimulus list but some traits are intrinsically central or peripheral; for 
some other authors, the centrality of traits reflects their extremity in a given 
dimension (Hays, 1958; Jackson, 1962). From the placing of the stimulus traits and 
the checklist traits in the bidimensional space of impression formation, the idea that 
the positioning of a trait in a dimension, or its extremity within a dimension, is the 
only factor determining centrality can be ruled out. However, as Rosenberg and 
colleagues (1968) suggest, only systematic selection of stimulus traits based on 
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multidimensional information would allow to clarify the distinctions between the two 
dimensions and the way people use them and the possible connotative meanings when 
forming impressions, and thus clarify what makes a trait more central or peripheral, 
and we would say, which boundaries can be set for effects such as the primacy effect. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The bidimensional representation of the implicit theory of personality, from 
Rosenberg and colleagues (1968). 
 
The mapping of the implicit theory of personality onto a multidimensional space 
makes possible a bypass from the gestaltic-elementaristic discussion to an emphasis 
on the study of the relations between traits and their representation in shared 
multidimensional structures as a way to study how people form impressions of 
personality. Hence the new possibility of understanding how personality traits and 
their relations are represented in the implicit theory of personality opened way to 
explanatory theories focused on the characteristics of the personality traits, such as 
their descriptive or evaluative aspects (Brown, 1986; Peabody, 1967; 1990).  
 
1.5. Descriptive issues and evaluative questions: Consistency of impressions 
A year before the development of the geometric representation of the implicit 
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theory of personality in a bidimensional space, divided in four poles – a social 
positive, a social negative, an intellectual positive, and an intellectual negative – by 
Rosenberg and colleagues (1968), Dean Peabody proposed a model to explain the 
interaction of evaluative and descriptive aspects of the personality traits and how it 
influences trait inferences and, consequently, impression formation. 
Contrary to Asch (1946) and Anderson (1965; 1967), Peabody (1967; 1970) 
decided to put aside the question about how information about others is integrated in 
order to form an impression of personality to focus on a more primary issue: how 
evaluative and descriptive characteristics of the traits account for inferences from 
single traits. This primary question assumes special relevance if we consider that the 
impression formation process is mainly an inferential process (e.g., Brown, 1986). 
However, Peabody’s main goal was more specific than generally characterizing the 
impression formation processing. His principal question was if evaluation was the 
most important aspect in judgment. Many studies had focused on the importance of 
evaluation for the judgments of adjectives or targets described by sets of adjectives 
and pointed to a major role of the consistence of evaluation when forming 
impressions about someone’s personality (e.g., Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; 
Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Rosenberg & Abelson, 1960; Podell, 1961). 
Besides these studies, some other studies on impression formation implied only rating 
targets or traits in evaluative scales of good-bad (e.g. Anderson, 1962). Thus Peabody 
(1967) conceived a study to assess the importance of evaluative and descriptive 
aspects of personality traits in a task of trait inference, which seems to be a more 
appropriate task to test impressions of personality if the traits are not independent, as 
Asch (1946) suggested. In order to assess these two different aspects of the traits, 
Peabody removed the usual confounding between evaluative and descriptive 
similarity of traits. To do so, he created sets of traits (usually four traits, if all the 
attempted separation between descriptive and evaluative similarity was achieved) in 
which the comparison between each pair could lead to these types of pairs: same 
descriptive meaning, different evaluative meaning; or different descriptive meaning, 
same evaluative meaning; given that the evaluative meaning could be positive or 
negative. But if the two opposites of evaluative meaning are clearly defined as 
positive and negative, the descriptive meaning of the traits deserves further 
explanation. The two opposites of descriptive meaning involve a low level and a high 
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level – as an example, the descriptive meaning “risk taking” at its low level will 
comprise the traits cautious and timid, and at its high level, the traits bold and rash. 
Then, in a clever way to test if the inferences that people usually make when forming 
impressions are more dominated by the evaluative characteristics of the traits or by 
their descriptive characteristics, Peabody gave participants a certain trait and asked 
them to rate how likely someone who possessed that trait was to possess one of two 
other traits that were either descriptively similar (same level) but evaluatively 
dissimilar, or evaluatively similar but descriptively dissimilar (different levels) to the 
given trait. This rating was made in a seven point rating scale, in which the test-traits 
were the two alternative ends. For example, consider the trait cautious. The trait rash 
is evaluatively dissimilar and also descriptively dissimilar, but the trait timid is 
descriptively similar but evaluatively dissimilar, whereas the trait bold is descriptively 
dissimilar but evaluatively similar. Thus, if we want to oppose evaluative similarity to 
descriptive similarity, we can ask if someone who is cautious will be more timid or 
bold. If participants infer that someone cautious is more bold than timid, they are 
making inferences based on evaluative similarity, as was suggested by some previous 
studies; however, if participants infer that someone cautious is more timid than bold, 
they are making inferences based on descriptive similarity. The results obtained 
showed that participants tend to preserve the descriptive consistency in detriment of 
the evaluative consistency and thus inferences from positive traits were toward 
negative traits and inferences from negative traits were toward positive traits, as long 
as the descriptive characteristic was maintained. So, participants inferred toward 
descriptive similarity and away from evaluative similarity.  
Given these results, Peabody (1967) also performed a factor analysis of the 
correlations between the trait inferences and found that the descriptive characteristic 
was the determinant factor. Taken together, these results suggest that similarity of 
description is the main variable affecting trait inferences and that evaluation is 
typically based on a descriptive judgment of the degree of extremeness. So, Peadody 
developed a model that implies that any judgment should be analyzed in two parts: 
first, a specific descriptive judgment, that entails locating the target on the relevant 
implicit scale; and, second, a general rule relating the previous descriptive judgment 
to evaluation, entailing the location of the criterion in the implicit scale. In the 90s, 
Peabody wrote a comprehensive chapter about the role of evaluation in impression 
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formation and depicted a clearer view of his theory, in opposition to Roger Brown’s 
(1986) evaluative consistency theory. We will get to a more detailed description of 
Peabody’s theory and how it explains Asch’s (1946) effects after describing Brown’s 
ideas on impression formation. 
 Roger Brown (1986) did not ignore the debate about information integration in 
forming impressions of personality, but rather solved that issue by simply assuming 
that information integration meant going beyond the information given and thus 
inferring. This idea seems even congruent with Asch’s view that very few words 
about someone are enough to tell us a whole story (Brown, 1986, p. 387). So, the 
main question should be what determines the most preferred inferences people make 
when forming impressions of personality. After analyzing Asch’s results (1946, Exp. 
1), Brown noticed that participants tended to either choose only positive (desirable) or 
only negative (undesirable) traits, i.e., if someone was thought of as being honest, that 
person was also thought of as being happy, important, and even good-looking; on the 
other hand, if someone was thought of as being dishonest, they should also be thought 
of as being unhappy or irritable. In sum, good qualities were combined with good 
qualities and bad qualities with bad qualities. This evidence that people tend to infer 
that all good qualities occur together in real persons and that all bad qualities also 
occur together is also supported by different studies using trait to trait inferences 
(Bruner et al.,1958), using ratings of real persons (Passini & Norman, 1966), or even 
in the previously referred studies trying to map the structure of the impressions of 
personality and which had showed the existence of an evaluative dimension 
(Rosenberg et al., 1968). These different sets of results lead Brown (1965; 1986) to 
think that some type of evaluative consistency is the main principle of inference. 
Evaluative consistency is a very important notion in many Social Psychology theories 
and studies (e.g. Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; Rosenberg et al., 1968; Chaiken & 
Baldwin, 1981; Chaiken & Yates, 1985) and was devised as an axiom of human 
thought by Fritz Heider (1946), in his theory of attitude change, the Balance Theory, 
according to which evaluative consistency drives the attitudinal change toward 
psychological balance. As stated by Brown (1986) the clearest aspect of evaluative 
consistency is that people act as if they really believed in it. This characteristic of 
evaluative consistency is clear in the implicit theory of personality – people actually 
tend to think that good traits usually go together in the same person and also that bad 
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traits go together in the same person, as we can see in Rosenberg and colleagues’ 
(1968) bidimensional representation of the structure of the implicit theory of 
personality. 
The Evaluative Consistency theory is depicted by Brown (1986) as the 
simplest Implicit Personality theory, influencing our beliefs about which personality 
traits co-occur and explaining why we feel that evaluative inconsistency is surprising 
and hardly explainable. This theory would be in accordance with Asch’s (1946) 
effects, showing that personality impressions are triggered by very little bits of 
information but progress toward completeness according to principles of consistence 
(e.g. primacy effect). The simplicity of this theory is clear as it states that we make 
inferences that maximize the evaluative consistency relative to the first pieces of 
information we received. Thus, if we are presented with positive information about a 
target we tend to infer and accept more easily more positive information about that 
same target, and if we receive negative information about a target we tend to infer and 
accept more easily more negative information about that target. Let us now see how 
this theory can be applied to the centrality and primacy effects in impression 
formation (Asch, 1946).  
The Evaluative Consistency Theory borrows from Peabody (1967) the notion 
that there are usually two levels of descriptive meanings and two types of evaluative 
meanings for each general descriptive meaning but, in certain cases, the low level of 
the descriptive meaning is coincident with the negative evaluative meaning and the 
high level of the descriptive meaning coincides with the positive evaluative meaning 
(see Figure 2). For instance let us consider the descriptive domain “Intellectual 
capacity”, at the low level meaning we have the trait stupid and at the high level 
meaning we have the trait intelligent, however, the evaluative meaning of these traits 
is confounded with their descriptive meaning, as intelligent is positive and stupid is 
negative, but we cannot find a trait at the low level with a positive meaning or at the 
high level with a negative meaning. As Brown (1986) refers it is not only the words 
that are missing but the concepts themselves as it is very difficult to think of a 
positive evaluation of a trait at the low level of intellectual capacity. These descriptive 
domains that do not allow for the complete set of four traits with all the combinations 
of two descriptive meanings by two evaluative meanings are important to understand 
the primacy effect (Asch, 1946), because part of the presented list was composed of 
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those traits. Asch presented a group of participants with the list “intelligent – 
industrious – impulsive – critical – stubborn – envious” and another group with 
exactly the same traits but in reversed order. The traits in the extremity of the list – 
“intelligent – industrious – envious” – are traits belonging to descriptive domains that 
allow only for sets of two traits, and thus they only have one positive or negative 
evaluation – intelligent or industrious cannot be thought of as being negative and 
envious cannot be thought of as being positive. On the other hand, impulsive can 
either mean “spontaneous” (positive) or “reckless” (negative); critical can either be 
“fault-finding” (negative) or “discriminating” (positive); and stubborn can either 
mean “obstinate” (negative) or “resolute” (positive). If we suppose that the end traits 
of the list and that do not accept a different evaluative meaning select the meanings of 
the traits that allow two evaluative meanings, in order to maximize the evaluative 
consistency with their uninfluenceable evaluative meaning, we would obtain the 
following integrated impression if we started with the trait intelligent: “intelligent – 
industrious – spontaneous – discriminating – resolute – envious”; and, if we started 
with the trait envious: “envious – obstinate – fault-finding – reckless – industrious – 
intelligent”. Of course, the two impressions are very different, with the first one being 
much more favorable than the second. Logically, the integrated impression does not 
show perfect evaluative consistency because of the end terms that maintain their 
meaning no matter which are the other accompanying traits, and must be somehow 
integrated in the final impression. According to Brown (1986), two types of 
integration must occur in Asch’s primacy experiments. First, participants must go 
beyond the information given, they must infer traits guided by the presented traits. 
These inferences may be based on simple associations. After making inferences, a 
second type of integration comes to play a role – the selection of evaluative meanings 
for the traits that allow the two types of evaluative meanings. These types of 
integration that Brown (1986, p.405) called “going beyond and fitting together” 
should be guided by the implicit theory of personality, which means that, for Brown 
(1986), evaluative consistency guides the two types of integration. Thus, the primacy 
effect occurs because the early traits select the meanings for the later traits in 
accordance with the evaluative consistency, expected according to the implicit theory 
of personality. 
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FULL SETS WITH FOUR MEANINGS 
 
Descriptive Meaning: Control of Impulse (impulsive) 
High                                      Low 
Evaluative 
Meaning 
+ Resolute Spontaneous 
- Inhibited Reckless 
 
Descriptive Meaning: Inclination to criticize (critical) 
High                                      Low 
Evaluative 
Meaning 
+ Discriminating Tolerant 
- Fault finding Undiscriminating 
 
Descriptive Meaning: Mental Changeability (stubborn) 
High                                      Low 
Evaluative 
Meaning 
+ Flexible Resolute 
- Vacillating Obstinate 
INCOMPLETE SETS WITH TWO MEANINGS 
 
Descriptive Meaning: Intellectual Capacity (intelligent) 
High                                      Low 
Evaluative 
Meaning 
+ Intelligent Stupid 
- ----- ----- 
 
Descriptive Meaning: Habitual Work Level (industrious) 
High                                      Low 
Evaluative 
Meaning 
+ Industrious ----- 
- ----- Lazy 
 
Descriptive Meaning: Temperament 
High                                      Low 
Evaluative 
Meaning 
+ Warm ----- 
- ----- Cold 
 
Figure 2. Descriptive and evaluative meanings of personality traits (adapted from Brown, 1986; 
pp. 403). 
 
 
In what concerns the centrality effect, Brown (1986) uses the Evaluative 
consistency theory, but borrows the multidimensional structure of impression 
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formation from Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) to explain it. Basically all the 
stimulus traits constant across Asch’s conditions are located in the good-intellectual 
pole of the representation and thus are neutral in what concerns the social dimension; 
however, the changing traits warm and cold are located in the opposite poles of the 
social dimension. This means that within the provided description of the target, warm 
and cold provide almost the only information on the social evaluation of the target, 
and this information is highly contrasting if we consider the inclusion of the positive 
trait warm or the negative trait cold. Thus, the integration of information will reflect 
inferences about the social desirability of the target that are in accordance with the 
evaluation of the presented social trait – warm or cold – and these inferences will 
again reflect a maximization of the evaluative consistency.  
Given this reinterpretation of the centrality and the primacy effects, Brown 
(1986) assumes that they are the same, in the sense that they reflect the same type of 
process, i.e. the same type of integration of information, obeying to the maximization 
of the evaluative consistency. Brown (1986) also argues that in both effects there are 
some traits that weight more than the others in the final impression either because 
they represent unique evaluative information about a given dimension (centrality 
effect) or because their descriptive meaning is confounded with their evaluative 
meaning and thus they cannot be reinterpreted. This theory of Evaluative Consistency 
reflects a very clever way to articulate the implicit theory of personality and its 
geometrical representation (Rosenberg et al., 1968) with Peabody’s (1967) theory in 
order to explain the main effects obtained by Asch (1946). However, the idea that 
centrality and primacy are the same and reflect the same process can be challenged, as 
well as the Evaluative Consistency theory itself. And it was exactly what Peabody did 
in 1990. 
Returning to his idea that the descriptive meaning is more important than 
evaluation for forming impressions of personality, Peabody (1990) challenged once 
again Brown’s Evaluative Consistency theory and restated clearly why he thinks 
Brown’s theory is wrong. However, it should be noted, that contrary to what Peabody 
advocated in his 1967 paper but consistent with his 1970 work, he now acknowledges 
the importance of evaluation as a factor in impression formation, just does not see it 
as the decisive factor or the determinant. Peabody (1990) restates the four principles 
of his “descriptive evaluative theory”: 1) judgments of traits combine descriptive and 
 30 
evaluative meanings, as referred earlier; 2) there are determinants of trait judgments, 
which are their specific descriptive meaning and determine the direction of the 
judgment, and there are factors that abridge the relations between trait judgments, one 
of which is the general evaluation of the traits involved; 3) the descriptive meanings 
of traits have larger effects than their evaluative meanings, but evaluative meanings 
have insidious and general effects; and 4) the usual factors combine evaluative and 
descriptive meanings, and the two most important in Asch’s (1946) studies are 
conscientciousness, concerning “conscientious performance”, and agreeableness, 
concerning “interpersonal traits involving affiliation”.  Given these four principles, it 
is possible to compare how Peabody’s theory opposes to Brown’s theory in the 
prediction/explanation of Asch’s effects. Basically, Peabody (1990) explains primacy 
as a change of meaning of the later traits in the stimulus list, just like Brown (1986) 
did, but a change of descriptive meaning and not evaluative meaning. This 
assumption is supported by Asch’s (1946) participants’ comments who felt the need 
to comment on traits like “stubborn” or “impulsive”, which Brown (1986) assumed 
were changed into the trait with consistent evaluative meaning.  
The centrality effect gives Peabody a better opportunity to contradict the 
Evaluative Consistency theory, in the sense that even Brown (1986) had some trouble 
explaining it using only the evaluative consistency and had to apply the notion of two 
different dimensions (social and intellectual) used by Rosenberg and colleagues 
(1968) in their multidimensional representation of the implicit theory of personality. 
For Peabody (1990), the explanation of the centrality effect is simply that the traits 
warm and cold are the only stimulus traits related to some of the checklist traits, as 
they are the only stimulus traits concerning agreeableness and thus they will be the 
only traits influencing the descriptive meaning chosen for those traits in the checklist 
that also concern agreeableness. This explanation is not different from Rosenberg and 
colleagues’ (1968) explanation but Peabody emphasizes that the depiction of an 
“Intellectual Good-Bad” dimension can be misleading as it accentuates the 
intelligence traits but it is supposed to represent the “conscientiousness” traits, and 
that the “Social Good-Bad” dimension actually represents “agreeableness”. A more 
direct evaluation of the Evaluative Consistency theory is given by Asch (1946) 
himself who noted that the results of the experiment were not evaluatively consistent, 
in the sense that only the social traits were affected by the warm-cold manipulation 
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and that, when the trait included was cold, the evaluation of more “intellectual” 
characteristics was still positive.  
Finally, Peabody demonstrates how his theory alternative to Brown’s (1986) 
theory can be applied to the change of meaning effect (Asch, 1946). By changing the 
accompanying stimulus traits of the traits warm or cold, Asch (1946, exp. 4) found 
that warm was a bit changed when accompanied by traits reflecting less social 
positive characteristics, such as “obedient” or “vain”; warm suffered an even bigger 
change when accompanied by more extreme social negative traits, such as 
“unscrupulous” or “envious”; cold suffered a big change when accompanied by social 
positive traits, such as “helpful” or “modest”; and finally, cold was not changed when 
accompanied by positive non-social traits (Asch, 1946, exp.1). According to the 
Evaluative Consistency theory, these changes occurred because the accompanying 
traits had the opposite evaluative meaning of the traits warm or cold. However, for the 
alternative theory proposed by Peabody, the change of the trait warm would occur 
because the accompanying traits depicted the descriptive meaning cold and vice-
versa. To directly assess this idea, Peabody (1990) asked 28 participants to make 
inferences about the stimulus traits used by Asch (1946) by rating them in a warm-
cold scale. He found that for the traits used in the description that promoted the 
biggest change of meaning of warm, 87% of the participants inferred cold whereas 
that for the traits used in the description that promoted a small change of meaning of 
warm, only 59% of the participants inferred cold; for the traits used in the description 
that promoted a big change of meaning of cold, 82% of the participants inferred warm 
and for traits used in the description that did not promote a change of meaning of 
cold, only 48% of the participants inferred warm. Peabody (1990) then takes these 
results as direct evidence against the Evaluative Consistency theory and supporting 
his alternative theory, according to which the descriptive meanings of traits are their 
most relevant characteristic for the inferential process implied in impression 
formation. 
The debate about the relative importance of the descriptive and the evaluative 
characteristics of personality traits for impression formation does not seem to be 
easily won by any of the positions. Actually, both theories can only account for all the 
major classical effects (Asch, 1946) if they consider aspects from the opposite theory. 
Again, it seems the best solution is to look at the mapping of the implicit theory of 
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personality which considers two dimensions and two opposite valences for 
personality triats, with a total of four possible combinations (Rosenberg et al., 1968). 
Moreover, in a recent study, Hampson (1998) actually showed that the way people 
integrate information about others personality relies more on evaluative aspects if 
they are in a personality description task, but if they are in an impression formation 
task they will rely more on the descriptive aspects. This study supports the idea that it 
is reasonable to divide the meaning of personality traits in evaluative and descriptive 
aspects but their differential use is flexible, depending on situational constraints of the 
task. 
 
1.6. Summary: An integrated impression of an impression 
Impressions of personality play an important role in everyone’s everyday life. 
Social interaction occurs everyday and forming impressions of personality is what 
guides social behavior, determining the way we relate to other people. To be an 
efficient process, forming impressions of personality must occur automatically in 
absence of detailed information and, more importantly, must be memory-based, so 
congruence between the ways different impressions are achieved is satisfied. 
However, the study of impressions formation revealed different theories about this 
relatively common process.  
Since 1920, researchers started to worry about impression formation (e.g., 
Thorndike, 1920), focusing on the relation between the impressions formed and the 
actual personality of the target and how accurate the impressions formed were. After 
this emphasis on accuracy, Asch, in 1946, set a new trend on the research about 
impression formation emphasizing the importance of the processes involved. Asch 
(1946) conceptualized the impressions of personality as gestaltic representations, i.e., 
unified and integrated representations about someone’s personality. In opposition to 
Asch’s view of the impression formation as the extraction of a gestaltic pattern, 
Anderson (1965; 1967) conceived the impression formation process as the application 
of algebraic rules in order to combine the provided personality traits and thus form an 
integrated impression.  
With a different perspective, Bruner and colleagues (1954; 1958) developed the 
notion of implicit theory of personality, and tried to find the structure reflecting 
commons beliefs about personality traits and their co-occurrence and that is supposed 
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to guide the impression formation process. Bruner and his colleagues were also the 
precursors of the mapping of the underlying structure of impressions of personality in 
spatial representations that consider not only the characteristics of the personality 
traits but also their distance reflecting their likelihood of co-occurring (Rosenberg et 
al., 1968). It is also worth mention that, with the development of Social Cognition, the 
organization of information in impression formation and the study of memory 
processes also contributed to the development of models of impression formation 
which emphasize the cognitive aspects of impression formation (Hamilton, 1989). In 
this later approach, many authors developed person memory models trying to explain 
how information about persons, behaviors, and personality traits is encoded, stored, 
organized, and retrieved (e.g., HAM; Anderson & Bower, 1973; Hastie-Srull model; 
Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Hastie, 1980; Srull, 1981; or TRAP model (Garcia-Marques 
& Hamilton, 1996). However, we did not review these later models because they are 
beyond the scope of the present work. We are more interested in the main effects 
found in impression formation by Asch (1946), specially the centrality and the 
primacy effects and the way the structure of the implicit theory of personality can 
inform those effects as well as the processes involved in impression formation. This 
is, we are interested in the contribution of memory processes and the impact of 
organization of information in memory on the referred classic impression formation 
effects. 
To understand the importance of memory processes and organization in 
impression formation, we must consider that it is possible to identify a structure 
underlying impressions (Bruner et al., 1954; 1958). And it seems safe to assume the 
existence of this type of structure as many studies supported it: research relying on 
data reduction techniques such as multidimensional scaling and cluster analysis 
(Rosenberg et al., 1968; Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972). This 
structure can be conceived as a bi-dimensional semantic space formed by two largely 
independent denotative dimensions – one intellectual and one social; and two 
evaluative poles for each dimension – one positive and one negative. Thus, it can be 
identified four clearly differentiable clusters: a social positive, a social negative, an 
intellectual positive, and an intellectual negative.  
But why do we think that this structure is a semantic memory structure subject 
to the same flexibility and biases of other semantic memory structures? Of major 
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importance is the evidence suggesting that the recruitment of the semantic structure 
underlying impressions of personality is conditional to impression formation and that 
this process carries reliable mnemonic consequences. For example, Hamilton, Katz, 
and Leirer (1980) have shown that when forming impressions about a target described 
in several sentences illustrating different traits, participants (relative to controls 
instructed to simply memorize the same information) perform better at recall and 
exhibit higher clustering of the behaviors that illustrate the same traits.  Hamilton and 
colleagues (1980) thus propose that, when forming an impression of personality, 
individuals try to organize the relevant information in terms of which “personality-
relevant themes” are implied by that information and then organize the traits and 
behaviors implied by the information under the labels of those personality-relevant 
themes. Thus, this hypothesis is in accordance with the existence of an implicit theory 
of personality (Bruner et al., 1958) that functions as a memory structure recruited 
every time someone has to form an impression of personality and that guides the 
process of forming the impression and the inferences made when individuals go 
beyond the given information.  
If we assume that the characteristics of this memory structure of impressions 
can explain some of the classic effects found in impression formation, we can also 
assume that it is prone to the same errors that other memory structures. Moreover, we 
can assume that some of those memory errors are related or even responsible for 
effects such as the centrality or the primacy effects. Also, as a memory structure with 
socially relevant content, the implicit theory of personality should be specially prone 
to the effects of social transmission of information. This is, when information about 
someone’s personality is conveyed from person to person, that information should be 
changed in a way that reflects the organization of personality traits in memory and 
that exacerbates the usual individual memory errors and biases in impression 
formation. We will deepen these questions when we present the hypothesis of the 
present study but let us now focus on the processes involved in transmitting 
information serially between persons and the main changes to the original 
information. 
 
2. SERIAL REPRODUCTION 
As we have been discussing, it seems that the way we form impressions about 
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other persons’ personality is grounded in a shared structure in which information 
about personality is represented. This structure has been called the implicit theory of 
personality and represents the general beliefs that lead people’s impression formation 
process. The spatial representation of this implicit theory of personality is 
multidimensional and implies two different dimensions (social and intellectual) and 
valences (positive and negative) (Rosenberg et al., 1968). If we agree that the implicit 
theory of personality exists and it represents the shared beliefs about which 
personality traits usually go together in the same person, it seems interesting to think 
about what should occur when information concerning impressions of personality is 
transmitted socially. Which changes will the information suffer after being 
transmitted across a few social links? If any, will these changes approximate the final 
impression to the general configuration of the implicit theory of personality or, on the 
other hand, will they make the final impression depart from the general implicit 
theory? These questions are particularly relevant if we think the implicit theory of 
personality as a script (Schank and Abelson, 1977) that gets active not only when 
there is the need or goal to integrate information about people but also when there is 
the goal to communicate and socially transmit that information. Thus, we believe that 
the implicit theory of personality and its organization is specially suited for 
communication purposes and it seems interesting to analyzing the transformation it 
suffers during its spreading. 
One of the ways information spreads in society is as rumor. Thus it is not 
surprising that rumor has been one of the preferred forms of transmitted information 
studied. Allport and Postman’s book The Psychology of Rumor (1947) is the precursor 
of this tendency and already comprises a good review of many studies exploring the 
social transmission of information and explores the importance of studying rumor 
spreading. 
However, the origin of studies exploring “transmission of information” can be 
traced back to Bartlett’s (1932) study on serial reproduction. Serial reproduction is a 
technique involving a series of participants recalling information, but with each 
participant studying the previous participant’s recall and not the original piece of 
information presented. This procedure basically resembles the children’s game 
“telephone”. Bartlett (1932) was interested in the social spawn of ideas and which 
changes occur over successive transmissions, but he was also interested in studying 
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how individual memories change when the same person repeatedly recalls the same 
information. The possibility of comparing the effects of serial reproduction (across 
social links) of socially relevant information, such as personality traits, with repeated 
reproduction (within the same person) of the same type of information may inform us 
about the inferences about personality traits and the impression formation process. 
However, as we will further discuss, Bartlett (1932) did not provide a direct way of 
comparing serial reproduction with repeated reproduction, and only in 2009, 
Roediger, Meade, Gallo, and Olson devised an ingenious procedure to directly 
compare the two types of information recall. 
In the following pages we will review some of the work on rumor and 
summarize Bartlett’s work on serial reproduction. Then, we will summarize how 
Roediger and his students’s (2009) ingeniously created a procedure that allows for the 
direct comparison between serial reproduction and repeated reproduction, i.e., 
provides a direct comparison between the changes information suffers when it is 
repeatedly retrieved by the same individuals and the changes information suffers 
when it is serially repeated by different individuals. This procedure is especially 
important because it provides a clarification of how individual memory biases are 
combined in serial reproduction, resulting in distorted memory. Later, the way this 
procedure can be combined with the study of impressions of personality to gather 
more information about the importance of the implicit theory of personality and the 
relevance of the bidimensional representation of its structure will be more thoroughly 
explored, as it is subject of one of the experiments conducted by us. Finally, the latest 
studies in serial reproduction (e.g., Bangerter, 2000; Barrett & Nyhof, 2001), and a 
Bayesian model used to account the main serial reproduction results (Xu & Griffiths, 
2010) will be discussed.  
 
2.1. Rumor and gossip: From wartime to everyday life 
Allport and Postman (1947, p.ix) defined rumor as a “specific (or topical) 
proposition for belief, passed along from person to person, usually by word of mouth, 
without secure standard of evidence being present”. As proposition for belief, the 
rumor always implies that some type of truthful information is being conveyed and 
this occurs even if no secure evidences are presented to support the information. More 
relevant to our studies, is the idea that rumors are passed from person to person and 
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the usual mean is word of mouth, which calls attention to the social aspects of rumor. 
The problem of rumor became a serious issue in the 40s as the Second World 
War was spreading across countries and oceans. From the American losses in Pearl 
Harbor to the fall of Germany and Hitler’s death, rumors seemed to spread faster than 
news. The first ones can be classified as fear or “bogy” rumors and the later as “pipe 
dream” rumors (Allport & Postman, 1947). Of course they occurred in different times 
of the war and reflected the general social atmosphere people were living in. Another 
type of rumors was the hate rumors, which reflected hostility against a certain group, 
and could be harmful to the national identity in times of war as they were based on 
stereotypes (Allport & Postman, 1947). There was also a small group of rumors that 
could be called “curiosity” rumors and were usually pseudo-news exploring possible 
occurrences but that lacked security of information (Allport & Postman, 1947).  
Allport and Postman cite a 1942 study, conducted by Ruch and Young, which 
measured the spread and acceptance of rumor during wartime. This study found that 
rumors circulated and were accepted differently across cities, social groups, economic 
statuses, and age groups. Of course, it provided important data for the government to 
create anti-rumor measures, but what is more relevant from this study is that it lead to 
the question of why and how rumors spread, if they affect people differently. And the 
mechanisms of rumor spreading should be similar if they refer to wartime rumors or 
to simple gossipy everyday life rumors. 
There seems to be two essential conditions for rumor to spread: importance and 
ambiguity. First, a rumor must be of some importance to the speaker and to the 
listener, so the speaker has the urge to tell the information and the listener will pay 
attention to it and later retell the information. Then, the provided information must be 
somehow ambiguous, a property that can be induced by the absence or haziness of 
news, by conflicting nature of the news, or by some factor that makes the individual 
distrust or question the news (Allport & Postman, 1947). Thus, the amount of rumor 
in circulation will be a byproduct of the importance of the subject to the individuals 
concerned and the ambiguity of the evidence relevant to the subject. Then, this basic 
law of rumor can be seen as the multiplication of the importance by the ambiguity 
(Allport & Postman, 1947). Please note that if either the importance or the ambiguity 
is inexistent, there is no rumor. Of course, these two factors imply that the rumor 
needs a motivational factor in order to occur. This motivation can be one of 
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explaining, justify, or relieve some social condition; on the other hand, if we are 
talking about simple gossip, the motivation can be only the simple desire to know. 
Any of these needs are a mere reflection of a simplest need of extracting meaning 
from our environment, a simple need for closure (Allport & Postman, 1947). Finally, 
the role of expectancy in rumor spreading must be considered, as Allport and Postman 
suggest (1947), the rumors are more inflated when the individuals are expecting a 
related event to occur, which usually occurs after a long wait and the rumor will 
reflect the individuals’ “goal gradient”. These specific “goal gradient rumors” can be 
seen as a simple product of expectancy but do not violate the previously stated 
conditions for a rumor to occur. However, these rumors can be more easily related to 
everyday life situations and even to perceptual illusions, like when we think we have 
heard the telephone ringing when we are anxiously anticipating a phone call. 
But how can we more directly relate rumor to the social transmission of 
information? First, it takes at least two people to make a rumor and then, usually 
rumor spreads in a chain of successive individuals. The cognitive operations going on 
in each individual’s mind are responsible for the construction and spawning of the 
rumor, and thus we must understand those individual operations to understand the 
rumor chain (Allport & Postman, 1947). So, even before taking into account the serial 
reproduction of rumor (between indidividuals) one must pay attention to the basic 
patterns of “perception-retention-report” as they occur at the individual level. These 
patterns reflect how information is encoded, depending on the type of information and 
the situational constraints and how it will be later recovered, as what occurs in typical 
memory experiments. As Stern (cited by Allport & Postman, 1947) already pointed, 
the ability to report information is affected by errors such as distortions and omissions 
that seem to occur already during the original perception of an episode or even an 
image. On the other hand, commission errors may also occur, either by remembering 
information not presented (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Deese, 1959) or by changing the 
presented information (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Loftus & Palmer, 1974). These 
commission errors usually reflect the associative properties of the presented 
information or some schemas associated to the information (e.g., Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995; Bransford & Franks, 1971). These commission errors are specially 
relevant if one intends to analyze the structure of information and its impact on 
recovery of information and thus we will dedicate the next section to fully discuss 
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these errors, the main paradigms used to study them and the theoretical implications 
of the main results. For now, just bear in mind that the individual processes leading to 
testimony or memory errors are implied in rumor transmission, with the aggravating 
characteristic of being repeated throughout each link in the social chain implied. As 
Allport and Postman (1947) state, the three steps in testimony – perceiving, 
remembering, and reporting – are the same steps in rumor transmission, with the 
difference that in rumor transmission, these steps occur repeatedly throughout the 
rumor chain and perceiving is progressively reduced, as after the first link it becomes 
only a listening of hearsay. All these steps are, in each individual, influenced by their 
attitudes, expectancies and beliefs, conveying remembering a constructive 
characteristic rather than a simple reproductive function (Bartlett, 1932). 
Given the referred characteristics of rumor, the paradigm generally used to 
study rumor in the lab is adapted from the one used to test memory, and implies 
presenting information to an individual and asking them to later reproduce that 
information; each individual’s report is then used as the information presented to the 
following individuals – the serial reproduction of information (Bartlett, 1932). Of 
course this is not the ideal situation to study rumor as it does not preserve some 
naturalistic conditions, but these laboratory experiments seemed to elicit all the basic 
phenomena in rumor spreading (Allport & Postman, 1947). In the experiments 
conducted by Allport and Postman (1947), the information presented to the first link 
consisted of a picture depicting an episode, then this first linked had to describe the 
picture without seeing it to the second link, and the second link had to pass the 
description to the third link and so on until the last link. The progression of the 
descriptions and their departure from the initial picture were analyzed(see Figure 3 for 
an example of one of the scenes used and a description of that same scene by one of 
the latest links in a serial reproduction chain). The results obtained pointed to a 
shortening of the description, with the details recalled decaying more sharply at the 
beginning of the series of reproductions and continuing to decline, more slowly, until 
the last description. Actually, about 70% of the details are eliminated throughout five 
or six links. However, the last descriptions show some tendency to stabilize which 
indicates that a more concise report is more likely to be correctly reproduced, and as 
the report gets shorter there are fewer details that can be distorted and the task gets 
easier. Usually, the omitted details are the ones that do not convey meaning, showing 
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that the pattern of omissions does not occur in a random fashion but is guided by 
some structure imposition. There is also selective perception, retention and reporting 
of a limited number of details from the picture or the descriptions, which can be 
called sharpening. Sharpening makes some odd characteristics to be preserved 
throughout the descriptions as they catch attention, even if they are not the most 
important details to retell the episode. This sharpening may also occur as an 
exaggeration of some characteristics of the picture or the descriptions, as movement 
or size of certain details. A very important form of sharpening is closure, which 
reflects the need of the perceiver to achieve a description as coherent and meaningful 
as possible. The need for closure reflects the already referred gestaltic principle of 
integrating information to make it meaningful and complete. The errors due to closure 
usually take place in the first link’s description and are maintained throughout the 
chain (Allport & Postman, 1947). Also based on gestaltic principles is the 
assimilation process by which the information becomes progressively more coherent 
with the “good gestalt”. This can be achieved by subtly changing the information to 
be accommodated to a previous structure, to a set of expectations, or to be the most 
coherent possibly with the central theme of the episode (Allport & Postman, 1947). 
Please note that the previous structure can be a cognitive schema, a stereotype, or 
even the implicit theory of personality. Also worth of mention is the maintenance of 
the core theme of the episode and that had already been reported by Hartgenbusch 
(cited by Allport & Postman, 1947), who showed that the central theme was resistant 
to change with different types of materials and across different levels of education and 
age. 
 
 
This takes place on a street 
corner. Something is happening. 
There is a Negro with a razor, a 
man with a beard, two women 
reading newspapers and not 
particularly interested in what is 
happening. 
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Figure 3. Original picture of the “subway scene” used by Allport and Postman (1947) to test the 
serial reproduction/social transmission of information (left) and description of the same scene 
by one of the last links on a serial reproduction chain (right; Allport & Postman, 1947; p. 70). 
 
The abovementioned set of results lead Allport and Postman (1947) to 
characterize the basic pattern of distortion that occurs in rumor spreading. According 
to them, the descriptions of the pictures were leveled, sharpened, and assimilated. The 
leveling is the omission of many details that were essential for a true understanding of 
the episode. On the other hand, the sharpening is the emphasizing of some details of 
the episode that should not be given such relevance. Finally, assimilation is basically 
the process guiding leveling and sharpening, as they occur in conformity with past 
experience, pre-existent structures, or expectancies and beliefs. This basic pattern of 
distortion can also be applied to the results found earlier by Bartlett (1932), who was 
more interested in studying memory and the social transmission of ideas than 
specifically studying rumor but was the one who created the serial reproduction 
technique borrowed by Allport and Postman (1947). 
 
2.2. Before and beyond rumor: Biases in serial and repeated reproduction   
Perhaps the serial reproduction experiments got famous because of Allport and 
Postman book The Psychology of Rumor (1947) but it was Sir Frederic Bartlett (1932) 
the one who conducted the first experiments using the serial reproduction paradigm. 
Bartlett was interested in studying the social transmission of information and how 
memory biases shape it over successive transmissions. Most of Bartlett’s (1932) 
research shows the reconstructive nature of memory, pointing that individuals’ 
memory is not a film where the reality is captured and then reproduced whenever it is 
needed but instead a canvas where perceptions are changed even before their 
encoding and which reproduction also suffers reconstruction. The reconstructive 
process by which remembering occurs is thus influenced by prior experience, 
expectations, cultural conventions, and other factors external to the stimuli 
themselves. Actually, Bartlett (1932) conceptualizes theses biases as resulting from 
the “effort after meaning”, which is a tendency of the mind to reshape all the 
experiences and perceptions into meaningful experiences and categorize them in a 
way that is congruent with previous schemata. Thus, memories are the result of the 
individual’s effort to integrate information is their previous mental schemes and to 
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make sense of the world. The result of this may be the existence of false memories, 
but those are the adaptive way to deal with and make sense of reality. But we will 
dedicate the following chapter to review this concept of false memories and how it 
can be applied to impression formation and its importance for the serial reproduction 
of information. For now, let us just lightly approach the repeated reproduction 
paradigm (Bartlett, 1932) and the derived individual memory biases to make sense of 
the serial reproduction paradigm and theories, and focus on the later one. 
Bartlett (1932) started by giving different participants various types of material: 
two folk tales; passages describing a cricket match, an air raid, and how to play 
tennis; a joke; two arguments; or a series of pictures. Then, at various time intervals, 
he asked participants to reproduce as accurately as they could the given stimuli. The 
time intervals varied from a few minutes after the study phase to several months, and 
even years. In a procedure called repeated reproduction, the same participant was 
asked to repeatedly recall the studied information over time. Bartlett (1932) found that 
the recalled information tended to be a simplification of the presented stimuli and that 
omissions increased over the number of recalls. On the other hand, elaboration, or the 
increment of details was relatively rare. These biases were specially clear when the 
stimuli were the folk tales, as the final versions were markedly shorter than the 
original version, the dates, names and numbers were altered and, more interestingly, 
the stories were rearranged to fit the usual occidental story script, so that, for instance, 
supernatural elements were suppressed (Bartlett, 1932). These results can be taken as 
evidence to the fact that memory is a reconstruction made to fit the previous 
conceptions of the individuals. But, Bartlett (1932) was also interested in the way 
these individual biases will influence the passage of information between individuals, 
in a serial reproduction chain. In the seventh chapter of his 1932 book, Remember, 
Bartlett describes the series of experiments he conducted using the serial reproduction 
paradigm. The paradigm is very similar to the repeated reproduction paradigm but 
with different individuals recalling instead of using many recalls by the same 
individual. Bartlett (1932) used three different types of materials – written folk 
stories; written descriptive and argumentative prose passages; and pictures. The folk 
stories contain information that passes very quickly from one social group to another 
and most individuals regard them as interesting by themselves, so Bartlett (1932) 
picked folk tales from a different social group than the one of the individuals in the 
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experiment (British undergraduate students): the North American folk tale The War of 
the Ghosts; and the Congolese Folklore tale The Son who tried to Outwit his Father. 
The prose passages used were mainly picked because participants were familiar with 
them and thus provided a good comparison with the folk stories, and they were 
basically newspaper reports on sports and other topics, and scientific arguments. On 
the other hand, pictures were chosen because they are a different type of material, in a 
different medium, and their transmission has been very important to “realistic art”. 
The main procedure used was the same regardless the type of material and consisted 
in having the first individual in a serial reproduction chain reading the material twice 
(or seeing the picture) and, after a filled interval of 15 to 30 minutes, asking them to 
reproduce what they read or saw. Then, the reproduction of this first individual was 
the study material of the following individual in the chain and so on until the end of 
the serial reproduction chain. Bartlett reports chains of, at least, ten links, i.e., ten 
individuals. 
Along the reproduction chain, the original material suffered several 
modifications according to specific effects that hold for the three different types of 
materials. The two folk tales got more coherent, much shorter due to omissions, and 
lost their least English characteristics – The War of the Ghosts progressively lost its 
supernatural characteristics and the mention to ghosts disappeared very early in the 
chain whereas the other folk tale acquired a much more English setting. Also, a little 
bit of elaboration was found in the sense that new links between parts of the stories 
were provided with the goal of making them more logical from the British point of 
view, showing a strong rationalization effort, supported by the transformation of 
minor details. Also, the transformation of unfamiliar names into more familiar ones 
was frequent and the order of events was rearranged. Surprisingly, the same type of 
distortions was found for the more familiar prose passages. Taken together, these 
alterations of the original information point to the radical nature of the changes and 
the constructive character of recall, reflecting biases towards concreteness, loss of 
specific characteristics, abbreviation and rationalization of the information (Bartlett, 
1932). However, these changes do not occur accidentally but are the result of the 
interplay between the individual and social factors, although they are not carried out 
conscientiously. The main idea is that when any complex structural material is 
presented, their “general impression” is the first apprehension, so that the other 
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elements suffer a grouping around that general impression that constitutes the central 
theme. However, the central theme does not depend only on the presented information 
but is shaped by the culture, conventions, and interests of the individuals extracting 
the “general impression”. Thus, any element of the material that fails to find 
background in the individuals own culture fails to be assimilated and is either omitted 
or changed (Bartlett, 1932). The importance of the cultural group of the individuals 
involved in the experiment becomes more evident if we look at Bartlett’s (1932) 
experiment with Indian students. The story used was The Son who tried to Outwit his 
Father and procedure was exactly the same, already described. The results were 
basically the same as those obtained with the British students but now the elaboration 
was much bigger. In the case of the Indian students, the elaboration and adornment 
tendency were evident, pointing to strong cultural differences in how alterations of the 
information occur (Bartlett, 1932). Finally, for the serial reproduction of pictures, 
Bartlett (1932) used very simple picture representations of a common object with 
unfamiliar features for the group of participants (e.g. the Egyptian mulak representing 
an owl). The results were congruent with the ones obtained with the written materials, 
with the representations converging to a more conventional and familiar 
representation (e.g. the Egyptian mulak representing an owl becomes a black cat; see 
Figure 4), with the difference that elaboration was much more common, but also 
simplification occurred as soon as the form was readily recognizable. Taken together, 
the main results of the serial reproduction experiments indicate that the same type of 
changes that occur in the repeated reproduction experiments also occur for the serial 
reproduction experiments, however, in the later case, these changes are magnified and 
accelerated. It seems that it is enough for one element in the chain to make a basic 
error to completely change the stimulus to the following element and thus the 
distortion emerges earlier and in a more accentuated form that is perpetuated along 
the chain, originating a completely different final representation of information. 
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Figure 4. Alterations of an Egyptian mulak representing an owl until it becomes a cat, in a serial 
reproduction paradigm (Bartlett, 1932; p. 180). 
 
2.3. A modern study on serial and repeated reproduction: A direct comparison   
Despite Bartlett’s (1932) efforts, he did not do careful experiments to compare 
repeated reproduction with serial reproduction, and although he states that serial 
reproduction leads to greater forgetting and distortion than repeated reproduction, he 
never did a direct quantitative comparison between them. To our knowledge, the first 
and only direct comparison between serial and repeated reproduction was reported by 
Roediger, Meade, Gallo and Olson (2009). Roediger and his students (2009) used as 
stimuli eight lists of words that had already been normed and are known to induce 
false memories (DRM lists; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Stadler, 
Roediger, & McDermott, 1999). Each list was composed of fifteen words which were 
the strongest associates of a nonpresented critical word. Previous results of free recall 
and recognition memory tests using these lists showed that participants tend to recall 
and/or recognize the critical word as often as the presented words (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). Please note that the procedure associated with these lists of words 
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and that pioneered the study of false memories will be subject to a careful review in 
the following chapter as well as the main explicative theories. These materials seem 
especially suited for the study of memory biases because they elicit known biases and 
therefore allow for a careful measure of both accuracy and inaccuracy. Thus, although 
more artificial than the stories Bartlett (1932) used, DRM lists provide a better 
material to systematically study serial and repeated reproduction. But how to directly 
compare the two types of reproduction? Repeated reproduction is a within participants 
procedure that implies individuals repeatedly retrieving the same information whereas 
serial reproduction is a between participants procedure that implies a series of 
individuals recalling information, but with each studying the previous individual’s 
recall. So, Roediger and his students (2009) created an experiment in which each 
participant would repeatedly recall the information studied four times in a row 
(repeated reproduction) but, at the same time, participants were also divided in groups 
of four that would constitute a serial reproduction chain, where each participant’s first 
recall protocol would be the study list for the following participant. More clearly, the 
first participant received the original information (i.e., the original DRM lists) and 
was asked to recall it repeatedly for four times; the second participant would study the 
first participant’s first recall protocol, and then be asked to recall that information four 
times; the third participant would study the second participant’s first recall protocol, 
and then be asked to recall that information four times; finally, the fourth participant 
would study the third participant’s first recall protocol, and then be asked to recall that 
information four times. Each recall from the repeated reproduction part of the 
experiment would take place after short breaks and without restudy. The main 
comparison of interest is between changes of information along the four recalls of the 
first participants in each chain (the ones who received the original lists) and the 
changes of information in the first recalls along the four participants in each serial 
reproduction chain. However, Roediger and his students (2009) completed the design 
to allow the examination of how repeated recalls could be changed depending on 
which level of completeness they began at. Starting with the comparison of interest, 
participants showed little forgetting across the four within participants recall tests 
(repeated reproduction), with 50% of the original lists still recalled in the fourth 
recall, whereas participants in the serial reproduction chain showed high forgetting, 
with the fourth participant in a chain recalling in average only 20% of the original 
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lists. So, within each participant, recall of list words remained relatively constant 
across retrieval attempts, and it was only when the list was passed between 
participants that fewer list words were recalled (Roediger et al., 2009). However, 
these results are not a consequence of participants in the fourth positions of the serial 
reproduction chains being “poor rememberers” (Roediger, 2010) as when output-
bound measures2 are taken, they actually seem to perform better than the previous 
participants in the chain. The reason for this is that the lists studied by participants 
grew increasingly small across serial reproduction links, so participants in later 
positions in the chain would output fewer words than previous participants but 
remember a greater proportion of the material they actually studied. This effect 
represents a classic finding in memory literature, according to which, the shorter the 
study list, the higher a proportion of items that can be successfully recalled (Murdock, 
1962).  
We have just summarized the comparison between serial and repeated 
reproduction in terms of accuracy, but what happens in terms of distortions? What 
will be the changes of false recall of the critical words across repeated recalls and 
across serial reproduction links? Results showed that false recall of the critical 
nonpresented words increased across serial reproduction links but also across repeated 
recalls, and serial reproduction participants showed higher levels of false recall than 
repeated reproduction participants. This was true when using input-bound measures 
and also when using output-bound measures. If we consider the proportion that falsely 
recalled critical words comprise of the total output, we verify that this proportion 
dramatically increases across serial reproduction links but remains fairly constant 
across repeated recalls. The results reported by Roediger and his students (2009) 
support Bartlett’s (1932) more casual comparison of repeated and serial reproduction. 
Mainly, serial reproduction seems to give rise to greater forgetting and distortion over 
successive recall attempts than repeated reproduction. Taken together, Bartlett’s 
(1932) and Roediger and his students’ (2009) results point to the fact that serial 
reproduction reflects the individual memory biases and maximizes them. If we 
assume that serial reproduction reflects a process analog to the social transmission of 
information, and as suggested by Allport and Postman (1947), it is also analog to 
                                                        
2 Output-bound measures refer to the proportion of list items produced as a proportion of the list 
the participant actually studied (rather than the original list – input-bound measures). For a 
more complete distinction of these criteria, usually related to metacognition, see Koriat and 
Goldsmith (1996). 
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rumor transmission, the reported distortions seem important to understand how 
socially relevant information may also be distorted and if the same individual memory 
mechanisms will exert an impact on the transmission of socially relevant information 
as strong as the impact they exert on the transmission of other types of information.  
From the reported experiments it is clear that the focus of this type of research 
should be on the interplay between the individual memory processes and the social 
transmission of information. More specifically, we should focus on how the 
transmission of information is shaped by the individual processes involved in each 
step of transmission and thus study not only what occurs within the individual 
memory processes but also how those individual processes come to play when 
information must be transmitted. After almost seven decades since Bartlett’s pioneer 
studies, some authors started calling attention to this issue, and adapted the serial 
reproduction paradigm to study how individual processes shape the transmission of 
information or even iterated learning. 
 
2.4. Recent studies on serial reproduction and future directions 
The serial reproduction paradigm developed by Bartlett (1932) explored how 
individual memory biases affected the transmission of information, as an individual’s 
reconstruction of information became the following individual’s stimulus. Sir 
Frederic Bartlett’s (1932) results showed that serial reproduction could transform the 
original information, reflecting biases inherent to memory processes. However, the 
existence of these biases does not point to an irrational and maladapted use of 
memory (for reviews, see Howe, 2011; and Newman & Lindsay, 2009). On the 
contrary, the ways in which our memories distort reality seem to reflect an 
appropriation of reality that will optimize future performance on different tasks (e.g., 
Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011) and even maximize survival and 
adaptation to the environment (e.g., Nairne, 2010). As the serial reproduction of 
information imitates the way information spreads in the real world and reflects these 
adaptive biases, it seems important to study how these processes may explain some 
cultural characteristics and biases. Recent research on serial reproduction has focused 
precisely on these questions. 
The use of diffusion chains, which are basically the serial reproduction chains 
used in the serial reproduction paradigm, has been widely described in Anthropology 
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and Evolutionary Biology. Their main usage has been to study cultural processes and 
social learning processes in non-human animal societies, ranging from tool use in 
chimpanzees to passing alarms in blackbirds societies (Whitten & Mesoudi, 2008). 
These diffusion chains share some properties that can also be applied to human serial 
reproduction chains. One of the first studies on cultural processes using the method of 
serial chains was performed by Kashima in 2000, and was intended to show how the 
transmission of information about cultural stereotypes contributed to their 
maintenance. Kashima (2000) presented participants with short stories having 
congruent and incongruent information about male/female stereotypes. He then used 
twelve chains of serial reproduction, each one with five individuals in it. His results 
pointed to an advantage for the incongruent information at individual levels, but a 
higher survival rate of the congruent information along the serial reproduction chains. 
These results are congruent with the idea that stereotypes are relatively stable memory 
instances (Stangor & McMillan, 1992), but only at a cultural level. Because, if we 
look at the individual level, the stereotypes seem to be malleable and highly flexible 
instances, which is congruent with a recent view proposed by Garcia-Marques, 
Santos, and Mackie (2006), who provided direct evidence for stereotypes context 
sensitivity by showing that manipulation of context stability affects the stability of 
stereotype assembling across sessions. Kashima’s (2000) study seems to reconcile 
these two views and proposes that the better recall of incongruent information at 
individual levels is due to its distinctiveness whereas the higher memorability for 
congruent information at serial reproduction levels is caused by the loss of 
incongruent information across links in the chain, and once this incongruent 
information is lost it is very unlikely that it will be reintroduced. However, a more 
systematic use of a serial reproduction paradigm to test the transmission of 
stereotypical information is needed to provide more insight about the processes that 
make stereotypes endure in social context but that are also responsible for their high 
intraindividual flexibility. 
Other types of studies showed the contribution of the serial reproduction 
paradigm to the study of cultural evolution (e.g., Mesoudi, 2007; Mesoudi & Whitten, 
2008). Actually, Mesoudi (2007) considers that using experimental methods borrowed 
from Experimental Psychology, such as the serial reproduction technique, allow for a 
better study of cultural evolution instead of the usual description provided by Cross-
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Cultural Psychology and Cultural Anthropology and not systematically tested. Since 
the 30’s that many Cultural Studies used the transmission chain method, as in the 
serial reproduction paradigm, varying the type of materials used – pictures or written 
stimuli – and the participants involved – from children to participants from different 
professions, and all of them showed results supporting Bartlett’s (1932) findings (for 
a review, see Mesoudi, 2007). More interesting for our work is a recent study by 
Mesoudi and Whiten (2008) on the human cultural evolution via the roles of cultural 
transmission. This study started with the idea proposed by Schank and Abelson 
(1977) that routine events, such as “going to a restaurant”, are represented in 
hierarchically organized “action scripts” that are called to action when needed and 
include a series of standardized information and procedures. Thus it seems reasonable 
to think that lower level action scripts will easily be summarized by higher level 
action scripts. If these action scripts are culturally transmitted, a serial reproduction 
technique should reflect this hierarchical organization. To test this idea, Mesoudi and 
Whiten (2008) gave their participants information related to lower levels action 
scripts included in the routine events of “going to a restaurant”, ”getting up”, and 
“shopping” and then had them passing the information across ten chains of four 
participants each, mimicking a social transmission of information. Mesoudi and 
Whiten (2008) found that, as predicted, the lower level action scripts were gradually 
transformed in the higher level action scripts and even goals. These results are 
consistent with the idea that we hold scripts about routine events hierarchically 
embedded in memory (Schank & Abelson, 1977) and also that information 
transmitted socially is changed and tends to maintain only its core properties (Bartlett, 
1932). 
On a different fashion, procedures similar to serial reproduction have been used 
to study language evolution. A discussable theory by Simon Kirby (2001) proposed 
that language evolves by iterated learning, with linguistic competence being acquired 
from observations of other individuals’ language productions. Iterated learning is thus 
the process by which the output of one individual's learning becomes the input to 
other individuals' learning and provides a framework for investigating the cultural 
evolution of linguistic structure. By now it is clear that iterated learning is basically 
the serial reproduction procedure. Thus, Kalish, Griffiths, and Lewandowsky (2007) 
managed to test the implications of iterated learning as a mode of cultural and 
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linguistic transmission in laboratory by using serial reproduction procedures. Kalish 
and colleagues (2007) use the assumption that learners are Bayesian agents and thus 
predict that the iterated learning process should converge to a distribution that reflects 
the inductive biases of the learners, or simply the survival of the items with highest 
prior probabilities. Their results supported this assumption and provided insight into 
the individual biases that affect the intergenerational transmission of information, and 
how Bayesian reasoning may explain those biases. In a similar study, Reali and 
Griffiths (2009) used a formal Bayesian model to explore how regularization of 
language structures can emerge from iterated learning processes. By performing 
simulations, it was found that people tend to regularize inconsistent word-meaning 
mappings, and that weak individual biases towards regularization can be magnified 
via the serial transmission of information and allow regular languages to emerge 
(Reali & Griffiths, 2009).  These two studies seem to support Kirby’s (2001) theory 
that some functional linguistic structure emerges inevitably from the process of 
iterated learning without the need for natural selection or explicit functional pressure, 
and that opposes to other language structure evolution theories, such as the one 
advocated by Chomsky (1965) stating that the structure of language is the result of 
constraints imposed by an innate, special-purpose language faculty. However, this 
debate about the origin of language structure is beyond the scope of this introduction 
and these studies on iterated learning reveal themselves interesting because they show 
how individual biases might be magnified by serial reproduction and how the final 
product of a serial reproduction chain is close to what should be expected by Bayesian 
models. Actually, the two abovementioned studies call our attention to one important 
characteristic of the serial reproduction chains that is that they behave as Markov 
chains, and thus the “hypothesis” or items chosen by each learner depend only on 
those chosen by the previous learner. The Markov chain will converge to its 
stationery distribution that happens to be the prior assumed by the learners (Norris, 
1997; Griffiths & Kalish, 2005) and thus, the probability of a given item to survive a 
long serial reproduction chain is simply the prior probability of that item’s 
occurrence, regardless of the data provided to the first link in the chain. From this 
point of view, the information provided initially is irrelevant in the long run and the 
outcome of iterated learning only reflects the individual biases of each learner 
involved in the serial reproduction chain. 
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In a clear succession of the previously referred studies, but with a more direct 
application to the present work, Xu and Griffiths (2010) provided a rational Bayesian 
analysis of serial reproduction. The authors used learning of stimuli characteristics 
instead of language development, and were more interested in the reconstruction of 
stimuli belonging to a category from memory. More specifically, they analyze the 
process of reconstruction from memory as a Bayesian inference and thus, 
reconstructions from memory should combine prior knowledge about the world with 
noisy stimuli. The biases in memory should derive from the prior knowledge of the 
world and thus be adaptive, influencing the inferences each person makes. If we agree 
with this view, the same type of inferences should occur at each link of the serial 
reproduction chain and the memory biases’ effects will accumulate. As the serial 
reproduction chain behaves as a Markov chain, the serial reproduction should 
ultimately reveal the nature of the prior shared knowledge about the world. To test 
this idea, Xu and Griffiths (2010) propose a Bayesian model of serial reproduction, 
providing general predictions about the process of serial reproduction for complex 
stimuli and very specific predictions for one-dimensional stimuli with Gaussian 
distribution. To test the predictions of their model, the authors ran a set of 
experiments in which the width of different fishes had to be recovered from memory 
and one participant’s output was the following participant’s input, as in any other 
serial reproduction experiment. The obtained results converged with the predictions of 
the model, indicating that serial reproduction may be an effective and highly sensitive 
way to understand people’s prior knowledge about the world and their inherent biases. 
However, it should be referred that the biases that emerge from serial reproduction are 
connected with general Bayesian strategies of combining prior knowledge with noisy 
information and that usually result in higher accuracy and better performance (Xu & 
Griffiths, 2010).  
The latest studies using serial reproduction and Bayesian approaches to 
information transmission (Griffiths & Kalish, 2005; Reali & Griffiths, 2009; Xu & 
Griffiths, 2010) are very important as they rehabilitate the technique used by Bartlett 
(1932) and show how it can be systematically used in controlled experiments. Also, 
these latest studies point to the fact that individual biases emerge and are magnified 
by the serial reproduction processes, what makes serial reproduction a privileged way 
to study individual biases. However, these studies have focused on the learning in 
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noisy environments and tend to give high importance to the central tendency of the 
prior distributions and their density and to neglect the context in which the 
information is being transmitted. Thus, even if those models seem to explain some of 
the main results obtained in serial reproduction, they have the implicit assumption that 
the prior estimations are perfect and thus they only allow for the increment of 
accuracy. Of course we are not arguing that serial reproduction reveals biases that are 
mal-adaptive as they may converge to a lack of accuracy. On the contrary, we are 
arguing that serial reproduction may not only increase accuracy, as suggested by 
Bayesian models applied to it, but it may also enhance memory errors that make the 
final product of a reproduction chain to depart from the original knowledge of the 
world but that serves the adaptive functions of memory to navigate the world. As we 
already pointed, the implicit theory of personality also seems to be a memory 
structure that serves to navigate the world, by shaping the way we form impressions 
about others and how we communicate. And, despite the social functions of this 
memory structure, it can also be seen as any other associative memory structure 
influenced by the same types of cognitive processes and therefore subject to the same 
biases. So, the implicit theory of personality should be a highly flexible memory 
structure, enabling impression formation and communication processes that allow us 
to navigate the social world; but, just like what occurs for associative structures such 
as semantic memory, this flexibility must come with the associated cost of memory 
errors. In the following section of this introduction we will specify which individual 
memory errors and biases may occur within the implicit theory of personality and 
review their main theoretical explanations used so far and that show why those 
memory distortions can be considered a by-product of our adaptive and flexible 
memory. 
 
3. FALSE MEMORIES 
Our memory is a flexible and adaptive structure and although this is what makes 
possible to navigate the world and learn it does not come without a cost – the 
susceptibility to memory illusions (Newman & Lindsay, 2009). Memory illusions 
seem to occur routinely in life but the evidence supporting their everyday occurrence 
is sparse because it is usually hard to check if our memories are accurate or an 
illusion, as the events they refer to already “disappeared” (Roediger, 1996). Think 
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about someone who takes a medicine every morning after the breakfast, the medicine 
becomes so associated with the breakfast that, sometimes, that person may forget to 
take the medicine but will have the illusory remembering of having taken the 
medicine just because they had breakfast that morning. Of course this is an example 
of a negative outcome of a possible everyday life memory illusion. But memory 
illusions are not always negative; on the contrary, memory illusions can have positive 
outcomes and an adaptive value (for a review, see Howe, 2011). It can be mildly 
negative to have a false memory about taking a medicine or locking the door when it 
actually did not occur; but the misremembering of traumatic events in childhood or 
the memory illusions in eyewitness testimony can have a very negative impact on 
one’s life (e.g., Howe, 2011). Nevertheless, memory illusions can have positive and 
adaptive functions, such as maintaining one’s own consistency in self-perception by 
misremembering the past or even giving an enhanced, more positive, self-concept 
(Ross & Wilson, 2003). In any case, even if memory illusions, in special false 
memories, are not functionally valuable themselves, the fact that they are a natural by-
product of a very powerful and flexible memory system (Newman & Lindsay, 2009) 
makes them adaptive. Going back to Bartlett’s (1932) conception of remembering as a 
reconstructive process and thinking of reconstruction as a form of inferential 
processing, we can understand that inferences based on well established memory-
schemas help us understand the world and make sense of many stimuli, allowing us to 
remember more about past events than it would be possible if we relied only on a 
simple descriptive memory system (Newman & Lindsay, 2009). Moreover, this 
ability to remember many aspects of past events, even if some intrusions occur, and 
being able  to almost get transported to the past while remembering perceptual details 
of the experience (mental time travel; Tulving 1983; 2002) is very important as it 
seems to be linked to the ability to plan future behaviors. For instance, Schacter, 
Addis, and Buckner (2007) showed that recalling past and imagining future events 
recruited similar brain regions and Szpunar and McDermott (2007) showed that the 
ability to show episodic future thought, i.e., imagining future events, was influenced 
by the level of perceptual details of the contextual setting previously represented in 
memory, indicating that memory is sampled to reconstruct future scenarios just as it is 
sampled to reconstruct past episodes. This sampling and recombination of memories 
to retrieve past episodes and construct possible future scenarios reflects the flexibility 
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of the memory system but also provides an explanation for the occurrence of memory 
illusions (Schacter & Addis, 2007). Thus, false memories are no longer taken to be 
bizarre or sui generis effects but instead represent the cost of flexible associative 
memory structures that possess considerable learning powers and inference skills, as 
Roediger (1996) had already suggested. 
But how can we study memory illusions? First, we can think of two types of 
memory illusions, one type reflecting omissions and another one reflecting 
commissions. Omissions can be conceptualized as forgetting, which has been widely 
studied, specially the way to prevent it (e.g., Ebbinghaus, 1885; Underwood, 1957; 
for a review, see Wixted, 2004) whereas commissions can be thought of as false 
memories, which only started receiving attention since 1995, when Henry L. Roediger 
and Kathleen McDermott adapted a forgotten paradigm originally developed by 
James Deese (1959), creating the DRM paradigm (Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
paradigm). False memories are the memory illusions that we will be dealing with and 
they are a very good example of the reconstructive nature of memory proposed by 
Bartlett (1932) as we mentioned earlier. However, the recent findings on false 
memories have been obtained with variations of the DRM paradigm, which derives 
from the original idea by Deese according to which quantifiable associations between 
materials lead to false memories. Actually, Bruce and Winograd (1998) compare 
Deese’s (1959) research to that of Bartlett’s (1932) and find that Deese’s not only did 
not share Bartlett’s enthusiasm for the idea of reconstruction and used drier and colder 
materials but also suggested that schemas and reconstruction is based on a completely 
quantifiable aspect that does not seem to have the influence of cultural schemas or 
social variables – associative frequencies between items. But, if one prefers to take an 
approach more similar to Bartlett’s one or to Deese’s, it does not matter that much, 
because in one point both authors agree, false memories are a by-product of normal 
memory processes and reflect individual biases as well as the representations of 
information in memory.  
After having presented in the previous chapter the main serial reproduction 
studies that usually reflect the accumulation of individual memory errors, we will now 
turn to the presentation of those individual memory errors, specially the intrusions 
obtained when individuals must remember associated stimuli, i.e., false memories. 
We will start to introduce the DRM paradigm and thoroughly explain the associated 
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procedure and the main effects obtained. Then we will discuss the main theories 
adopted to explain the effects obtained with many variations of the DRM paradigm; 
we will focus on two of the major theories that are more relevant to the present work 
– the Activation-Monitoring framework (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and the 
Fuzzy Trace Theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995a; 1995b). While reviewing these 
theories and the studies that either support or go against them, we will also review 
some of the major findings obtained with the different adaptations of the DRM and 
will furher explain the processes supposed to contribute to the occurrence of false 
memories or its prevention. Finally, we will conclude this chapter by summarizing 
some of the main findings and their implications for the theoretical accounts of false 
memory as well as for the study of associative memory in general.  
 
3.1. The Deese-Roediger-McDermott Paradigm 
One of the first references to associative memory errors dates back to 1889. Burnham 
(1889) published a review of memory research in which he refers the idea of “associirende 
Erinnerungsfälschungen”, this is memory associative errors, developed by the psychiatrist 
Emil Kraepelin. These errors were related to pseudo-reminiscences associated to a specific 
event that were evoked by an event similar to the original one or somehow connected to it. 
This type of errors were compatible with the later definition of remembering provided by 
Bartlett (1932), as a constructive process, in opposition to the previous notion of 
remembering as a rigid reproductive process. But, still in the 19th century, we can find one 
of the first experiments showing the flexibility and constructive nature of remembering, 
with purely semantic material – in 1894, Kirkpatrick noticed that when words such as 
spool, thimble or knife were pronounced, several students recalled words that are associated 
to them, such as thread, needle or fork.  
 Nevertheless, it would be only in 1959 that James Deese would develop an 
experimental procedure to test the way associations between words presented in a list 
influence both veridical and false memories about those list. Deese’s (1959) procedure 
consisted in presenting participants with lists of words strongly associated to a 
nonpresented word, based on free-association norms (Russell & Jenkins, 1954); and 
afterwards asking participants to recall the presented words. Deese (1959) found that 
nonpresented words were systematically intruded in the free recall protocols and that their 
probability of intrusion was positively correlated (.87) with its association to the presented 
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list words. However, this pioneer study by Deese would not be given much importance 
until 1995, when Henry L. Roediger and Kathleen McDermott adapted his procedure to 
make possible a better understanding of the obtained results. The reason why Deese’s 
(1959) results remained in obscurity is probably due to the zeitgeist of the 60s, when 
Memory research was mainly focused on the study of correct memory outputs than on the 
analyses of intrusions (for a discussion, see Bruce & Winograd, 1998). However, that 
zeitgeist changed in the 90s, mainly because of concerns about the validity of repressed and 
retrieved memories that seemed to grow exponentially in clinical settings, and then 
Memory research was ready to start focusing on memory errors (Bruce & Winograd, 
1998). Taking advantage of this zeitgeist and using a suggestion by Endel Tulving, 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) developed what would be called the DRM paradigm, an 
acronym for Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm. One important departure from the 
original paradigm (Deese, 1959) was that besides analyzing participants’ free recall, 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) also assessed their recognition and remember–know 
judgments (Tulving, 1985). 
Since 1995, several variations of the DRM paradigm have been used but, for now, 
let us look at the classic procedure, as used by Roediger and McDermott (1995; exp.2).  We 
will provide a detailed description of this procedure because almost all the studies reviewed 
in this chapter used variation of this paradigm and, most importantly, the experiments we 
performed used an adaptation of the DRM. Participants were presented with 16 lists of 15 
words each. For each list, the words presented were the first 15 associates (e.g., queen, 
England, crown, prince, etc.) to a critical nonpresented word (e.g., king), as defined by 
Russell and Jenkins (1954) free-association norms. The lists used were picked because they 
seemed to have elicited the highest levels of false recall in Deese’s (1959) study, and 
specially because some of Deese’s lists rarely elicited false recall (the possible reasons for 
this will be discussed later). The order of presentation of the associates was in descending 
order of association to the critical nonpresented word. It should be noted that some later 
studies have found mixed evidence for the importance of presentation order, with authors 
such as McEvoy, Nelson, and Komatsu (1999) finding no effects of presentation order and 
Nunes, Sommers, Garcia-Marques, and Marques (in prep) reporting significant effects of 
presentation order. Each word was read to participants at a rate of approximately 1.5 sec per 
word and after the last word of each list was read, participants were instructed to either 
freely recall all the presented words or to perform math problems for 2 min (this was a 
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within participants manipulation, and the different tasks occurred in an unexpected order, 
counterbalanced across participants). In the free recall task, participants were instructed to 
write down, in any order, as many words as they could recall from the just presented list but 
were instructed against guessing. The math task was included only as a control, because 
after the presentation of all the lists and the last free recall or math task, participants were 
asked to perform a final recognition test that could be influenced by the previous free recall 
tests. This final recognition test included 96 words printed in columns in a test sheet: 48 
studied words – 3 words by list, presented in the first, eighth, and tenth positions; and 48 
non-studied words – 16 critical words (one per list), 8 critical words from 8 nonpresented 
lists of the same type of the studied ones, and 24 words from the same nonpresented lists in 
the first, eighth and tenth positions. Whether a list had been presented or nonpresented was 
counterbalanced between participants. The eight critical words from nonpresented lists of 
associates were included in order to provide a control for a possible intrinsic special 
characteristic of the critical words that could be driving their false remembering instead of 
the presentation of the lists of associates, and their false recognition also provided a base 
rate level of false recognition. Participants were told that the test would contain presented 
and nonpresented words and that their task was to circle “old” for presented words and 
“new” for nonpresented words. Immediately after the response for each word, if 
participants circled the “old” option, they were asked to judge their phenomenological 
experience of remembering, choosing between “remember” and “know”. The 
“remember/know” judgment was introduced by Tulving (1985) to measure the subjective 
experience that accompanies recognition responses. Participants are instructed that a 
“remember” judgment should be made only if they vividly remember specific details about 
the event of the word’s occurrence within the lists, such as the speaker’s voice or what they 
were thinking at the moment of presentation. On the other hand, a “know” judgment should 
be made if participants were sure that the word had been presented but they could not recall 
specific details of the event of its presentation, so that they were sure the word had been 
presented perhaps only because it seemed very familiar. The experiment was finished after 
the recognition test and participants were then asked if they knew what the experiment was 
about, and only one participant reported that he realized the lists were designed to make 
them think of a nonpresented word; data for this participant was thus excluded. 
For the free recall tests, Roediger and McDermott (1995, exp. 2) obtained a typical 
serial position curve, with the words presented in the beginning and in the end of the lists 
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being more often correctly recalled than the words presented in the middle of the lists 
(primacy and recency effects, respectively). More interestingly, the false recall of the 
critical nonpresented word was as high as the correct recall of the words presented in the 
middle of the list (M = .55), even though this word has never been presented. Although the 
intrusions of other nonpresented words are not reported for this experiment, it should be 
noted that they are usually very low (e.g., only for 14% of the lists in Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995; exp. 1). Thus, it seems that false recall of the critical words is as high as 
the correct recall of some of the presented words and higher than false recall of other 
nonpresented words, which replicates Deese’s (1959) results. Concerning the recognition 
tests, veridical recognition of the presented words, i.e., hits, was higher than the false 
recognition of their control words – the words from nonpresented lists (M = .65 vs. M = .11, 
respectively). However, of more interest is the false recognition of the critical nonpresented 
words, i.e., false alarms, that was much higher than the false recognition of their control 
critical words from nonpresented lists (M = .72 vs. M = .16). Just like what happened in the 
free recall tests false recognition of the critical nonpresented words was as high as correct 
recognition of the presented words and much higher than false recognition of unrelated 
nonpresented words. Also of interest are the “remember/know” judgments, with the 
judgments of “remember” being as high for the critical nonpresented words as for the 
actually presented words whereas that the majority of falsely recognized unrelated words 
received “know” judgments. This result suggests that false recognition of critical 
nonpresented words is so strong that it is usually accompanied by strong phenomenological 
illusions. As a matter of fact, a study by Payne, Elie, Blackwell, and Neuschatz (1996) 
showed that when the studied words are presented in different voices, participants easily 
ascribe the falsely recognized critical word to one of the voices; later, Sommers and Lewis 
(1999) replicated these findings and also verified that the attribution of a voice to the critical 
nonpresented word was made with an elevated degree of confidence. It should also be 
noted that when the lists had been previously recalled, the veridical recognition increased 
but also did the false recognition of the critical words, reflecting a testing effect in memory 
that can occur when participants perform a free recall test and then a recognition test (e.g. 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). 
The main effects obtained by Henry L. Roediger and Kathleen McDermott in 1995 
drew attention to the issue of false memories and thus have been extensively replicated 
since then and extended to different materials (e.g., Sommers & Lewis, 1999; Pesta, 
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Sanders, & Murphy, 2001) and different populations and/or age groups (e.g., Balota et al., 
1999; Carneiro, Fernandez, & Dias, 2009). The classic paradigm just described has also 
suffered modifications and adaptations to study different questions, such as the effects of 
multiple tests or study episodes on veridical and false memories (e.g., McDermott, 1996; 
Nunes & Weinstein, 2012). In the following section of this chapter we will review some of 
these studies while we discuss how they support or provide evidence against some of the 
most used theories to explain the false memory effect, especially the Activation-Monitoring 
framework (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and the Fuzzy Trace Theory (Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1995a; 1995b). 
 
3.2. Main theories and effects 
3.2.1. The Activation-Monitoring framework 
Since the 1995 study, Roediger and McDermott proposed that the explanation for 
false memories could be achieved by associative activation theories (Collins & Loftus, 
1975) in conjunction with reality monitoring theories (Johnson & Raye, 1981); and this 
idea lead to the development of the Activation-Monitoring framework (e.g., Roediger & 
McDermott, 2000; McDermott & Watson, 2001; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 
2001). Dual-process theories of false memories like the Activation-Monitoring framework 
explain the false memory effects as the outcome of two processes, a spreading activation 
process that describes how activation converges from the associates to the critical concept 
and the failure of a deliberate monitoring process that is supposed to discriminate between 
presented from nonpresented information (Roediger et al., 2001).  The spreading activation 
process occurs due to associative activation, by which concepts represented in semantic 
memory are activated due to the processing of other associated concepts. More specifically, 
and as defined by Collins and Loftus (1975), each concept in memory is represented as a 
node, and each node is connected to several other nodes, i.e. to other concept 
representations, by associative links. The strength of the associative links between nodes is 
variable, and it is thought to be semantically organized, thus reflecting semantic similarity 
amongst other types of relatedness between concepts, such as taxonomic, situational or 
linguistic relations (for a review, see Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008). So, the 
bonds between concepts’ representations can be strong if the two concepts are very 
associated or weak if the concepts are not very associated. Thus, when one concept is 
processed (e.g., queen) the corresponding node is activated and its activation automatically 
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spreads, in parallel, across the associative links, to the other associated nodes (e.g., king), 
which also gets activated by this indirect form of activation. So, the non-processed concepts 
that are associated to the processed ones get activated by the automatic dispersion of 
activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975). The extent to which a concept is indirectly activated 
depends on the strength of the association between it and the processed concept. Such type 
of activation is considered to occur rapidly, automatically, and to fade quickly (Posner & 
Snyder, 1975). The main evidence supporting associative activation theories comes from 
semantic priming experiments, in which a prime word is presented and it then facilitates the 
processing of a related word relatively to unrelated words in tasks of lexical decision, 
speeded naming, or fragment completion (for a review, see Hutchinson, 2003). Thus, 
according to this model of associative activation, in the DRM paradigm the direct activation 
of the presented words would converge and automatically and indirectly activate the 
nonpresented critical word, which is associated to all the presented words. However, this 
automatic spreading of activation would not be enough to produce a false memory. In 
concomitance with the indirect activation of the critical word, a failure of reality monitoring 
must occur for the false memory to be produced (Roediger et al., 2001) i.e., the individual 
must mistake the indirect associative activation with direct presentation activation. 
Reality monitoring can be defined as the process by which people decide if certain 
retrieved information had an external or an internal source (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Marcia 
Johnson and her collaborators began a research line on reality monitoring in the late 70s and 
their first studies were concerned with the way people can distinguish between information 
derived from external sources, i.e., information about events that actually occurred, from 
information with an internal source, i.e., information about events that were only 
experienced within the person as they were imagined or auto-generated. Some of the first 
experiments on this topic tried to understand how people estimate the frequency of 
occurrence of externally presented events and internally generated events (e.g., Johnson, 
Taylor, & Raye, 1977). These first results pointed to the idea that when an event was 
frequently imagined by different participants, it was more often estimated as being derived 
from external sources and having actually occurred. Thus, it seems that individuals 
confused the imagined events that have never occurred with the events that actually 
occurred, which can be seen as a failure of reality monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981). But 
how is it that people distinguish between internal and external events recovered from 
memory and what in that process leads to the referred failures of reality monitoring? 
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Johnson and Raye (1981) proposed that the differences between the characteristics of the 
encoded representations of externally and internally generated information as well as 
decision rules used at the time of retrieval can contribute to the distinction between 
internally generated events and externally generated events. More specifically, the 
externally generated events’ representations possess four characteristics that allow their 
differentiation from the internally generated events’ representations: (1) are rich in 
perceptual and sensory attributes; (2) include contextual information present at the time of 
encoding, such as space and time; (3) are semantically detailed and contain specific 
information; and (4) include less information about the cognitive operations that lead to its 
encoding than the internally generated events’ representations (Johnson & Raye, 1981). 
These characteristics are then used to decide if an event was internally or externally 
generated. However, memory errors occur when monitoring processes fail. The monitoring 
can involve two different types of processes – one more systematic, conscious and 
deliberate and another more automatic, fast and of heuristic nature (Johnson, 1983). This 
distinction of two types of processes involved in cognitive operations is common to what 
has been proposed by other authors to explain cognitive functioning (e.g. Jacoby, 1991). 
Usually the idea behind these dual processes approaches is that if an individual can use both 
types of processes and both converge to the correct response, then the correct response will 
be achieved, but if the two types of processes lead to different responses, then an incorrect 
response may be produced. More importantly, the systematic process is less error prone 
than the heuristic process, as it considers more features of the event when making a 
judgment; but, the usage of the systematic process is not always available because it 
consumes time and cognitive resources; in cases in which the heuristic process is the only 
available process, reality monitoring errors are very likely to occur (Johnson, 1983; 
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). 
Based on this theory, in 1993, Johnson and colleagues developed a general 
framework of source monitoring. Source monitoring includes the attribution of not only an 
external or internal source to memories but also the judgment about other characteristics of 
the source, such as modality of presentation (visual, auditory, etc.), time or place. Thus, this 
general framework accounts not only for the occurrence of false memories because a failure 
in reality monitoring that leads to the misattribution of an external source to information 
that was generated internally but also the illusions of memory that may arise from the 
confusion of sources. For instance, the results obtained with the misinformation paradigm 
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(Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) can easily illustrate the way two 
external sources are confounded, affecting estimations of reality and creating memory 
errors. In the original version of this paradigm, Loftus and Palmer (1974) showed their 
participants a video of a car accident and later gave them a questionnaire containing this 
critical question “About how fast were the two cars going when they ____ each other?” in 
which the verb varied for different groups of participants. Participants who received the 
critical question with the verb smashed into estimated the velocities as being much higher 
than did participants who received the question with the verb hit. More interestingly, when 
asked if they saw broken glass on the floor in the video, 32% of the participants in the 
smashed into condition answered “yes” whereas only 14% of those in the hit condition said 
“yes”; and in reality, no broken glass appeared in the video. So, these results can be 
interpreted as deriving from confusion between the source of the information about the 
event (video) and the source of the information about velocity, which was the questionnaire 
and the verb used and not the original source of information (the video). 
In sum, the Activation-Monitoring framework combines the spreading of associative 
activation theory and the source monitoring framework to provide a theoretical explanation 
of the false memory effect. According to the Activation-Monitoring framework (Roediger 
& McDermott, 2000; Roediger et al., 2001), in the DRM paradigm a false recall or false 
recognition occurs, first because the presentation of the semantic associates to the critical 
nonpresented word activates their representation in memory and this activation converges 
and automatically and quickly spreads to the critical nonpresented word, which also gets a 
level of activation similar to the one of the presented words. After the automatic indirect 
activation of the critical word, the false recall or recognition may or may not occur, 
depending on how the monitoring processes operate – if monitoring is able to find out that 
the activation of the critical word occurred internally and not externally, the false memory 
does not occur; but if the monitoring processes go awry the false memory occurs. Within 
the DRM paradigm, the monitoring processes may fail at the time of encoding, when 
individuals have to distinguish between what is really occurring in the environment, i.e., 
what is being presented to them, and what they just thought because of the real external 
events; or at the time of retrieval, when individuals must untangle previous thoughts from 
previous experienced events (Roediger & McDermott, 2000; McDermott & Watson, 2001; 
Roediger et al., 2001). Thus, according to the Activation-Monitoring framework, a false 
memory occurs if indirect automatic activation takes place in concomitance with a failure 
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of reality/source monitoring. 
The central role of the spreading of activation to the generation of false memories 
within the DRM paradigm receives support primarily from Deese (1959), who showed that 
the associative strength between list words and the critical nonpresented word (backward 
associative strength – BAS) was strongly correlated with the level of false recall across lists 
(.87). In 2001, Roediger and colleagues also determined that the main factor positively 
correlated with the level of false recall was the BAS (.73), and also that BAS (as measured 
by the norms of Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998) was the strongest predictor of false 
recall in a multiple regression analysis (.70). This important role of BAS in producing false 
memories supports the associative activation theory of DRM false remembering, as BAS 
reflects the probability that that the critical nonpresented word is generated/activated 
whenever participants are presented with the list words in a free-association task, and this 
would precisely be the type of process occurring during the DRM list presentation 
(Roediger et al., 2001). Related to this issue is the fact that some DRM lists elicit more false 
remembering than others (Stadler et al., 1999) and it has been found that the major 
difference between the lists that elicit more false remembering and the lists that elicit less 
false remembering is that the previous have a higher mean BAS (Gallo & Roediger, 2002). 
Also in accordance with an explanation for the false memory effect based on the automatic 
dispersion of activation is the increase of false memories when the number of presented 
associates increases (Robinson & Roediger, 1997) and the occurrence of false memories 
even when the DRM lists are presented subliminally, preventing the conscious activation of 
the critical word (Seamon et al., 2002; McDermott & Watson, 2001). 
Supporting the importance of the failure of monitoring for false memories to occur 
are the findings that veridical recall is negatively correlated with false recall (-.43), when 
analyzed by a multiple regression analysis (Roediger et al., 2001), which seems to indicate 
that the weaker the veridical memories are the harder it is to differentiate externally 
generated memories from internally generated memories because veridical memories could 
operate to help distinguishing externally generated from internally generated 
representations, as predicted by the reality monitoring approach. Also, the reduction of false 
memories when the presented words are paired with the respective image representation 
(Israel & Schacter, 1997; Schacter, Cendan, Dodson, & Clifford, 2001) points to the 
importance of perceptual details to distinguish between externally generated representations 
and internally generated representations, showing that the addition of perceptual details 
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allows a more efficient source monitoring. Still related to the importance of a failure of 
monitoring for the false memory to occur, the abovementioned strong phenomenological 
illusions that accompany false memories, such as attributing a voice to the nonpresented 
word (Payne et al., 1996) provide support for a failure of source monitoring when false 
memories are produced. And finally, also in accordance with the source monitoring 
approach, Norman and Schacter (1997) and Balota and colleagues (1999) showed that older 
adults, who are known to have less efficient monitoring processes (see Balota, Dolan, & 
Duchek, 2000), show higher levels of false memories.  
 The Activation-Monitoring framework thus seems very well supported by some of 
the general findings obtained with the DRM paradigm. However, some other theories such 
as the Fuzzy Trace (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1995b), have also received empirical support 
and, as we will see in the next section, and although they differ from the Activation-
Monitoring framework in terms of the explanation of the false memory effect, they are not 
incompatible with it. 
  
3.2.2. The Fuzzy Trace Theory 
The Activation-Monitoring framework is not the only dual process framework 
proposed to explain the effects obtained with the DRM paradigm. Valerie Reyna and 
Charles Brainerd (1995a; 1995b) developed a theory based on thematic consistency 
to explain false memory effects – the Fuzzy Trace theory (FTT). This theory does 
not apply only to false memory effects but also to decision making, deductive 
inference, quantitative judgment, and cognitive development (for a review, see 
Reyna & Brainerd, 1995a). The basic assumption of the FTT is that two different 
types of memory traces are extracted when information is presented and thus dual-
opponent processes are involved in false memories (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002).  
The idea that two different types of memory traces are extracted when 
information is presented means that individuals process the surface form and the 
general meaning of the experience and store dissociated representations of each. 
More specifically, the encoding of surface form originates verbatim traces and the 
encoding of the general meaning originates gist traces. For example, if we present 
the word “spaniel”, the gist traces dog or pet can be activated plus the verbatim 
traces derived from the stimulus. The two types of memory traces are encoded in 
parallel and the processing of the gist begins as early as 20 to 30 ms after the onset 
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of the stimulus well before the processing of the verbatim traces is completed, 
indicating that the gist processing is not a simple derivation of the verbatim 
processing (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). The verbatim traces refer to the 
representation of the form and specific characteristics of the presented items, 
including contextual information (e.g. attributes such as type of font, color, voice, 
position in the list, etc.) whereas the gist traces are the meanings, relations and 
patterns that emerge from the encoding of several items and thus captures the 
meaning of experience without specific characteristics (e.g., overlapping conceptual 
or perceptual attributes and shared theme). Given the differences between the two 
types of traces, their differential accessibility will influence the levels of veridical 
and false memories. For instance, retrieval cues will influence the accessibility of 
gist and verbatim traces – items that were actually experienced (spaniel in the 
example above) are good retrieval cues for verbatim traces whereas items that were 
not experienced but preserve the same meaning of the presented ones (for example, 
collie) are good retrieval cues for gist traces (dog and pet, in the example). The 
retrieval of gist and verbatim traces is also influenced by the type of encoding of the 
stimulus, if one focused more on each item and processed its specific characteristics 
as when the same item is repeatedly presented (e.g., spaniel is repeatedly presented), 
the retrieval of verbatim traces would be favored; but if one focused more on the 
relations between the presented stimuli as when different exemplars of one meaning 
are presented (e.g., spaniel, collie, terrier, and poodle are presented), the extraction 
of gist traces would be favored. This is in accordance with theories that oppose item-
specific processing to relational processing (e.g., Hunt & McDaniel, 1993) and 
verify that a focus on the later increases veridical memory with the cost of also 
increasing false memory (e.g., Smith & Hunt, 1998; McCabe, Presmanes, 
Robertson, & Smith, 2004), but we will get to these theories when we discuss other 
processes and theories that may be important to a better understanding of the false 
memory phenomena. It should also be noted that memory for verbatim traces 
decline faster than memory for gist traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). 
As mentioned, the FTT considers that dual-opponent processes are involved in 
false memories (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). This means that the FTT assumes that 
two different processes have opposite effects on the level of false memories and 
these processes are related to the two types of traces extracted at encoding. Thus, for 
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non-experienced items that preserve the meaning of the presented ones, recovery of 
gist traces contributes to increasing false memories whereas recovery of verbatim 
traces contributes to suppressing false memories. On the other hand, for experienced 
items, the recovery of both verbatim and gist traces contributes to a high level of 
veridical memory. One finding that has been considered to be diagnostic of 
opponent processes is the inverted-U relations between false memory levels and 
variables such as the number of list presentations (e.g., Seamon et al., 2002), 
duration of presentation (e.g., McDermott & Watson, 2001), or retrieval time on 
memory tests (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003). In line with this, it 
should be noted that the conceptualization of false memories as a result of these two 
opponent processes makes possible to apply a process dissociation model to the 
results on recognition tests (Brainerd, Reyna, & Mojardin, 1999).  
The FTT, just as the Activation-Monitoring framework (Roediger et al., 2001), 
has received some empirical support. The FTT assumes that dissociations between 
veridical and false memories will occur whenever the experimental situation fosters 
reliance on verbatim traces as the basis for acceptance of items and thus acceptance 
and rejection of items will be based on different memory traces. One way to foster 
reliance on verbatim traces is to have participants performing the memory test 
immediately after the study phase in opposition of a long delay between study and 
testing (e.g., Reyna & Kiernan, 1994, Exp. 1), and the results in these tasks are in 
accordance with the dissociation predicted by the FTT. On the contrary, the FTT 
assumes positive associations between veridical and false memories when the 
experimental situation fosters reliance on gist traces as the basis for acceptance of 
items. Increasing the delay between the study and the test or instructing participants 
to base their responses on the meanings presented encourage reliance on gist traces, 
and studies have shown that these manipulations actually make veridical and false 
memories positively associate (e.g., Reyna & Kiernan, 1994, Exp. 2, and 1995, Exp. 
2), supporting the FTT assumptions. Concerning the phenomenology that 
accompanies false memories, the FTT predicts that false memories will be 
accompanied by vivid illusory details, i.e., strong phenomenological details and 
“remember” judgments in the “remember/know” paradigm and, as previously 
referred this seems to be true (e.g., Payne et al., 1996). Moreover, the FTT predicts 
that these vivid illusory details, dubbed phantom recollection, should be dissociated 
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from veridical recollection, i.e., the vivid details that accompany veridical memory 
responses, whenever the experimental manipulations affect separately verbatim and 
gist traces, and this prediction has been supported by authors such as Brainerd, 
Wright, Reyna, and Mojardin (2001). 
Overall, just like the Activation-Monitoring Theory, the Fuzzy Trace theory 
receives some empirical support. However, the FTT has also received some critics 
and it does not seem to fully explain the false memory effects found in the literature. 
Thus, the two theories can be compared and somehow combined to provide a better 
description of the main false memory phenomena. 
 
3.2.3. The Activation-Monitoring vs. The Fuzzy Trace Theory 
So far, we have summarized the basic theoretical assumptions of the Activation-
Monitoring framework (Roediger et al., 2001) and the Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT) 
(Reyna & Brainerd, 1995a; 1995b). Now, it is of interest to see some criticisms 
pointed at both theories and how compatible can these two theories be. 
On one hand, the FTT presents a very vague definition of gist and does not 
specify how the strength of the gist can be quantified or measured nor how is the 
concept of gist related to conceptual categorization. This issue is of particular 
importance if we take Gallo and Roediger (2002) results pointing to the fact that 
similar lists, with a similar number of words and sharing two themes, have different 
ability to elicit false memories about each one of the themes. As an example, the list 
thematically related to the critical word sweet can be the same list thematically related 
to the critical word bitter, but after this list presentation, sweet is falsely recovered 
54% of the times whereas bitter is falsely recovered only 1% of the times. Of course, 
the Activation-Monitoring framework can handle these results because although the 
lists are similar and thematically related to both critical words, the mean BAS is 
different for each critical word, being higher for sweet than for bitter (Roediger et al., 
2001; Stadler et al., 1999). 
Another problem initially pointed to the FTT is that it did not handle false 
memory effects with materials that were not words and thus could not have a clear 
thematic consistency based on semantics. For instance, Sommers and Lewis (1999) 
obtained false memories with phonological associates that shared only surface 
features, the ones that, according to FTT, are encoded into verbatim traces and thus 
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contribute to veridical memory; and Pesta and colleagues (2001) obtained false 
memories with numerical associates. Also against the FTT is the super-aditivity 
reported by Watson, Balota and Roediger (2003) when they presented participants 
with mixed lists of semantic and phonological associates and obtained a higher 
number of false memories whereas according to the FTT, adding phonological 
associates would not contribute to promote semantic false memories. But, more 
recently, Holiday and Weekes (2006) defined the concept of “phonological gist” as 
the general theme based on the phonological relations at the sublexical level and 
admitted that these phonological relations can converge to a nonpresented item that 
shares the same phonological theme. This, in part, allows the FTT to accommodate 
phonological false memories but the definition of phonological gist is still a little bit 
fuzzy. Actually, it should be noted that the FTT is hard to systematically criticize 
because of the ill definition of some of its key-concepts such as gist and thus it 
appears to raise less criticisms than the Activation-Monitoring framework, but that’s 
not true.  
The Activation-Monitoring framework has suffered from critics related to the 
relation between false memories and tasks such as lexical decision. More specifically, 
Meade, Watson, Balota, and Roediger (2007) found that the activation of a critical word 
associated to the presented DRM lists only allowed that word to be a prime in a lexical 
decision task when the test item was presented immediately after the last list item whereas 
false recognition persisted across longer delays. But it should be noted that Tse and Neely 
(2005) had found the opposite results, indicating that the activation of the critical word 
derived from the lists presentation persists for some time and can function as a prime for 
some time. According to Michelle Meade and her colleagues (2007), these results indicate 
that false recognition obtained with the DRM paradigm results from reactivation processes 
that occur mainly during retrieval and that can be dissociated from simple activation 
processes that last fewer time. Of course, this critic is more aimed at the assumption that 
activation of the presented words automatically spreads to the nonpresented critical word. 
However, this is not a real critic to the Activation-Monitoring framework itself. Actually 
these results can easily be accommodated if the Activation-Monitoring framework is 
further specified. Meade and colleagues (2007) thus propose that a well integrated network 
encoded at the time of study is still present at the time of test and therefore activation also 
occurs during episodic retrieval. Thus the notion of “episodic retrieval mode” becomes 
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important. Participants enter the episodic retrieval mode when they are prompted to retrieve 
information and are exposed to strongly related recognition probes which reactivate the 
episodic associative network (Tulving, 1983). In the case of the DRM paradigm, the 
overlap between the recognition probes and the reactivated network is very high and thus 
participants tend to make erroneous episodic recognition decisions leading to false 
memories. In the special case of the critical nonpresented item, the reinstated episodic 
activation is so high because of the backward associative strength that false recognitions 
occur very frequently. By opposition, in a lexical decision task, participants do not have to 
enter in episodic retrieval mode and they simply consult the recently activated associative 
network, so the task will only be sensitive to forward associative strength and only during a 
brief period of time (Meade et al., 2007). About the monitoring processes, they still play a 
role as they are the only possible way to reject the occurrence of the critical nonpresented 
word in the list (Jacoby, 1991; Israel & Schacter, 1997) and they also benefit from 
recollection itself (e.g. Gallo, 2004).  
A more serious critic to the Activation-Monitoring framework is related to the work 
developed by Gunter, Ivanko, and Bodner (2005) that showed that when participants are 
tested only with related words (the presented words plus related lures), the level of false 
recognition decreases. According to the Activation-Monitoring framework we would 
expect the opposite, because the activation during test would be even higher than it is with 
the usual paradigm. Gunter and colleagues (2005) thus assume that the classic procedure 
emphasizes gist-based responses because studied and non-studied words are chiefly 
distinguishable on the basis of gist traces and the only ones that violate the validity of that 
distinction are the critical nonpresented words that share the gist with the presented words 
but were never presented. Nevertheless, veridical memory also gets lower when the test is 
composed only by related words, which may indicate that, as the test is harder, participants 
adopt a more strict criterion of response, as would be advocate by the proponents of the 
Signal Detection Theory (Miller & Wolford, 1999). 
Finally, another critic to the Activation-Monitoring framework is that it does not 
deal with results showing high levels of false recognition for materials that were not 
previously represented in memory and therefore cannot be activated by convergent 
spreading activation. So, material such as non-words (e.g., Zeeelenberg, Boot, & Pecher, 
2005), dot-patterns (e.g., Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970), novel faces (e.g., Solso & 
McCarthy, 1981), or even visual patterns (e.g., Franks & Bransford, 1971) leads to false 
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recognition of similar objects. Thus, materials that easily provide a prototype (e.g., 
Nosofsky, 1991) seem to be subject to the same memory errors that lists of associated 
words. But, contrary to those lists, the referred materials are not previously associated, or 
even represented, in memory and therefore, a simple convergence of spread activation 
cannot account for these memory effects, posing a problem for the Activation-Monitoring 
framework. Some authors have tried to explain the false memory effect as a prototype 
effect (e.g., Whittlesea, 2002) but, despite some theoretical similarities with the activation 
accounts, these theoretical proposals are not the simplest way to account for many of the 
false memory effects and even if “relatedness” may explain all these effects, the theoretical 
differences between the different explanations lie precisely in the different 
conceptualizations of the nature of relations between materials (Gallo, 2006). We can 
consider that these prototype-false-memories are mainly based in the failure of perceptual 
discrimination from memory whereas the semantic false memories usually described in the 
DRM paradigm are mainly based in the failure of distinction between the previously stored 
representations indirectly activated and the ones directly activated via presentation. In any 
of the cases, we may assume that there is an associative structure involved and the 
difference rests in “when” that structure was formed – with the novel perceptual associative 
structures being formed at the time of presentation and specifically assembled for the task. 
But, to our knowledge, this issue has not yet been systematically studied and, as we will 
further discuss, we are more concerned with differential activation of pre-existing 
associative structures according to different processing goals than with the assembling of 
novel associative structures depending on the presented material. 
So far we have reviewed the theoretical assumptions of the two major theories used 
to explain false memory effects as well as the main findings supporting each one and the 
effects providing evidence that is not immediately dealt by each one of the theories. But are 
these two theories incompatible? First of all, it seems that associative activation plays a 
central role in the emerging of false memories but thematic consistency can also be 
involved and we can conceptualize thematic consistency as deriving exactly from semantic 
associations (Gallo, 2006). As Valerie Reyna pointed (cited by Gallo, 2006), concepts such 
as gist are not opposed to assumptions about associative networks because associative 
networks are exactly one of the possible ways that semantic gist may be represented. 
Actually, the definitions of thematic consistency, thematic gist, or phonological gist are 
very flexible and allow different interpretations. However it is safe to say that increasing 
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the likelihood of relevant semantic associations to be processed increases activation, 
consequently increasing the DRM illusion (Gallo, 2010). Also the monitoring 
processes are compatible with an approach focused on thematic similarity as their 
existence is somehow independent of the mechanisms responsible for the activation of 
the critical lures and thus it shouldn’t matter if those critical lures are incorrectly 
recovered because they were indirectly activated or because they share the theme of 
the presented lists and thus could have been presented. Thus, we can assume that the 
Activation-Monitoring framework provides perhaps the most compelling explanation 
for the false memory effect. Of course, as we mentioned, false memory effects with 
materials that did not have a previous representation in memory provide strong 
evidence for the importance of similarity based false memories, i.e. thematic false 
memories. Moreover, a very clever way to solve the apparent discrepancy between 
theories is to assume that different mechanisms operate differently depending on the 
type of test (recall or recognition), material involved (e.g., perceptually or 
semantically related) and even encoding conditions (Gallo, 2006). For instance, BAS 
seems to have a higher impact on false recall than on false recognition (Gallo & 
Roediger, 2002), indicating that maybe gist extraction has a bigger impact on 
recognition than on free recall, and it should be noted that the FTT was developed to 
account for false recognition effects and not for false recall effects (Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1995b). It is also worth of mention that these two theories make similar 
predictions for the majority of false memory effects (Gallo, 2006), with the exception 
of the ones abovementioned. So,  for the remainder of this work we will focus more 
on the Activation-Monitoring framework specially because it contemplates a wider 
set of conditions on its predictions – it is applicable to recognition tests as well as to 
free recall tests and it makes predictions for different types of materials as long as 
they were previously represented in memory. Nevertheless, whenever the FTT is 
useful to further explain the obtained results we will go back to it. In the next section, 
for the sake of completeness, we will review some other theories used to explain false 
memory effects but we will not provide deep descriptions of each one as they do not 
seem to be better explanations than the Activation-Monitoring framework and have 
sometimes proved to add few to the explanations already provided by the associative 
theories or the similarity based theories. 
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3.3. Monitoring related processes: Decreasing false memories? 
One of the reasons why , it is so hard to avoid false memories is because monitoring 
processes tend to fail under certain circumstances. But, what is exactly the nature of 
monitoring processes and which are the main characteristics of the most efficient ones? 
Monitoring is very specific as it depends on the materials and tasks involved and also on 
individual strategies and expectations (Schacter, Gallo, & Kensinger, 2007). As Schacter 
and colleagues (2007) refer, one reason to think that monitoring processes are specific and 
thus hard to be generalized is the variability of the relation between veridical and false 
memory. It could seem reasonable to think of monitoring as related to veridical memory 
and that an increment of veridical memory would enhance monitoring processes and 
therefore reduce false memories. However, the relation between veridical and false 
memories does not follow that simple rule. Some manipulations, such as repeating words at 
study or slowing down the presentation rate, effectively reduced false memories by 
enhancing veridical memory and consequently making available a recollection-based 
monitoring process (e.g., Benjamin, 2001; McDermott & Watson, 2001; Seamon et al., 
2002); on the other hand, other manipulations such as presenting studied items in distinctive 
ways by using pictures or different fonts, are known to enhance monitoring processes but 
have no effect on the levels of veridical memory (e.g., Schacter et al., 1999; Dodson & 
Schacter, 2001); and there are also manipulations, such as taking multiple tests on the 
presented DRM lists, that enhance veridical memory but have no effect on false memories 
(e.g., Nunes & Weinstein, 2012). These different patterns of veridical and false memories 
clearly indicate that monitoring is not always based on the same processes and the way it 
operates must be complex (Schacter et al., 2007). 
Two qualitatively different major recollection-based monitoring processes have been 
proposed – one that reflects a recall-to-reject strategy (Gallo, 2004) and another one 
reflecting the use of a distinctiveness heuristic (Israel & Schacter, 1997; Schacter, Israel, & 
Racine, 1999). The distinctiveness heuristic was first developed to explain why false 
recognition is reduced when study format is perceptually distinctive as, for example, when 
pictures are presented with the DRM list words. The reasoning behind this heuristic is that 
when stimuli is perceptually distinctive, individuals will be able to have more distinctive 
recollections than when stimuli was less distinctive and thus will be able to reduce false 
memories for which there is no distinctive information (Schacter et al., 1999). On the other 
hand, the recall-to-reject strategy relies on the recollection of information that allows the 
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critical item to be rejected (Gallo, 2004). So, the distinctiveness heuristic reduces false 
memories because the lack of retrieval of details accompanying the critical items makes 
them get rejected whereas the recall-to-reject strategy makes the critical item get rejected 
because detailed information is retrieved. This distinction between two different types of 
monitoring is important because when false memories fail to occur it may be attributable to 
either one of the referred processes and it has implications for the inferences made about the 
memory for the studied materials and their organization. The importance of these two 
monitoring processes will be further discussed when we refer to one of the experiments 
conducted.  
However, another view that may explain the effects that usually support the use of a 
recollection-based strategy, especially the distinctiveness heuristic, is the one that opposes 
item-specific processing (Arndt & Reder, 2003) to relational processing (Einstein & Hunt, 
1980; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993).  According to Arndt and Reder (2003), presenting study 
items in more distinctive formats or accompanied by more perceptual details will lead to 
more item-specific processing, i.e., individuals will focus more on the specific details of 
each item than on the relation between items and thus relational processing will be 
hampered. If relational processing is reduced, the activation of the critical nonpresented 
item will also be reduced and therefore the level of false memories will decrease. This view 
is different of the distinctiveness heuristic because it is memory based and not decision 
based, so it should occur not only on within-participants manipulations but also on 
between-participants manipulations, indicating that not only the criterion set but also 
encoding itself will be affected in function of the studied items and that will shape decisions 
at retrieval. Because this effect of false memories reduction via item-specific processing 
occurred both within and between participants (Arndt & Reder, 2003), the item-specific 
hypothesis receives support. Arndt and Reder (2003) actually argue that increasing item 
specific processing during encoding will hamper the memory signal for the related 
nonpresented items. It can be argued that it is not just a distinctiveness heuristic based on 
item-specific processing that is operating but a lack of relational processing due to more 
item-specific processing (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Smith & Hunt, 1998; McCabe et al., 
2004). Although this explanation can seem very compelling – monitoring processes that 
occur during encoding and prevent relational processing and thus avoid the activation of the 
critical items or the encoding of the list gist – Schacter and colleagues (2001) directly tested 
it by using a gist recognition test in opposition to a standard recognition test. In a gist 
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recognition test, participants are instructed to respond “old” not only to the studied items 
but also to the items that could have been studied because seem somehow related to the 
studied ones. Thus, in the gist recognition test, all the effects that are only due to monitoring 
strategies such as the distinctiveness heuristic or the recall to reject strategy should be 
eliminated, but the effects due to monitoring at encoding and specially to activation during 
encoding should remain the same obtained in a standard recognition test. Dodson and 
colleagues found that false memories reduction after studying words accompanied by 
pictures was higher in the standard recognition test than in the gist recognition test. The 
procedure of studying words and pictures is supposed to reduce false memories either by 
making possible the disctinctiveness heuristic to operate or by prompting item-specific 
processing, but according to the relational encoding hypothesis, it is item-specific 
processing what is leading to less relational processing and thus reducing the activation of 
the critical words. The fact that false memories reduction is higher in the standard 
recognition test indicates that a deficit of relational encoding is not enough to explain the 
effects due to accentuation of distinctive features of items. However, as the pattern of false 
memories obtained was similar in both tests, the deficit of relational processing also seems 
to be playing a role. Taken together, these findings suggest that when item-specific 
processing is enhanced, there is a reduction of false memories, but the way that item-
specific processing is contributing to the reduction of false memories is still not clear 
(Gallo, 2006). But we think that the two proposed ways that item-specific processing may 
be contributing to the reduction of false memories are not mutually exclusive – at one hand, 
item-specific processing may be facilitating a distinctiveness heuristic to operate; and on the 
other hand it may be preventing relational processing to occur. But the disentangling of 
these two processes may be hard. However, it should be said that increased relational 
processing does not necessarily increase false memories, as the abovementioned recall-to-
reject strategy may benefit from enhanced relational processing that will allow activating 
the obvious critical items and thus reject them. This would be consistent with studies 
showing that when the theme of a DRM list is easily identifiable, the level of false 
memories is reduced (Carneiro et al., 2009). The referred idea of item-specific processing 
and relational processing as opposed processes preventing and instigating false memories, 
respectively, will deserve more attention in the discussion of our experiments, as we 
assume that these two processes can be used depending on the activated processing goal 
and the nature of the associative structure activated. 
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3.4. Concluding remarks: Implications of processes and effects  
For almost the last two decades the false memory phenomena has been 
thoroughly studied. After Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) adaptation of the 
original Deese’s (1959) paradigm, the false memory effect has been shown to occur 
within materials other than semantic associates, such as phonological associates 
(Sommers & Lewis, 1999) or numerical associates (Pesta et al., 2001). Also different 
materials that do not seem to have a previous representation in memory revealed to be 
susceptible to false retrieval as, for example, faces (Solso & McCarthy, 1981), dot-
patterns (Posner & Keele, 1968, 1970), or even visual patterns (e.g., Franks & Bransford, 
1971). Of course some of these results were anterior to the publication of the 1995’s 
Roediger and McDermott paper, but all of them have been reanalyzed in light of the more 
recent findings and proposed theories (for a review, see Gallo, 2006). Of course, the DRM 
paradigm as it had been initially used (Roediger and McDermott, 1995) suffered several 
adaptations to study how different materials are represented in memory and how different 
encoding and testing manipulations may affect the level of both veridical and false 
memories. The false memory effects have also been extended to different age groups and it 
has been shown that children produced false memories just like adults as long as they were 
tested with materials normed for their age (e.g., Carneiro, Albuquerque, Fernandez, & 
Esteves, 2007) and older adults tend to produce more false memories than young adults 
mainly due to monitoring failures (e.g. Balota et al., 1999). 
Taken together, the different effects obtained with adaptations of the DRM paradigm, 
two theories seem to be the ones providing better insight into the processes that occur in 
memory, at time of encoding and retrieval. One of these theories is the FTT, proposed by 
Reyna and Brainerd (1995a), which assumes the encoding of two distinct types of traces for 
each stimulus – verbatim traces, represeting perceptual details and contributing to veridical 
memory, and gist traces, which capture the semantic meaning, i.e., the general theme of a 
list of stimuli and contribute to false memories about nonpresented items that share the 
same general theme. But the most accepted theory is the Activation-Monitoring framework 
(Roediger et al., 2001) which can be applicable to free recall and recognition tests and to 
different types of materials.  
The Activation-Monitoring framework assumes that a fast and automatic spreading 
of activation occurs (Collins & Loftus, 1975), from the presented items to the nonpresented 
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associated items; because in the DRM paradigm, all the presented items have at least one 
associate in common (i.e., the critical word), this spreading activation converges to that 
nonpresented item and it gets indirectly activated. Then, at the time of test, if monitoring 
processes that usually allow to distinguish internal from external activation (Johnson & 
Raye, 1981) fail, the nonpresented item will erroneously be judged as a presented item. It 
should be noted that monitoring may also occur during the encoding phase and the 
activation may also occur during the test at time of retrieval. 
But what differentiates veridical from false memories? Are they completely 
indistinguishable? We have already mentioned that in “remember/know” judgments, 
falsely recovered items receive as many “remember” answers as presented items (e.g., 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Read, 1996, for recognition tests and free recall tests, 
respectively) and that a specific source-voice is easily attributed to items that have never 
been heard (e.g., Sommers & Lewis, 1999). But, several studies have been specially 
designed to test if the subjective content of false memories is similar to the subjective 
content of veridical memories and indicated that participants recollect more perceptual 
details of the studied items than of the nonpresented critical items (Mather, Henkel, & 
Johnson, 1997; Norman & Schacter, 1997). These results have been supported by 
neuroimaging data obtained using different techniques (e.g., Schacter et al., 1996; Fabiani 
Stadler, & Wessels, 2000; Cabeza, Rao, Wagner, Mayer, & Schacter, 2001;). Schacter and 
colleagues (1996) have used PET to test if the veridical recognition of auditorily presented 
words elicit more activity in the brain auditory-specific regions, such as the superior 
temporal gyrus and the supramarginal gyrus, than the false recognition of nonpresented 
critical words and found the expected pattern, with more activation occurring for the 
veridical recognition. In a ERP study, Fabiani and colleagues (2000) found that veridical 
but not false recognition elicited laterality effects corresponding to the lateralized visual 
presentation used at study. Using fMRI, Cabeza and colleagues (2001) also found that, after 
a visual presentation at study, veridical recognition was more likely to activate brain areas 
involved in visual processing (e.g., parahippocampal gyrus) than false recognition. These 
neuroimaging results point to differences between veridical and false memories but, given 
the strong set of empirical evidence, the truth is that false memories are difficult do avoid. 
 So far, we have reviewed some of the main effects obtained within the study of 
false memories and how these effects contributed to the development of the main theories 
or frameworks used to explain memory distortions. We have also provided some 
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information about which processes are supposed to be involved in the creation of memory 
errors. Although the false memory phenomenon is a very well studied one it is clear that 
there is no consensus on the nature of the processes involved and thus the theories 
developed to explain memory distortions actually overlap on some features and are not 
mutually exclusive. Despite this, the study of false memories and their formation and nature 
seems very useful to inform our theories of memory (Roediger, 1996) and to clarify the 
way different processing goals may impact encoding of information and retrieval processes, 
as well as how the nature of materials and their organization in memory reflects on the 
patterns of veridical and false memories. One of the main insights provided by the research 
in false memories specially relevant to the present work is that as long as we are dealing 
with associative structures, retrieval errors, i.e., false memories, will arise. And it does not 
matter if the associations were made at the time of encoding (e.g., dot patterns; Posner & 
Keele, 1970) or if they existed long before encoding in memory (e.g., semantic memory; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In the next chapter of this introduction we will develop this 
idea that we can use memory paradigms to study impression formation and memory for 
personality traits. The main hypothesis and theoretical proposals of the present work will 
also be discussed. 
 
4. PRESENT STUDIES: THE IMPLICIT THEORY OF PERSONALITY AS AN 
ASSOCIATIVE STRUCTURE PRONE TO FALSE MEMORIES 
The way we form impressions about others’ personalities has been thoroughly 
studied since the 1920’s (e.g., Thorndike, 1920) but it was only after Asch’s seminal 
study, published in 1946, that the study of impression formation became more 
focused on the processes involved than on the outcome of the impression and its 
accuracy. As we referred, Asch viewed the process of forming an impression as a 
holistic process by which the perceiver tried to combine all the information available 
about the target into an unified impression – a gestaltic impression. Asch’s conception 
of the impression formation process as a gestaltic process can be discussable (e.g., 
Anderson, 1965), but the effects he reported definitely galvanized the study of 
impressions formation.  
Asch (1946) was responsible for identifying two main effects on impression 
formation – the centrality effect and the primacy effect. The centrality, or “warm-
cold” has been systematically replicated (e.g., Mensh & Wishner, 1974; Veness & 
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Brierley, 1963; Zanna & Hamilton, 1972) and also has the primacy effect (e.g., Mayo 
& Crockett, 1964; Anderson & Barrios, 1961; Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Anderson, 
1965; Stewart, 1965). The general idea that Asch used to explain these effects was 
that some personality traits were weighted more heavily when forming an impression 
either because of their characteristics and relation to the context created by the other 
traits or because they were presented earlier and guided the impression, changing the 
meaning of the following traits, for the sake of forming a complete, integrated and 
coherent impression (Asch, 1946; Asch & Zukier, 1984). In opposition to Asch, 
Norman Anderson (1965; 1967; 1969) suggested that these effects could be explained 
by simple information integration rules. According to Anderson, perceivers would 
perform an average of an initial impression with the presented traits values, 
suggesting an elementaristic view of the impression formation process, in which each 
trait was weighted independently of the context, i.e., the other presented traits. We are 
not particularly concerned with the opposition between Asch and Anderson and we 
discussed their theoretical debate mainly for the sake of completeness. More 
interesting to us are the approaches that conceive the process of forming an 
impression of personality as the placement of the target in a bidimensional space in 
which the personality traits are represented and their location reflects their 
characteristics and the relations they have with each other (Bruner and Tagiuri, 1954; 
Rosenberg et al., 1968).  
According to Bruner and Tagiuri (1954), the beliefs we hold about which 
personality traits tend to co-occur in the same individual and our expectations about 
other’s personalities form a shared implicit theory of personality. It is then this 
implicit theory of personality that will guide the impression formation process. 
Following the idea that there is a structure representing personality traits and their 
relationship, Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) used multidimensional scaling 
techniques and cluster analysis to identify a bidimensional representation of this 
structure. This bi-dimensional semantic space is formed by two largely independent 
dimensions – a social and an intellectual – each one with two poles – a positive and a 
negative – resulting in four different clusters: a social positive, a social negative, an 
intellectual positive, and an intellectual negative. It is also possible to clearly identify 
which personality traits form each cluster, how distant they are from one another, and 
which traits are more central to each cluster, i.e., the trait closest to all the traits 
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forming a given cluster. We can thus consider that forming an impression of 
personality is the placement of the target in this semantic space, as suggested by 
Brown (1986) and that people usually go beyond the information given when forming 
an impression about someone’s personality (e.g. Asch, 1946). So, individuals should 
actively infer non-presented information that could “go-together” with the presented 
one and the centrality and primacy effects could be explained by these processes. 
Wishner (1960) and Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) had already suggested that 
Asch’s (1946) reported effects could be explained by the relations between the traits 
used to describe the target and the traits presented in the checklist used to measure the 
impression formed. But our idea goes a little beyond this, and we suggest that Asch’s 
effects are determined by the configuration of the implicit theory of personality that, 
in turn, represents the organization of personality traits in memory and the associative 
links between them. We thus make a parallel between the implicit theory of 
personality and other associative memory structures thoroughly studied in the 
memory literature, such as semantic memory structures. Plus, we consider the 
importance of descriptive and evaluative aspects of each personality trait, as Brown 
(1986) and Peabody (1967; 1990) suggested and incorporate their idea that 
consistency (either evaluative or descriptive) plays a role in the process of forming an 
impression of personality. 
More specifically, we suggest that when individuals form impressions about a 
target’s personality from a series of stimulus traits, they attempt to position the target 
in the intellectual/social semantic space described by Rosenberg and colleagues 
(1968) and that this semantic space behaves as an associative memory structure, being 
highly flexible and thus prone to the same errors and biases. For instance, just as what 
occurs with memory for lists of semantic associates, if an individual is presented with 
a number of positive intellectual traits used to describe a given target, the subsequent 
activation of these traits would gradually converge on their non-presented semantic 
neighbors that load more heavily in the intellectual dimension and possess positive 
valence, originating the false attribution of these traits to the target and, if in a 
memory test, to their false retrieval. Moreover, we hypothesize that impression 
formation encoding processes involve the assemblage of this specific semantic trait 
space that is not available under encoding goals of memorization. And, therefore, 
certain effects will be maximized under impression formation processing goals, such 
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as the role of consistency.  
If it is true that the semantic structure of the implicit theory of personality 
behaves as an associative structure, although conditional to impression formation 
processing goals, we should be able to study it using paradigms usually used to study 
other associative memory structures. The DRM paradigm has successfully 
demonstrated the flexible and error-prone nature of associative memory structures 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995). So, we propose to use an adaptation of the DRM 
paradigm to study the implicit theory of personality and the differences between the 
representations of personality traits under impression formation goals and the 
representations of the same traits under memorization goals. We also propose to 
replicate Asch’s centrality and primacy effects using this false memory paradigm, i.e., 
we will try to demonstrate a centrality effect and a primacy effect reflected in false 
memories of personality. Thus, we argue that the implicit theory of personality can be 
seen as an associative memory structure, which activation is conditional to impression 
formation processing goals, that can be prone to memory errors; and effects such as 
the centrality or primacy effects, reported by Asch (1946) are strictly connected to 
those memory errors that will impact the impression formed.  
In case our assumptions about the implicit theory of personality structure and its 
proneness to memory biases receive support, it will also be interesting to test what 
happens to this type of information when it is subject to serial reproduction. If serial 
reproduction of information reflects individual memory biases as suggested (Bartlett, 
1932), then information prone to those individual biases as the information about 
impressions of personality may be, should also suffer changes across a serial 
reproduction chain. More interestingly, the serial reproduction technique is supposed 
to mimic the social transmission of information and the process by which rumor 
spreads (Allport & Postman, 1947) and impressions of personality contain socially 
relevant information, thus we will be able to assess if the effects of repeatedly 
transmitting socially relevant information are similar to the effects of transmitting 
socially irrelevant information, such as lists of semantic associates (Roediger et al., 
2009). Plus, we will be able to compare the effects of repeated and serial reproduction 
of formed impressions as well as measure the survival rate of personality traits with 
different characteristics, i.e., to check which personality traits do not vanish across 
repeated and/or serial reproduction and evaluate their positioning within the implicit 
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theory of personality structure. 
To test these ideas, we developed a set of five studies. First, we tested the idea 
that the implicit theory of personality could be seen as an associative memory 
structure prone to associative memory errors and if its activation was conditional to 
impression formation goals. To do this (Experiment 1), we developed an adaptation of 
the DRM paradigm, using lists of personality traits belonging to a given personality 
cluster instead of semantic associates and manipulating the type of instructions (either 
giving memorization goals or impression formation goals). We then tested the levels 
of veridical and false recognition in a standard recognition test and in an inclusive 
recognition test. In a second set of two studies (Experiments 2a and 2b) we tried to 
replicate the centrality effect by using the same adaptation of the DRM paradigm. In a 
third set of two experiments (Experiments 3a and 3b) we attempted to replicate the 
primacy effect, using the same DRM modification. And, finally, in two studies 
(Experiment 4 and Experiment 5), we tested the serial and repeated reproduction of 
personality traits and their survival rate. 
We will now present the referred set of studies. For each experiment we will 
start by introducing our hypothesis and predictions as well as briefly reviewing the 
rationale behind it. Then we will present the methods used and the results obtained. 
Finally we will briefly discuss the results. After the presentation of all the studies we 
will present a final integrated general discussion. 
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EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 
 
STUDY 1: FALSE MEMORIES WITHIN THE IMPLICIT THEORY OF PERSONALITY3 
In this first study we intend to combine false memory research with impression 
formation research. As already explained, false memory effects have been shown to 
occur in a variety of associative structures. Thus, we hypothesize that these effects 
can also originate from impression formation. As Brown (1986) suggested when 
people form impressions of a target's personality from a series of stimulus traits, they 
attempt to position the target in the intellectual/social semantic space described by 
Rosenberg and colleagues (1968). So, it seems reasonable to think that impression 
formation encoding processes involve the assemblage of a specific semantic trait 
space before placement of the target in that space. For instance, if a person is 
presented with a number of positive intellectual traits, the subsequent activation of 
these traits will gradually converge on their non-presented semantic neighbors that 
load more heavily in the intellectual dimension and possess positive valence. In order 
to test this hypothesis, we composed four study lists that mainly correspond to the 
four clusters from the bi-dimensional implicit theory of personality (Rosenberg et al., 
1968) and presented them to our participants, such that each participant was only 
presented with one of them. At test, we assessed recognition memory for critical non-
presented traits that best represent these four clusters. We expect false alarms to be 
higher for traits that belong to the same cluster of those included in the list (i.e., 
matching false alarms) than for traits that belong to other clusters (i.e., mismatching 
false alarms). However, because the recruitment of the specific semantic structure 
underlying impressions of personality is hypothesized to be conditional to impression 
formation, we expect this difference to be much greater for participants instructed 
with impression formation goals relatively to participants instructed to simply 
memorize the words. 
Before continuing with the full description of the experiment, we must point 
your attention to the constitution of the study lists. Since the study list itself was 
composed by highly diagnostic trait words, it could inadvertently induce impression 
formation goals (for a similar case, see Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987; for an example of 
                                                        
3 This study is published as Garcia-Marques, L., Ferreira, M., Nunes, L. D., Garrido, M., & Garcia-
Marques, T. (2010). False Memories and Impressions of Personality. Social Cognition, 28, 556-
568. Therefore, parts of this section are a reproduction of the mentioned article. 
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the implicit induction of impression formation goals, see Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). 
In fact, as indicated by pilot testing, participants in the memory condition would often 
engage in spontaneous impression formation. Therefore, to prevent such possibility, 
we also included athematic words (not related to personality traits) in the study lists 
and associates of these athematic words in the recognition test. To make these 
athematic words plausible descriptors of personality, impression formation 
participants were told that the study list was composed of words provided by people 
who knew the target well, that could be adjectives, verbs or nouns. 
Thus, we predicted a higher rate of false memories under impression formation 
relative to memory conditions because the recruitment of the semantic structure 
underlying impressions of personality is conditional on impression formation. 
However, it could be argued that fewer false memories under memory instructions 
would merely be due to enhanced source monitoring at retrieval. This is, memory 
participants might simply be better at discriminating presented from non-presented 
items than impression formation participants, because they encoded more distinctive 
features of the list items at study. They then could use their failure to remember 
distinctive features at retrieval to decide that they had not seen the item, as a 
disqualifying monitoring strategy (Gallo, 2004). Thus, to disentangle these potential 
different explanations, we added a "gist" recognition test in which participants are 
asked to mark all items presented in the study phase plus all items that "could have 
been presented" because they are somehow related to presented items (Brainerd, 
Wright, Reyna, & Payne, 2002). As standard and gist recognition tests differ 
dramatically in their monitoring requirements, the comparison between the results of 
these two tests has been used to differentiate between alternative accounts of the 
conditions in which false memories decrease (Hege & Dodson, 2004; Schacter, 
Cendan, Dodson, & Clifford, 2001). In our case, the proposal of a specialized 
semantic structure that is assembled under impression formation goals will be 
empirically supported if the results of both tests are identical (i.e., greater false alarms 
in the impression formation than in the memory group). Similar performance in the 
two tests will suggest a specific relational deficit for memory participants because 
even when they are tested under conditions that minimize monitoring requirements, 
fewer false alarms (highly diagnostic for impression formation) would occur. On the 
other hand, if the potential difference between impression formation and memory 
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found under standard recognition test conditions disappears in the gist test, this will 
suggest that the difference is merely a function of a higher efficacy of monitoring of 
memory relative to impression formation participants. That is, encoding the items for 
a subsequent memory test facilitates later monitoring and rejection of non-presented 
critical items.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1  
Method 
Participants. One hundred and forty-nine undergraduate students from the 
University of Lisbon participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit. 
 
Materials. We selected our materials from the norms for Portuguese personality 
traits developed by Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Toscano, Carvalho, e Hagá (2011), 
using multidimensional analysis. Ferreira and colleagues (2011; exp. 1) used a 
procedure similar to that used by Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) but also performed 
another experiment in which they collected the most frequently used personality traits 
instead of using an arbitrary choice of traits (2011; exp. 2). We decided to use the 
materials developed in this second experiment, as they should be a better 
representation of actual beliefs about personality. In this procedure, a first sample of 
25 students was asked to provide short trait based descriptions of liked and disliked 
persons (both personal acquaintances and persons they did not know personally). 
From these descriptions the authors chose the most frequent 40 positive and 40 
negative traits. Following Rosenberg and colleagues (1968), a different sample of 27 
students sorted the 80 traits in 12 sets according to their likelihood of co-occurrence 
in the same person. A multidimensional analysis basically reproduced the 
bidimensional structure identified by Rosenberg et al. (1968) (stress = .21). A 4-Way 
Cluster Analysis identified the four expected clusters that result from the combination 
of the two evaluative dimensions: social-positive (e.g., friendly, generous, kind), 
social-negative (e.g., conceited, selfish, aggressive), intellectual-positive (e.g., 
cultured, smart, determined), and intellectual-negative (e.g., incompetent, lazy, 
irresponsible) –please see Appendix 1 for the complete bidimensional representation 
of the Portuguese implicit theory of personality and the four clusters obtained. We 
used the data from this 4-Way Cluster Analysis to select the 15 words of each cluster 
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closest to its centroid. The 5 words closest to each centroid were used as the critical 
lures (never to be presented to participants) and the nine next words plus the central 
trait formed the four lists (i.e., intellectual-positive, intellectual-negative, social-
positive, and social-negative). We also selected six athematic words' not related to 
personality traits and included them in each of the four lists we used, obtaining four 
lists of 16 words each (ten personality traits and six athematic words). These 
athematic words (nontraits) (e.g. telephone, closet, rose) were added to prevent 
participants in the memory condition to use an impression formation strategy to 
memorize the lists (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). The six athematic words were 
common to every list and appeared exactly in the same positions (2, 5, 6, 9, 12, 15). 
The traits within each list were presented in crescent order of distance to the central 
trait for all the participants.  
The recognition test contained 43 items: the 20 critical lures (5 per cluster/list); 
5 impression-irrelevant lures; 10 non-presented athematic words (including 6 
semantic associates of the presented athematic words); 3 presented athematic words; 
and 5 presented traits. So, the 5 presented traits included in the recognition test varied 
according to the studied list, but the rest of the test remained equal to every 
participant. The gist test was identical to the standard recognition test except for 
sequence of presentation which was separately randomized for each test – please see 
Appendix 2 for the study lists used and the recognition/gist test items. 
 
Design. The design used was a 2 types of processing goal (memory vs. 
impression formation) X 4 lists (social-positive vs. social-negative vs. intellectual-
positive vs. intellectual-negative) between participants design. The dependent 
variables measured were veridical recognition for presented personality traits and 
presented athematic words; and false recognition of list matching traits (i.e., traits 
belonging to the same dimension and valence of the presented list), list mismatching 
traits (i.e., traits belonging to a different cluster than the one of the presented list), and 
athematic associates (i.e., words semantically associated to the athematic words 
presented). The number of participants assigned to each of the eight conditions varied 
between 17 and 21.  
Procedure. The experiment was run in small groups of four to ten participants. 
In the impression formation condition, participants were asked to form an impression 
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of personality of a target person described by a set of words provided by people who 
were well acquainted with the targets. The participants were alerted to the fact that 
those words could be adjectives or athematic nouns because these were words that 
“people who know the target well associate with him”. An example of how lists were 
formed was provided to participants. Namely, participants were told about a man 
“who works in an office and often forgets his pen and insistently borrows his 
colleagues’. When asked to provide words that come to mind when thinking about 
Miguel, his close friends and colleagues provided associations such as office, pen, 
persistent and forgetful”.  
Then the experimenter announced the target name and participants heard the 
CD-recorded list of 16 words. Subsequently participants were instructed to mentally 
revise their impressions and performed this task for 90 seconds. In the memory 
condition, participants were presented with a list of 16 words and they were instructed 
to memorize them. After presentation of the list, participants rehearsed the presented 
items for 90 seconds as a preparation for the upcoming memory test. After this 
learning phase, the procedure was identical in both conditions. Participants performed 
a distracter task for 10 minutes, followed by the standard recognition test and then the 
gist test (see Appendix 3 for the instructions for the recognition and the gist tests).  
At the end of the sessions, participants were fully debriefed and thanked.  
 
Results 
We report veridical recognition of list traits separated into positive list traits and 
negative list traits, veridical recognition of athematic words, and false recognition 
separated into false recognition of social positive traits, social negative traits, 
intellectual positive traits and intellectual negative traits, and false recognition of the 
athematic associated words.  
All data are presented in terms of proportions. The denominators from which 
proportions were calculated for each item type are as follows. For veridical 
recognition: list traits out of 5 (the number of traits presented in the study list and in 
the test); athematic words out of 3 (the number of athematic words presented in the 
study list and in the test). For false recognition: each type of critical trait (social 
positive, social negative, intellectual positive, and intellectual negative) calculated out 
of 5 (the number of critical words in the test from each of the four clusters or 
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combinations dimension-valence); irrelevant traits out of 5 (number of irrelevant traits 
included in the test) and athematic associated words out of 6 (the number of athematic 
associates in the test).   
 
Standard Recognition Test. Participants performed very well in the 
recognition test as the level of hits (veridical memory) always greatly exceeded the 
level of false memories (see Table 1). We first analysed hits computing a mixed-
model 2 processing goals (impression formation vs. memory) X 4 lists (social positive 
vs. social negative vs. intellectual positive vs. intellectual negative) X 2 type of hits 
(traits vs. athematic words) ANOVA, the last factor being within-participants and 
found only a main effect for type of hits, F(1, 141) = 13.93, p = .00, MSE = .04, η2 = 
.09, showing that participants correctly identified more presented traits than athematic 
words (M = .86 vs. M = .76). Our critical prediction regarded an increased level of 
false memories corresponding to the cluster of the presented list (i.e., list matching 
traits) under impression formation when compared to memory settings (see Table 1). 
To test this prediction we recoded the obtained false memories into list matching 
(proportions of false memories that corresponded to the same trait cluster of the items 
of the presented list), list mismatching (proportions of false memories that 
corresponded to a different trait cluster) and athematic associates (non-presented 
items that were associated with the athematic presented words). We then performed a 
mixed-model 2 processing goals (impression formation vs. memory) X 4 lists (social 
positive vs. social negative vs. intellectual positive vs. intellectual negative) X 3 type 
of false memories (list matching vs. list mismatching vs. athematic associates) 
ANOVA, the last factor being within-participants. We obtained a significant type of 
false memories main effect. This type of false memories effect, F(2,282) = 222.02, p 
= .00, MSE = .02, η2 = .58, revealed that, as expected, list matching (M = .34) were 
much more likely than list mismatching (M = .05) or athematic associates (M = .03) 
false memories. More interestingly, we also obtained the critical processing goal and 
type of false memories interaction, F(2, 282) = 10.92, p = .0001, MSE = .02, η2 = .03.  
This interaction, represented in Figure 5,  highlighted the fact that whereas the level 
of false memories was much higher for Impression Formation relative to Memory 
participants in the case of list matching [M = .40 vs. M = .28, t(141) = 2.69, p = .02], 
this difference disappeared for list mismatching (M = .04 vs. M = .05, p < .25) and 
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reversed for athematic associated false memories [M = .02 vs. M = .04, t(141) = 2.78, 
p = .00]. Thus as predicted impression formation participants were much more prone 
to accept false items from the Implicit Theory of Personality trait space that 
corresponded to the presented trait list. This result corroborates our argument that 
impression formation involves the activation of a specific semantic structure 
hypothesized in the implicit theory of personality followed by the placement of a 
target on this trait space. Moreover, the fact that this difference reversed for non-
presented associates of the presented athematic words speaks to the specificity of the 
process underlying impression formation. We will return to this reversal later.   
 
Table 1. Mean proportions of different types of veridical and false memories by type of list and 
condition in the standard recognition test in Experiment 1. 
 
Social Positive Social Negative Intellectual Positive Intellectual Negative
Impression Formation
Hits
Trait words (List) .95 .83 .82 .84
Athematic words .75 .74 .82 .81
False alarms
Social Positive .40 .00 .07 .04
Social Negative .00 .34 .00 .04
Intellectual Positive .22 .04 .46 .01
Intellectual Negative .00 .05 .00 .40
Athematic Associates .00 .04 .00 .02
Memory
Hits
Trait words (List) .90 .84 .80 .81
Athematic words .75 .77 .77 .71
False alarms
Social Positive .21 .02 .05 .01
Social Negative .00 .30 .01 .06
Intellectual Positive .23 .03 .31 .06
Intellectual Negative .00 .17 .01 .32
Athematic Associates .06 .06 .01 .04
Presented List
 
Note: Proportions of false memories that corresponded to the same cluster of the Implicit 
Theory of Personality of the items of the presented list are in bold. N = 149 
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Figure 5. Mean proportion of false alarms produced in the standard recognition test relative to list 
cluster personality traits and to other personality traits in Experiment 1 as a function of condition. Error 
bars display standard errors of the mean. 
 
Gist Recognition Test. As aforementioned, participants also filled a gist or 
inclusive recognition test after the standard recognition test. “Correct recognition” and 
“false recognition” in the gist test do not match “correct recognition” and “false 
recognition” for the standard recognition test because participants were instructed to 
select the previously presented words and all the words related to the presented ones. 
Thus in the case of the gist test, many false recognitions of previous test (e.g., non-
presented items from the presented list trait cluster) are strictly speaking “correct 
recognitions”. However, for the sake of clarity we will still call “correct recognition” 
when participants selected the presented words and “false recognition” when 
participants selected the non-presented words. The resulting data are presented in 
Table 2. We computed a mixed-model 2 processing goals (impression formation vs. 
memory) X 4 lists (social positive vs. social negative vs. intellectual positive vs. 
intellectual negative) X 2 type of hits (traits vs. athematic words) ANOVA, the last 
factor being within-participants. We again found only a main effect for type of hits, 
F(1, 141) = 18.51, p = .00, MSE=.03, η2 = .11, showing that participants accepted 
more presented traits than athematic words (M = .93 vs. M = .85).  Again, our critical 
data regard the proportion of false alarms, i.e., accepted non-presented items that 
semantically correspond to the cluster of the presented list (see Table 2). We 
predicted that the difference in false memories between Impression Formation and 
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Memory participants found under standard recognition test would persist in the gist 
test. To test this prediction we recoded gist false memories as we did for the standard 
recognition data into list matching (proportions of gist false memories that correspond 
to the same trait cluster of the items of the presented list), list mismatching 
(proportions of gist false memories that correspond to a different trait cluster) and 
athematic associates (non-presented items that are associated with the athematic 
presented words). We performed a 2 processing goals (impression Formation vs. 
memory) X 4 lists (social positive vs. social negative vs. intellectual positive vs. 
intellectual negative) X 3 type of gist false memories (list matching vs. list 
mismatching vs. athematic associates) mixed model ANOVA, the last factor being 
within-participants. The pattern of results paralleled what we found with the standard 
test.  We obtained a significant type of gist false memories main effect. This type of 
gist false memories effect, F(2, 282) = 167.95, p = .00, MSE = .05, η2 = .50, revealed 
that for gist false memories, list matching (M = .65) were much more likely than list 
mismatching (M = .22) or athematic associates (M = .27). In addition, we also 
obtained the critical processing goal vs. type of gist memories interaction, F(2, 282) = 
15.77, p = .00, MSE = .05, η2=.05. This interaction shows that whereas the level of 
false memories was much higher for Impression Formation relative to Memory 
participants in the case of list matching [M = .71 vs. M = .60, t(141) = 1.99, p = .05], 
this difference disappeared for list mismatching (M = .22 vs. M = .20, t < 1) and 
reversed for athematic associated gist memories [M = .18 vs. M = .35, t(141) = 3.56, p 
= .0001]4. Recall that we include a gist recognition test because the comparison 
between the data patterns for both types of tests has been used to differentiate 
between monitoring-based and relational-deficit-based accounts of decreased false 
memories. The parallel data patterns obtained suggests that the differences between 
impression formation and memory participants were not due to differences in 
monitoring efficacy but instead stem from divergent relational deficits more likely to 
occur at encoding. Memory participants (relatively to their Impression Formation 
counterparts) seem to exhibit an implicit theory of personality relational deficit, in the 
sense that they committed fewer false memories in standard recognition tests and 
                                                        
4 A complex Processing Goal X List Valence X Type of Gist False Memory was also significant 
suggesting that the above reported two-way interaction was stronger for positive than for 
negative lists. 
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accepted fewer gist items in the gist test for items that corresponded to the same 
cluster of the items of the presented list items. Conversely, Impression Formation 
relative to Memory participants display a semantic relational deficit, in the sense that 
they committed fewer false memories in standard recognition tests and accept fewer 
gist items in the gist test for non-presented associates of presented athematic items. 
We will explore the consequences of these results in the final section. 
 
Table 2. Mean proportions of different types of veridical and false memories by type of list and 
condition in the gist recognition test in Experiment 1. 
 
Social Positive Social Negative Intellectual Positive Intellectual Negative
Impression Formation
Hits
Trait words (List) .97 .93 .86 .89
Athematic words .78 .82 .84 .80
False alarms
Social Positive .81 .13 .21 .00
Social Negative .12 .73 .11 .08
Intellectual Positive .65 .27 .68 .20
Intellectual Negative .12 .44 .12 .18
Athematic Associates .20 .21 .14 .20
Memory
Hits
Trait words (List) .93 .93 .88 .82
Athematic words .91 .75 .83 .82
False alarms
Social Positive .48 .12 .21 .09
Social Negative .14 .73 .16 .18
Intellectual Positive .59 .14 .53 .11
Intellectual Negative .15 .42 .23 .54
Athematic Associates .47 .43 .54 .36
Presented List
 
Note: Proportions of gist false memories that corresponded to the same cluster of the Implicit Theory 
of Personality of the items of the presented list are in bold. N =149 
 
Discussion 
The reported results support our claim that false memories can stem from the 
implicit theory of personality associative structure as participants form impressions of 
personality. More specifically, the level of false memories obtained under impression 
formation instructions was higher than the level obtained under memory instructions.  
Moreover, the inclusion of athematic words among personality traits in the 
study lists led to more false alarms under memory instructions then under both the 
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standard and the gist recognition test. Thus, our results point to the critical importance 
of impression formation goals in the activation of a specialized semantic structure. 
From these results, we suggest that different encoding goals can lead to the activation 
of a somewhat different semantic structure. Once these specialized associative 
structures are active they seem even to interfere with the activation of the default 
association of the available stimuli, as it was the case with our athematic words. 
Under impression formation goals, the default semantic associates of the athematic 
words were much less often accepted in the gist recognition test then under a memory 
goal.  
Taken together, these results suggest that the Implicit Theory of Personality 
may function as a specialized semantic structure that is activated when the goal of 
impression formation is operative. This suggestion converges with recent work that 
advocates that social cognition may involve more than the mere recruitment of basic 
generic cognitive processes – it may involve the participation of specialized brain 
structures and dedicated cognitive processes that are activated whenever a social 
cognitive goal (e.g., impression formation) is pursued (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 
2004). Moreover, although there have been previous attempts to characterize the 
cognitive nature of the Implicit Theory of Personality (Cantor & Mischel, 1977; 
1979), we believe that both the present characterization of the Implicit Theory of 
Personality as a conditional associative structure and its exploration in an 
experimental paradigm (the DRM) that allows for systematic comparison with other 
associative structures represent a step forward to our understanding of the processes 
underlying impression formation.   
In addition, the conditional nature of the Implicit Theory of Personality 
associative structure may contribute to better understand false memories and 
associative memories in general. For instance, it seems that whereas the standard 
DRM paradigm makes use of unconditional or, at least, default associative structures, 
equivalent effects have been shown to occur in other associative structures when the 
stimuli are studied under appropriate instructions (for instance, the false memories of 
numeric associates only occur if participants are carrying the appropriate arithmetic 
operations at encoding, see Pesta et al., 2001). In sum, the systematic comparison of 
the characteristics of what we here labelled conditional and unconditional associative 
structures is an important endeavour that has been largely ignored. We believe this 
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first experiment contributes with a first step to change this state of affairs. 
Finally, we deem our success in adapting the DRM paradigm to impression 
formation as particularly noteworthy because we selected trait-words not from list of 
associates but from casual descriptions of real people. Although theoretically relevant 
false memories obtained using the DRM paradigm could be a result of using 
particular lists of stimuli that participants would not previously have learned to 
monitor adequately. In our case, we started with trait lists based on dimensions that 
underlie common descriptions of people, asked participants to form impressions of 
hypothetical targets described by such traits, and obtained levels of false memories of 
considerable magnitude. Hence, our successful adaptation of the DRM paradigm to 
impression formation supports the notion that false memories are not the outcome of a 
clever but unusual study list but instead the cost of a flexible associative structure. 
Now that we have shown that it is possible to obtain false memories within the 
associative memory structure of the implicit theory of personality and, more 
interestingly, that these false memories are more salient under impression formation 
goals than under simple memorization goals, we set to test the idea that two of the 
most important effects in impression formation are rooted in the representation of 
personality traits in memory and thus will impact false memories of personality. So, 
in the following sets of experiments, we test the centrality and the primacy effects, 
using a similar adaptation of the DRM paradigm to the one we used in this first 
experiment. To study the centrality effect we include in each list a central trait from a 
different cluster of the list’s cluster and measure the false alarms for the traits 
matching the central trait in dimension and valence. If the central trait is that 
important for impression formation, we should obtain high levels of false alarms for 
traits congruent with it. And, this effect should be specific to the Impression 
Formation condition, as under Memory instructions, the activation of the central trait 
should not diverge to the other personality traits associated to the central one. For the 
primacy effect we expect to have differential impact of each half of the studied list in 
the level of false alarms for traits matching each half. More specifically, we expect 
more false alarms for personality traits belonging to the same cluster of the traits in 
the first half of the list; of course, this effect should be more accentuated under 
impression formation processing goals. In the following set of two experiments we 
will describe the detailed rationale, method and results of the experiments concerning 
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false memories and the centrality effect. 
 
STUDY 2: INFERENTIAL COSTS OF THE CENTRALITY EFFECT5 
In this second study, we set out to identify how the centrality effect may reflect 
the organization of personality traits in memory and, more specifically, how traits 
supposed to be central will impact false memories about personalities. To do so, we 
use the same adaptation of the DRM paradigm that successfully showed the existence 
of false memories within the associative structure of the implicit theory of personality. 
Our hypothesis is that participants will produce false memories from the same 
dimension of the list that are also congruent with the valence of the list, replicating 
the previous experiment, but they should also produce false memories congruent with 
cluster of the “central trait” whenever it is added to the study list, just like in Asch’s 
experiments (1946; Exp.1). Because this trait will represent the only available 
information regarding the target standing in the corresponding dimension, and 
therefore contribute noticeably to the impression formed, it will lead to false 
memories about personality traits that share their dimension and valence.  However, if 
the assumption that the implicit theory of personality is a semantic space conditional 
to the impression formation goal is correct, these false memories congruent with the 
central trait valence should only occur for the impression formation condition. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2A 
This experiment was designed to test the impact of including a central trait from 
a different dimension of the traits presented in a study list. The valence of the central 
trait and the valence of the other traits in the list were manipulated, and they could be 
congruent or incongruent. The processing goal at the time of encoding was also 
manipulated, so the effect of the central trait when people are forming impressions of 
personality could be compared to its effect when people are only trying to memorize 
the same list. We expect a higher level of false memories congruent with the list 
dimension and valence in the impression formation condition than in the memory 
condition, thus replicating the previous results  in both standard and gist recognition. 
In addition, we also expect that false memories from the dimension of the central trait 
                                                        
5 This study is submitted as Nunes, L. D., Garcia-Marques, L., Ferreira, M. B., Ramos, T. 
(submitted). Inferential costs of the centrality effect: From organization in memory to impression 
formation.. Therefore, parts of this section are a reproduction of the mentioned article. 
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should be influenced by its valence, which would reflect a higher level of false 
memories from the same cluster as the central trait than from the opposite cluster. 
However, the impact of both the list and the central trait should be higher on the 
impression formation condition than on the memory condition because the central 
trait will be the only information available regarding its corresponding dimension of 
the implicit personality theory semantic space. We expect to replicate these results in 
the gist recognition test. 
 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and forty-nine undergraduate students from the 
University of Lisbon participated in exchange for course credit. 
 
Materials. We used the same material we had used in the first experiment, to 
study the effect of false memories within the implicit theory of personality. After a 
multidimensional scaling and a 4-Way Cluster Analysis of the traits most used to 
describe people, four lists of personality traits were identified and the traits within 
each one were organized in terms of their distance to the central trait. For each cluster, 
the central trait is the one that loads more heavily in the defining characteristics of the 
cluster. The distances between the central trait and the other traits are assumed to 
reflect their association within the implicit theory of personality. The clusters 
originating the four presented lists were: a social positive, a social negative, an 
intellectual positive, and an intellectual negative. The five words closest to the central 
trait were used as critical words, never being presented to participants in the study 
phase. The following nine words formed the lists. For each list we added the central 
trait from the opposite dimension, sharing the valence of the list or from the opposite 
valence. So, we obtained a total of eight lists – social positive with intellectual 
positive central trait; social positive with intellectual negative central trait; social 
negative with intellectual negative central trait; social negative with intellectual 
positive central trait; intellectual positive with social positive central trait; intellectual 
positive with social negative central trait; intellectual negative with social negative 
central trait; intellectual negative with social positive central trait. To each list, the 
referred six athematic words (nontraits) were also added (e.g. telephone, closet, rose), 
in the same positions. Each study list was therefore composed of sixteen words. 
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The standard recognition test was composed of the same words as the gist 
recognition test, and the sequence of presentation was randomized separately for each 
of them and for each participant. Each test contained 42 words: the twenty critical 
traits (five from each cluster), six nonpresented athematic words associated with the 
presented ones, four nonpresented and non-associated athematic words, the four 
central traits (only one was actually presented), five presented traits (which varied 
according to the presented list), and three presented athematic words. Except for the 
five presented traits, the tests were equal for every participant (for the constitution of 
the presented lists and the tests, see Appendix 4). 
 
Design. The design was a 2 encoding goals (memory vs. impression formation) 
X 2 valence of the list (positive vs. negative) X 2 valence of the central trait (positive 
vs. negative), with all factors between participants. Please note that the dimension of 
the list (social or intellectual) was also manipulated and the dimension of the central 
trait varied in function of the dimension of the list (being always the opposite), but the 
results of interest derived from the manipulation of the valence of the lists and the 
central trait. The number of participants assigned to each of the eight cells of the 
design varied between 16 and 20. A standard recognition test and a gist recognition 
test were used. Dependent measures for each test included the proportion of traits 
from the list correctly recognized, the correct recognition of the presented central 
trait, the proportion of athematic words correctly recognized, the difference between 
the proportion of positive and negative traits from the dimension of the list falsely 
recognized, the difference between the proportion of positive and negative traits from 
the dimension of the central trait falsely recognized, and the proportion of athematic 
associates falsely recognized. 
Procedure. The procedure used was in all similar to the procedure reported for 
Study 1. 
Results 
We report veridical recognition separated into list traits, added central trait, and 
athematic words, and false recognition separated into the difference between the 
proportion of positive and negative traits from the dimension of the list, the difference 
between the proportion of positive and negative traits from the dimension of the 
central trait, and athematic associated words. Results for the standard recognition test 
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and the gist recognition test are presented separately. For each test multi-factorial 
ANOVAs with 2 encoding goals (memory vs. impression formation) X 2 valence of 
the list (positive vs. negative) X 2 valence of the central trait (positive vs. negative) 
for each dependent variable were performed. 
All data are presented in terms of proportions. The denominators from which 
proportions were calculated for each item type are as follows. For veridical 
recognition: list traits out of 5 (the number of traits presented in the study list and in 
the test); the added central trait out of 1 (the number of central traits added to the 
study list and present in the test); athematic words out of 3 (the number of athematic 
words presented in the study list and in the test). For false recognition: the difference 
between the proportion of positive and negative traits from the dimension of the list, 
with each proportion being calculated out of 5 (the number of critical words in the test 
from each of the four quadrants or combinations dimension-valence); the difference 
between the proportion of positive and negative traits from the dimension of the 
central trait, with each proportion being calculated out of 5 (the number of critical 
words in the test from each of the four combinations dimension-valence); and 
athematic associated words out of 6 (the number of athematic associates in the test).   
 
Standard Recognition Test. The proportions of veridical and false recognition 
for each dependent measure are presented in Table 3. The level of correct recognition 
of presented traits did not differ between conditions, F < 1, with participants in the 
memory condition correctly recognizing 86% of the presented traits and participants 
in the impression formation condition correctly recognizing 87% of the presented 
traits. However, participants in the impression formation condition correctly 
recognized the added central trait more often than participants in the memory 
condition (M = .85 vs. M = .71), F(1, 133) = 4.33, p = .04, MSE = .17, η2 = .03 . Also 
the correct recognition of the presented athematic words did differ between 
conditions, F(1, 133) = 4.00, p = .05, MSE = .05, η2 = .03 with participants in the 
impression formation condition correctly recognizing more athematic words than 
participants in the memory condition (M = .86 vs. M = .78). The false recognition of 
athematic words associated to the presented athematic words did not differ between 
conditions, (M = .10 vs. M = .12, for participants in the impression formation 
condition and participants in the memory condition, respectively), F < 1. In any case, 
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the level of false recognition of athematic words associated to the presented athematic 
words was significantly different of the level of false recognition of athematic words 
non-presented and non-associated (M = .11 vs. M = .04, for associated athematic 
words and non-associated athematic words, respectively), F(1, 133) = 23.18,  p = .00, 
MSE = .01, η2 = .15.  
 
Table 3. Mean proportions of trait hits, central trait hits, athematic hits, athematic false alarms and 
mean differences between the proportions of false memories opposing in valence (for list and central 
trait dimensions) by list valence and central trait valence and condition, for the standard recognition 
test in Experiment 2A. 
 
Positive List Positive List Negative List Negative List
Positive Central Negative Central Positive Central Negative Central 
Impression Formation
Hits
Trait words (List) .86 .92 .89 .84
Central Trait .90 .95 .80 .75
Athematic words .83 .85 .88 .85
False alarms
Difference between positive 
and negative list clusters .44 .59 -.35 -.43
Difference between positive 
and negative central trait 
clusters
.20 .21 .07 -.10
Athematic associates .12 .08 .11 .09
Memory
Hits
Trait words (List) .84 .92 .86 .84
Central Trait .82 .62 .70 .69
Athematic words .75 .83 .76 .77
False alarms
Difference between positive 
and negative list clusters .38 .20 .04 -.11
Difference between positive 
and negative central trait 
clusters
.08 .22 .08 -.08
Athematic associates .07 .08 .19 .12
Presented List
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More interestingly, the difference between positive and negative false alarms 
from the same dimension of the list, i.e., difference between the proportions of false 
alarms for traits from the positive and negative list clusters, was influenced by the 
valence of the list, especially in the impression formation condition. The ANOVA 
showed a main effect of the valence of the list, showing that positive lists tend to lead 
to a higher difference between the proportions of positive and negative false alarms of 
that dimension (M = .40) than negative lists (M = -.21), F(1, 133) = 168.35, p = .00, 
MSE = .09, η2 = .56. Nevertheless, there was an interaction between the valence of 
the list and the condition (see Figure 6), indicating that the impact of the valence of 
the list was higher in the impression formation condition, F(1, 133) = 37.43, p = .00, 
MSE = .09, η2 = .22 such that the effect of list valence on the difference between the 
proportions of positive and negative false memories corresponding to the list 
dimensions was much more accentuated under impression formation (M = .52 vs. M = 
-.39) than under memory (M = .29 vs. M = -.04). For false recognition of traits from 
the central trait cluster, we were interested to see if the valence of the central trait 
would have an impact in the difference between the proportions of positive and 
negative false memories of traits from the central trait’s dimension. Contrary to what 
we expected, such main effect failed to occur, F < 1. Also, there was no interaction 
between the valence of the central trait and the instructional set condition (see Figure 
7), F < 1. So, the impact of the central trait valence in the difference between the 
proportions of positive and negative false memories from the central trait dimension 
did not differ significantly for participants in both impression formation and memory 
conditions (M  = .14 vs. M = .06 for impression formation, and M = .07 vs. M = .08 
for the memory condition). 
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Figure 6. Mean difference between the proportion of veridical recognition of positive and 
negative personality traits from the list’s dimension, in the standard recognition test in Experiment 2A, 
as a function of condition and list’s valence. Error bars display standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean difference between the proportion of false recognition of positive and negative 
personality traits from the central trait’s dimension, in the standard recognition test in Experiment 2A, 
as a function of condition and central trait’s valence. Error bars display standard errors of the mean. 
 
Gist Recognition Test. As we did for Study 1, for the sake of clarity we will 
still call “correct recognition” when participants selected the presented words and 
“false recognition” when participants selected the non-presented words. The 
proportions of veridical and false recognition for each dependent measure are 
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presented in Table 4. The level of correct recognition of presented traits did not differ 
between conditions, F < 1, with both participants in the memory and impression 
formation condition correctly recognizing 86% of the presented traits. Similarly to 
what occurred in the standard recognition test, the added central trait was correctly 
recognized (marginally) more frequently for participants in the impression formation 
condition than for participants in the memory condition (M = .80 vs. M = .68, 
respectively), F(1, 133) = 3.03, p = .08, MSE = .20, η2 = .02. On the contrary, the 
correct recognition of the presented athematic words did not differ between conditions 
(M = .80 for both participants in the impression formation condition and participants 
in the memory condition), F < 1. Also, the false recognition of athematic words 
associated to the presented athematic words did not differ between conditions, (M = 
.33 vs. M = .37, for participants in the impression formation condition and 
participants in the memory condition, respectively), F < 1. Again, the level of false 
recognition of athematic words associated to the presented athematic words was 
significantly different from the level of false recognition of athematic words non-
presented and non-associated (M = .35 vs. M = .22, for associated athematic words 
and non-associated athematic words, respectively), F(1, 133) = 33.12, p = .00, MSE = 
.04, η2 = .20.  
 
Table 4. Mean proportions of trait hits, central trait hits, athematic hits, athematic false alarms and 
mean differences between the proportions of false memories opposing in valence (for list and central 
trait dimensions) by list valence and central trait valence and condition, for the gist recognition test in 
Experiment 2A.  
 
 103 
Positive List Positive List Negative List Negative List
Positive Central Negative Central Positive Central Negative Central 
Impression Formation
Hits
Trait words (List) .92 .90 .81 .81
Central Trait .80 .80 .90 .70
Athematic words .80 .83 .78 .80
False alarms
Difference between positive 
and negative list clusters .56 .45 -.47 -.46
Difference between positive 
and negative central trait 
clusters
.41 .20 .07 -.17
Athematic associates .31 .34 .40 .28
Memory
Hits
Trait words (List)
.94 .92 .80 .77
Central Trait .71 .69 .65 .64
Athematic words .75 .83 .80 .78
False alarms
Difference between positive 
and negative list clusters .38 .30 -.20 -.22
Difference between positive 
and negative central trait 
clusters
.12 .16 -.05 -.04
Athematic associates .48 .30 .40 .27
Presented List
 
 
Concerning the difference between the proportions of positive and negative 
false alarms from the dimension of the list, we again found a main effect of the list 
valence, moderated by the instructional set condition. Positive lists lead to a higher 
difference between the proportions of positive and negative false memories of traits 
from the list dimensions (M = .42) than negative lists (M = -.34) , F(1, 133) = 144.31, 
p = .00, MSE = .16, η2 = .52. The interaction between the valence of the list and 
instructional set, depicted in Figure 8, indicated that the impact of list valence was 
more pronounced under the impression formation (M = .51 vs. M = -.47) than under 
the memory (.34 vs. -.22) instructional set, F(1, 133) = 10.52, p = .00, MSE = .16, η2 
= .07. For the false recognition of traits from the central trait clusters, and contrary to 
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what happened in the standard recognition test, a main effect for central trait valence 
occurred, F(1, 133) = 4.65, p = .03, MSE = .09, η2 = .03 such that difference between 
the proportions of positive and negative false memories became more positive when 
the central trait was positive (M = .14) than when it was negative (M = .04). An 
interaction between the valence of the central trait and instructional set also emerged 
(see Figure 9), F(1, 133) = 7.31, p = .01, MSE = .09, η2 = .05, indicating that the 
impact of central trait valence was higher under the impression formation (M = .24 vs. 
M = .02) than under the memory set (M = .04 vs. M = .06). 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Mean difference between the proportion of veridical recognition of positive and 
negative personality traits from the list’s dimension, in the gist recognition test in Experiment 2A, as a 
function of condition and list’s valence. Error bars display standard errors of the mean. 
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Figure 9. Mean difference between the proportion of false recognition of positive and negative 
personality traits from the central trait’s dimension, in the gist recognition test in Experiment 2A, as a 
function of condition and central trait’s valence. Error bars display standard errors of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
In this Experiment 2A we found that participants asked to form impressions of 
personality do not correctly recognize the presented personality traits more often than 
participants asked to simply memorize them, but they tend to show a greater impact of 
the nature of the presented traits, in a way such that they show a higher level of false 
memories congruent with the dimension and valence of the presented traits.  Thus the 
present results replicate Experiment 1. 
In the standard recognition test, veridical recognition of the presented 
personality traits and of the athematic words was not different for participants who 
memorized the words and participants who formed an impression of personality. 
However, the veridical recognition of the central trait was higher for participants 
forming an impression than for those memorizing the words. This result is 
reminiscent of the Von Restorff effect (1933; Calkins, 1896) also referred to as the 
isolation effect or the distinctiveness effect (e.g., Hunt, 1995; Hunt & Lamb, 2001; 
Kelley & Nairne, 2001) and demonstrates how people typically show better memory 
for a particular item that is distinctive or stands out in some way from similar items.  
It has been proposed that item’s distinctiveness is likely to reduce proactive and 
retroactive interference (e.g., Underwood, 1964); to lead to deeper processing levels 
(e.g., Lockhart, Craik, & Jacoby, 1976); and/or to produce more specific memory 
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cues (e.g, Tulving, 1983). Regardless of the relative contribution of these different 
accounts, the distinctiveness of the central trait here reported seems to be a direct 
result of the activation of a specific semantic space underlying the bifactorial implicit 
theory of personality, which was triggered by impression formation instructions. This 
assumption is supported by the increased level of false memories regarding traits that 
shared the same cluster of the presented trait, in the gist recognition test, and which 
does not seem compatible with a simple von Restorff effect. Besides this, the exact 
same information was presented across conditions but it seems to have been encoded 
and represented substantially differently under impression formation and memory 
settings. A likely cause for this is that for impression formation (but not memory) 
participants the added central trait brought unique information about its dimension 
whereas the other traits all belong to the same dimension and thus they did not play a 
special role individually (Asch, 1946). In other words, distinctiveness of central traits 
is not the result of some invariant property of the presented information. These traits’ 
distinctiveness just becomes to be so under adequate processing goals. Indeed, 
specific or ad hoc goals may lead to momentary distinctiveness of certain items. For 
instance, Pichert and Anderson (1977) showed that in a description of the items in a 
house, a TV might become a distinctive item from a burglar perspective but not from 
a potential buyer perspective. In the present case, however, distinctiveness of central 
traits resulted from trying to make sense of other people, which is a much more 
abstract goal that could hardly explain the present results unless we assume the 
existence and activation of the implicit theory of personality semantic space 
(Rosenberg et al., 1968). 
It should be reminded that the added central trait always appeared in the middle 
of the list thus excluding primacy or recency effects. Also in the standard recognition 
test, the valence of the presented list guided the valence of the false memories from 
the same dimension of the list produced by participants in both conditions, however, 
the interaction between list valence and the instructional set indicated that the impact 
of list valence was higher when participants were trying to form an impression of 
personality than when they were simply trying to memorize the traits. Nevertheless, 
we could not find a parallel effect for central trait valence and in this sense we failed 
to extend the effects of central traits to an increase of corresponding false memories.  
The results of the gist recognition test, replicate the effect of the list valence on 
 107 
the difference between proportions of positive and negative false memories of that 
dimension suggesting that these effects are probably due to a relative deficit of 
relational deficit of memory participants in processing trait lists and not due to 
differences in source monitoring (Experiment 1). More interestingly, we also see the 
expected effect of central trait valence in the difference between the proportions of 
positive and negative false memories of traits from the central trait dimension. 
Because of the high levels of veridical recognition of the central trait in the 
impression formation condition, it can be argued that these participants are using a 
strategy similar to a recall to reject strategy (Gallo, 2004), probably being able to 
monitor and reject non-presented traits from the same trait cluster as the central trait 
since the later proved to be very distinctive and very well learned. Thus, this result 
may indicate that central traits in this paradigm become very distinctive under 
impression formation goals and that this distinctiveness can be used to prevent non-
presented items from the cluster of the central trait to be wrongly accepted (Schacter 
et al., 2001; Hege & Dodson, 2004).  
Taken together, these results suggest a critical role of the central traits in the 
impression formation inferential process. Nevertheless, this role is still not completely 
clear because the importance of the central traits only emerged when participants 
were not actively monitoring the reality and in a test that was preceded by a 
recognition test where those words activation could have occurred. In any case, the 
nature of the presented traits influenced the false recognition of traits, especially when 
participants engaged in forming impressions of personality and tried to place a target 
in the semantic space underlying the implicit theory of personality. But, if the failure 
to obtain the predicted impact of the central trait in false memories (i.e., a centrality 
false memory effect) was due to a monitoring strategy, will we be able to obtain it in a 
task where monitoring is less likely to occur?  This is what we tested in Experiment 
2B.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2B 
Given the results of Experiment 2A and the lack of support for the hypothesis that the 
valence of the central trait would influence the valence of the traits from the central 
trait’s dimension falsely recognized, in a standard recognition test, we designed this 
experiment to try to decrease the likelihood of participants using a disqualifying 
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monitoring strategy, like recall to reject (Gallo, 2004), and thus see if the central 
trait’s valence effect would emerge also in the standard recognition test. More 
specifically, we simply added time pressure to the recognition tests. According to 
Benjamin (2001; exp. 2), time pressure at the time of a recognition test increases the 
level of false alarms. Therefore, we will be able to check if time pressure at test, 
despite increasing false alarms, will have different effects in the performance of 
participants forming impressions of personality and in the performance of participants 
memorizing the words. We expect that, by making monitoring more difficult, the 
effects of the central trait will be more noticeable and more traits from the central trait 
cluster will be falsely recognized, but only for the impression formation condition 
because it seemed that participants in this condition were the ones using a 
disqualifying monitoring strategy in the first place, what would explain their higher 
veridical recognition of the added central trait when compared to participants in the 
memory condition. Thus, we expect to concomitantly obtain a higher level of 
veridical recognition of the central trait and a higher level of false alarms for traits 
sharing the central trait’s dimension and valence, for participants in the impression 
formation condition. 
 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and thirteen undergraduate students from the University 
of Lisbon participated in exchange for course credit. 
 
Materials. We used exactly the same materials of Experiment 2A. 
 
Design. The same design of Experiment 2A was used. The number of participants 
assigned to each of the eight cells of the design varied between fourteen and fifteen. 
The measured variables were the same as those for Experiment 2A. But for the 
memory tests we added time pressure. This is, participants were forced to make their 
recognition decisions under 1 second.  
 
Procedure. We followed the same procedure used in Experiment 2A, but this time 
participants were tested under time pressure. For both the standard recognition and 
gist test, each word was presented on the screen for only 1 second, and participants 
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had to give their response within that time. Participants were warned before each test 
that they should give their response as fast as possible because they would have only 
one second for each response. Whenever a participant was too slow in giving his 
response, a warning would come up on the screen prompting participants to be faster 
in their next response. 
 
Results 
The results are reported in the same fashion as Experiment 2A results. The dependent 
measures were the same as the ones for Experiment 2A. Also as in Experiment 2A, 
for each test multi-factorial ANOVAs 2 encoding goals (memory vs. impression 
formation) X 2 valence of the list (positive vs. negative) X 2 valence of the central 
trait (positive vs. negative) for each dependent variable were computed.  
All data are presented in terms of proportions. The denominators from which 
proportions were calculated for each item type are the same as the ones for 
Experiment 2A.  
Standard Recognition Test (with time pressure). The proportions of veridical and 
false recognition for each dependent measure are presented in Table 5. The level of 
correct recognition of presented traits did not differ between conditions, F(1, 97) = 
2.27, p = .14, MSE = .05, η2 = .02, with participants in the memory condition 
correctly recognizing 69% of the presented traits and participants in the impression 
formation condition correctly recognizing 75% of the presented traits. On the other 
hand, the added central trait was more correctly recognized by participants in the 
impression formation condition (M = .79) than for participants in the memory 
condition (M = .61), F(1, 97) = 4.47, p = .04, MSE = .20, η2 = .04. This result 
replicates the “distinctiveness” effect for the central traits under impression formation 
found in Experiment 2A. On the contrary, correct recognition of the presented 
athematic words was higher for participants in the memory condition (M = .56 vs. M 
= .70 for participants in the impression formation condition and for participants in the 
memory condition, respectively), F(1, 97) = 6.87, p = .01, MSE = .08, η2 = .07. 
However, the false recognition of athematic words associated to the presented 
athematic words did not differ between conditions, (M = .22 vs. M = .20, for 
participants in the impression formation condition and participants in the memory 
condition, respectively), F < 1. But the level of false recognition of athematic words 
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associated to the presented athematic words was significantly different of the level of 
false recognition of athematic words non-presented and non-associated (M = .21 vs. 
M = .15, for associated athematic words and non-associated athematic words, 
respectively), F(1, 97) = 8.97, p = .00, MSE = .02, η2 = .08.  
 
Table 5. Mean proportions of trait hits, central trait hits, athematic hits, athematic false alarms and 
mean differences between the proportions of false memories opposing in valence (for list and central 
trait dimensions) by list valence and central trait valence and condition, for the standard recognition 
test in Experiment 2B. 
 
Positive List Positive List Negative List Negative List
Positive Central Negative Central Positive Central Negative Central 
Impression Formation
Hits
Trait words (List) .86 .69 .77 .68
Central Trait .86 .79 .71 .80
Athematic words .57 .43 .60 .62
False alarms
Difference between positive 
and negative list clusters .54 .39 -.49 -.41
Difference between positive 
and negative central trait 
clusters
.44 .26 -.06 -.23
Athematic associates .26 .17 .21 .22
Memory
Hits
Trait words (List)
.71 .79 .61 .64
Central Trait .64 .43 .50 .86
Athematic words .64 .79 .64 .72
False alarms
Difference between positive 
and negative list clusters .14 .26 -.16 -.36
Difference between positive 
and negative central trait 
clusters
.01 .20 -.03 -.14
Athematic associates .23 .18 .16 .24
 
 
The results concerning the differences between the proportions of positive and 
negative false memories from the list dimension showed that we replicated the main 
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effect of the list valence, and the interaction between list valence and condition. 
Positive lists lead to a higher difference between the proportions of positive and 
negative false memories of traits from list dimensions (M = .33) than negative lists (M 
= -.36), F(1, 97) = 134.13, p = .00, MSE = .10, η2 = .58. The interaction between the 
valence of the list valence and the instructional set also emerged indicating that the 
impact of the valence of the list valence was more accentuated under impression 
formation instructions (M = .46 vs. M = -.46) than under a memory instructional set 
(M = .20 vs. M = -.26) was greater in the impression formation condition, as we can 
see in Figure 10, F(1, 97) = 15.14, p = .00, MSE = .10, η2 = .14. Regarding the false 
recognition of traits from the central trait cluster, there was no main effect of central 
trait valence  in the magnitude of the difference between the proportions of positive 
and negative false memories of traits corresponding to the central trait dimension (M 
= .09 vs. M = .02), F(1, 97) = 1.93, p = .17, MSE = .08, η2 = .02. Despite this, an 
interaction between the valence of the central trait valence and instructional set did 
emerge (represented in Figure 11), F(1, 97) = 4.33, p = .04, MSE = .08, η2 = .04, such 
that the impact of central trait valence in the difference between the proportions of the 
proportions of false memories of positive and negative traits corresponding to the 
central trait dimension was higher under impression (M = .19 and M = .01, for 
positive and negative central traits respectively) than under the memory instructional 
set (M = -.01 versus M = .03). 
 
Figure 10. Mean difference between the proportion of veridical recognition of positive and 
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negative personality traits from the list’s dimension, in the standard recognition test in Experiment 2B, 
as a function of condition and list’s valence. Error bars display standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean difference between the proportion of false recognition of positive and negative 
personality traits from the central trait’s dimension, in the standard recognition test in Experiment 2B, 
as a function of condition and central trait’s valence. Error bars display standard errors of the mean. 
 
Gist Recognition Test (with time pressure). The proportions of veridical and false 
recognition for each dependent measure are presented in Table 6. The correct 
recognition of presented traits did not differ between conditions, F < 1, with 
participants in the memory condition correctly recognizing 84% of the presented traits 
and participants in the impression formation condition correctly recognizing 82% of 
the presented traits. Contrary to what occurred in the standard recognition test, the 
correct recognition of the central trait also did not differ between conditions (M = .84 
vs. M = .70 for participants in the impression formation condition and for participants 
in the memory condition, respectively), F(1, 97) = 3.39, p = .07, MSE = .18, η2 = .03. 
Also, correct recognition of the presented athematic words did not differ between 
conditions (M = .71 vs. M = .74 for participants in the impression formation condition 
and for participants in the memory condition, respectively), F< 1. Replicating the 
previous results, the false recognition of athematic words associated to the presented 
athematic words also did not differ between conditions, (M = .36 vs. M = .42, for 
participants in the impression formation condition and participants in the memory 
condition, respectively), F(1, 97) = 1.14, p = .29, MSE = .09, η2 = .01. And again, 
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level of false recognition of athematic words associated to the presented athematic 
words was significantly different from the level of false recognition of athematic 
words non-presented and non-associated (M = .39 vs. M = .29, for associated 
athematic words and non-associated athematic words, respectively), F(1, 97) = 17.26, 
p = .00, MSE = .15, η2 = .15.  
 
Table 6. Mean proportions of trait hits, central trait hits, athematic hits, athematic false alarms and 
mean differences between the proportions of false memories opposing in valence (for list and central 
trait dimensions) by list valence and central trait valence and condition, for the gist recognition test in 
Experiment 2B. 
 
Positive List Positive List Negative List Negative List
Positive Central Negative Central Positive Central Negative Central 
Impression Formation
Hits
Trait words (List) .86 .83 .79 .79
Central Trait .93 .86 .71 .87
Athematic words .74 .62 .74 .76
False alarms
Difference between positive 
and negative list clusters .56 .54 -.54 -.57
Difference between positive 
and negative central trait 
clusters
.46 .24 -.03 -.35
Athematic associates .47 .37 .33 .28
Memory
Hits
Trait words (List) .86 .81 .87 .80
Central Trait .71 .57 .71 .79
Athematic words .74 .91 .67 .64
False alarms
Difference between positive 
and negative list clusters .24 .31 -.19 -.29
Difference between positive 
and negative central trait 
clusters
.07 .34 -.09 .01
Athematic associates .48 .40 .43 .37
Presented List
 
 
 114 
The differences between the proportions of positive and negative false memories of 
traits corresponding to the dimension of the list, replicated the main effect of the list 
valence and the interaction between list valence and instructional set, represented in 
Figure 12. Positive lists lead to more positive differences between the proportions of 
positive and negative false memories of traits from the list dimension (M = .41) than 
negative lists (M = -.40), F(1, 97) = 144.38, p = .00, MSE = .13, η2 = .60. The 
interaction pointed to a higher impact of the valence of the list in the impression 
formation condition, F(1, 97) = 19.60, p = .00, MSE = .13, η2 = .17, indicating that 
this difference was much more pronounced in the case of impression formation (M = 
.55 vs. M = -.56) than in the case of memory (M = .28 vs. M = -.24) participants. 
Regarding the impact of central trait valence,  the interaction between the valence of 
the central trait valence and instructional set (depicted in Figure 13), F(1, 97) = 14.22, 
p = .00, MSE = .11, η2 = .13 replicates the same interaction found in Experiment 1 
and suggests that the impact of central trait valence was higher in the impression 
formation condition than in the memory condition, with participants under impression 
formation obtaining much higher differences between the proportions of positive and 
negative false memories of traits from the central trait dimensions for positive and 
negative central traits (M = .21 vs. M = -.05, respectively than memory participants 
(M = -.01 versus M = .18). 
 
Figure 12. Mean difference between the proportion of veridical recognition of positive and 
negative personality traits from the list’s dimension, in the gist recognition test in Experiment 2B, as a 
function of condition and list’s valence. Error bars display standard errors of the mean. 
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Figure 13. Mean difference between the proportion of false recognition of positive and negative 
personality traits from the central trait’s dimension, in the gist recognition test in Experiment 2B, as a 
function of condition and central trait’s valence. Error bars display standard errors of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
Following Benjamin (2001; exp. 2) we added time pressure for each response in the 
standard recognition test and in the gist recognition test. At standard and gist 
recognition tests, participants had to give their responses to each item within 1 
second. The idea was that this manipulation would decrease the possibility of a 
disqualifying monitoring strategy to operate (Gallo, 2004) and as a result increase the 
number of false alarms to the traits that shared the dimension and valence of the 
added central trait. We replicated the results of Experiment 2A, with the exception of 
the correct recognition of the presented athematic words, and we obtained the 
predicted effect of the valence of the added central trait and the interaction between 
the valence of the added central trait and the condition. In what concerns the 
presented athematic words, in Experiment 2A participants forming impressions 
correctly recognized more of these words than participants in the memory condition, 
whereas in Experiment 2B, this result reversed, with participants in the memory 
condition correctly recognizing more athematic words than participants in the 
impression formation condition. If we believe that a recognition decision taken under 
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time pressure is based mainly in familiarity (Heit, Brockdorff, & Lamberts, 2004), it 
can be thought that participants in the memory condition will have more familiarity 
with the athematic words because the way they are processing them does not imply a 
reconceptualization of these words as describing someone, as in the impression 
formation condition, but they are simply activating their most common meanings. 
This would explain why, when there is enough time for a decision based on 
familiarity and additional recollective information (Heit et al., 2004), participants who 
formed an impression and therefore had to process the athematic words in a different 
fashion, recognized them better than participants who only memorized them. The fact 
that in this experiment we found the predicted “centrality effect”, with the valence of 
the added central trait influencing the valence of the falsely recognized traits from the 
dimension of the central trait, especially if the participants were forming an 
impression of personality, supports the hypothesis that some traits are more important 
or central than others. Namely, traits that bring unique information to an impression 
and that are the most informative about a personality dimension, because of their 
close connections to all the other traits highly saturated in that dimension (Asch, 
1946; Wishner, 1960). Moreover, we think that, in some cases, the central trait may 
play an important monitoring role because it is highly distinctive and recognizable 
(Experiment 1 and Experiment 2). When cognitive resources are sufficient, the central 
trait can be recalled to reject non-presented traits belonging to the same trait cluster of 
the implicit personality theory space (for other examples of this recall to reject 
strategy, see Gallo, 2004). Only when participants lack the necessary resources to use 
this strategy (e.g., when responding under time pressure) will the full extent of the 
central traits influence on impression formation be fully revealed, such that a high 
level of recognition of the central trait is combined with a high level of false 
recognition of non-presented traits belonging to the same cluster of implicit 
personality theory. Thus, the central trait seems to be distinctive and its inclusion 
prevents false alarms when there is enough time to make a response but, under time 
pressure, this false memory suppression is abolished (Dodson & Hege, 2005). 
 
STUDY 3: PRIMACY EFFECT AND EVALUATIVE CONSTRAINTS 
In this third set of experiments we intend to study the primacy effect in 
impression formation and its relationship with memory effects and how it can reflect 
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into the production of false memories. Basically, in this study we will do what we 
did for the centrality effect in Study 2. So, departing from the idea that the implicit 
theory of personality is an associative memory structure prone to memory errors just 
like other semantic memory structures but with the peculiarity of eliciting very 
specific memory errors whenever the impression formation goal is activated, and 
that these errors can be linked to the classic impression formation effects described 
by Asch (1946), we tried to show the impact of the primacy effect on false 
memories. To do this, we used the same adaptation of the DRM paradigm that 
successfully showed the existence of false memories within the associative structure 
of the implicit theory of personality and the existence of a centrality effect (Study1 
and Study 2). According to Asch’s (1946; Experiments 6 to 8) conceptualization of 
the primacy effect, we expect that the initial information presented about someone 
will guide the impression formed and thus the false memories produced. Plus, we 
predict that this effect will be stronger when participants are trying to form 
impressions of personality because, according to our previous studies, there is no 
reason to believe that in a simple memorization task the first presented traits will 
have a bigger impact in the type of false memories formed. 
 In two experiments we manipulated the predominant valence of traits presented 
in each half of the studied list (Experiment 3A), or the dimension and valence of the 
first half of the studied list (Experiment 3B). We expected to obtain higher levels of 
false memories belonging to the predominant cluster of the first half of the lists 
relative to false memories from the predominant cluster of the second half of the lists. 
And this difference should be higher for participants instructed to form impressions of 
personality than for participants instructed to memorize the words, according to the 
already demonstrated conditional nature of the associative memory structure 
underlying the implicit theory of personality. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3A 
This experiment was designed to test if the first presented personality traits in a 
study list could lead the process of forming impressions of personality such that in a 
later memory test participants would produce more false alarms congruent with those 
first presented traits than false alarms congruent with traits presented later in the study 
list. To test this possible primacy effect in false memories of personality, we created 
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lists of personality traits belonging to the same dimension (intellectual or social) and 
manipulated the proportion of positive and negative traits presented in each half of the 
lists. So, we obtained two intellectual lists composed exactly of the same traits but 
organized in a different fashion, and also two similar social lists organized differently. 
The reason why we manipulated the proportion of positive and negative traits in each 
half of the list and not simply the blocked order of positive and negative traits was 
because, although we carefully picked up traits which were not obvious antonyms, 
participants could become more easily aware of the inconsistency of such description 
and thus recruit different types of monitoring processes (e.g., distinctiveness 
heuristic), diminishing the occurrence of false recognitions. The processing goal at the 
time of encoding was also manipulated, so the primacy effect when people are 
forming impressions of personality could be compared to a possible primacy effect 
when people are only trying to memorize the same list.  
We expected a higher level of false memories congruent with the predominant 
valence of the first half of the list (please note that within a list only valence was 
manipulated and dimension was constant), indicating a primacy effect in false 
memories. This impact of the predominant valence of the first half of the list should 
be higher in the impression formation condition than in the memory condition, 
because it should reflect the conditional activation of the semantic space underlying 
the implicit theory of personality. We expected to replicate these results in a gist 
recognition test, showing that they derive from differences at encoding, namely a 
relational processing deficit for participants in the memory condition relative to 
participants in the impression formation condition. 
 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and five undergraduate students from the 
University of Lisbon participated in exchange for course credit. 
Materials. We used the same material we had used in the previous 
experiments. Again, the identified clusters originating the four presented lists were: a 
social positive, a social negative, an intellectual positive, and an intellectual negative. 
The five words closest to the central trait were used as critical words, never being 
presented to participants in the study phase. The following eight words plus the 
central trait from each cluster were used to form the lists. But, at this time, each list 
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was formed by the traits from the two opposing clusters of each dimension6. Thus, 
each list combined nine positive and nine negative traits either from the social or the 
intellectual dimension. For each dimension (social and intellectual) we created two 
different lists composed of the same words but presented in a different order. More 
specifically, we manipulated the proportions of positive and negative traits presented 
in each half of each list. Thus, for each dimension, we created what we named a 
“positive-negative” list and a “negative-positive” list. In a positive-negative list, the 
first half of the list was composed of two thirds of the positive traits (i.e., six positive 
traits) and one third of the negative traits (i.e., three negative traits), the second half of 
the list was composed of two thirds of the negative traits (i.e., six negative traits), and 
one third of the positive traits (i.e., three positive traits). In a negative-positive list, the 
first half of the list was composed of two thirds of the negative traits (i.e., six negative 
traits), and one third of the positive traits (i.e., three positive traits); and the second 
half of the list was composed of two thirds of the positive traits (i.e., six positive 
traits), and one third of the negative traits (i.e., three negative traits. So, the positive-
negative and negative-positive lists for each dimension were composed of the exact 
same words but the predominant valence on each half varied. The order of 
presentation of the traits was always to make sure that the two most positive and 
negative traits were presented at opposed extremities of the list and in the middle of 
the list were the traits that were farther apart from the centroid of the cluster. Note that 
the positive-negative list meant that there was a predominance of positive traits in the 
first half of the list, and a negative-positive list meant that there was a predominance 
of negative traits in the first half of the list. To each list, five athematic words 
(nontraits) were also added (e.g. telephone, closet, rose), in the same positions for 
every list. Each study list was therefore composed of twenty three words, and we 
obtained a total of four lists  
The standard recognition test was composed of the same words as the gist 
recognition test, and the sequence of presentation was randomized separately for each 
of them and for each participant. Each test contained 46 words: the twenty critical 
traits (five from each cluster), six nonpresented athematic words associated with the 
                                                        
6 Please note that because each list combined negative and positive traits, in the case of the traits 
from the intellectual positive cluster we had to select the trait in the ninth position after the five 
critical traits, and for the social positive cluster we had to select the traits in the ninth and tenth 
positions after the five critical traits. We did this to substitute the traits that were clear antonyms 
of other traits included in the list (from the opposite cluster). 
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presented ones, four nonpresented and non-associated athematic words, five irrelevant 
nonpresented traits, eight presented traits – four positive and four negative – (which 
varied according to the presented list: social traits if the list was social and intellectual 
if the list was intellectual), and three presented athematic words. Except for the eight 
presented traits, the tests were equal for every participant (for the study lists and tests, 
see Appendix 5). 
Design. The design was a 2 encoding goals (memory vs. impression formation) 
X 2 dimension of the list (social vs. intellectual) X 2 predominant valence of the first 
half (positive vs. negative), with all factors between participants. The number of 
participants assigned to each of the eight cells of the design varied between 10 and16. 
A standard recognition test and a gist recognition test were used. Dependent measures 
for each test included the proportions of positive and negative traits from the list 
correctly recognized, the proportion of athematic words correctly recognized, the 
proportions of positive and negative traits from the dimension of the list falsely 
recognized, and the proportion of athematic associates falsely recognized. 
Procedure. The procedure used was similar to the procedures reported for 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2A, with the exception that we suppressed the 
instruction for participants to revise the impression formed or to recapitulate the list to 
better memorize it for 90 seconds. We altered this step in the procedure to eliminate 
the possibility of participants in the impression formation condition get too aware of 
the contradictory nature of the studied traits. 
 
Results 
We report veridical recognition of list traits separated into positive list traits and 
negative list traits, veridical recognition of athematic words, and false recognition 
separated into false recognition of social positive traits, social negative traits, 
intellectual positive traits and intellectual negative traits, and false recognition of the 
athematic associated words. Results for the standard recognition test and the gist 
recognition test are presented separately. For each test multi-factorial ANOVAs with 
2 encoding goals (memory vs. impression formation) X 2 dimension of the list (social 
vs. intellectual) X 2 predominant valence of the first half (positive vs. negative) were 
computed. 
All data are presented in terms of proportions. The denominators from which 
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proportions were calculated for each item type are as follows. For veridical 
recognition: list traits out of 8 (the number of traits presented in the study list and in 
the test); positive list traits out of 4 (the number of positive traits presented in the 
study list and in the test); negative list traits out of 4 (the number of negative traits 
presented in the study list and in the test); athematic words out of 3 (the number of 
athematic words presented in the study list and in the test). For false recognition: each 
type of critical trait (social positive, social negative, intellectual positive, and 
intellectual negative) calculated out of 5 (the number of critical words in the test from 
each of the four clusters or combinations dimension-valence); irrelevant traits out of 5 
(number of irrelevant traits included in the test) and athematic associated words out of 
6 (the number of athematic associates in the test).   
Standard Recognition Test. The proportions of veridical and false recognition for 
each dependent measure are presented in Table 7. The level of correct recognition of 
presented traits did not differ between conditions, F < 1, with participants in the 
memory condition correctly recognizing 73% of the presented traits and participants 
in the impression formation condition correctly recognizing 71% of the presented 
traits. Also for the veridical recognition of the positive traits there were no differences 
between conditions, with participants in the memory condition recognizing 77% of 
the positive traits and participants in the impression formation condition recognizing 
74% of the positive traits, (F < 1). And, also for the negative traits there were no 
differences (70% for memory participants and 67% for impression formation 
participants, F < 1). Likewise, correct recognition of the presented athematic words 
was not different between conditions (M = .73 vs. M = .76 for participants in the 
impression formation condition and for participants in the memory condition, 
respectively), F < 1. Furthermore, false recognition of athematic associates did not 
differ for participants in the memory condition (M = .13) and participants in the 
impression formation condition (M = .09), F(1, 97) = 1.78, p = .19, MSE = .02, η2 = 
.02. But the level of false recognition of athematic associates was significantly 
different of the level of false recognition of athematic words non-presented and non-
associated to the presented athematic words (M = .11 vs. M = .04, for associated 
athematic words and non-associated athematic words, respectively), F(1, 97) = 22.85, 
p = .00, MSE = .01, η2 = .19.  
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Table 7. Mean proportions of trait hits, positive and negative trait hits, athematic hits, athematic 
false alarms and false alarms to positive and negative traits (for the list dimension) by type of 
list (dimension and predominant valence of the first half) and condition, for the standard 
recognition test in Experiment 3A. 
Social List Social List Intellectual List Intellectual List
 First Half 
Positive
 First Half 
Negative
 First Half 
Positive
 First Half 
Negative
Impression Formation
Hits
Trait words (List) .70 .76 .59 .77
Positive Traits .75 .75 .71 .75
NegativeTraits .66 .77 .48 .79
Athematic words .69 .78 .75 .69
False alarms
Positive Traits                                                    
(same dimension) .44 .27 .43 .37
Negative Traits                                      
(same dimension) .25 .25 .15 .41
Athematic associates .13 .07 .07 .10
Memory
Hits
Trait words (List) .80 .82 .68 .64
Positive Traits .85 .83 .73 .68
NegativeTraits .75 .80 .63 .61
Athematic words .87 .80 .67 .69
False alarms
Positive Traits                                                    
(same dimension) .26 .37 .48 .44
Negative Traits                                      
(same dimension) .34 .33 .37 .39
Athematic associates .10 .14 .10 .18
Presented List
 
Concerning false recognition of personality traits, our interest was to compare 
negative false recognitions with positive false recognitions within the same dimension 
of the presented list. Thus, when we refer to false recognition of positive or negative 
traits we mean false recognition of positive and negative traits belonging to the 
dimension of the presented list (social or intellectual) which was already included as 
an independent variable in the ANOVA. The mean proportion of positive false alarms 
was significantly different of the mean proportion of negative false alarms depending 
on the preponderant valence of the first half of the list and only for participants in the 
impression formation condition, F(1, 97) = 4.67, p = .03, MSE = .05, η2 = .05 (this 
interaction is represented in Figure 14). Thus, performing planned comparisons, we 
found that in the impression formation condition participants produced more positive 
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false alarms than negative false alarms (M = .44 vs. M = .20, respectively) when the 
first half of the list was mostly positive [F(1, 97) = 7.67, p = .00, MSE = .01, η2 = .07] 
and slightly the same proportion of positive and negative false alarms when the first 
half of the list was predominantly negative (M = .32 vs. M = .33, for positive and 
negative false alarms, respectively, F < 1). On the other hand, planned comparisons 
for participants in the memory condition revealed no impact of the predominant 
valence of the first half of the list in the valence of their false alarms (M = .37 vs. M = 
.36 for positive and negative false alarms, respectively, when the first half of the list 
was mostly positive; and M = .41 vs. M = .36 for positive and negative false alarms, 
respectively, when the first half of the list was mostly negative), F < 1. Thus, and as 
predicted we obtained a primacy effect but only under impression formation 
instructions and when the predominant valence of the first half of the list was positive. 
It is also worth mention that even using lists of traits from contradicting valences the 
overall level of false alarms concerning traits from the dimension of the studied lists 
was higher relative to false recognition of irrelevant traits, i.e., traits that are farther 
apart from the centroids of each cluster (M = .35 vs. M = .20, respectively, F(1, 97) = 
42.75, p = .00, MSE = .03, η2 = .31). 
 
Figure 14. Mean proportion of positive and negative false alarms, in the standard recognition 
test in Experiment 3A, as a function of condition and predominant valence of the first half of the 
list. Error bars display standard errors of the mean. 
 
Gist Recognition Test. For the gist test and as we have been doing, for the sake of 
clarity we will still call “correct recognition” when participants selected the presented 
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words and “false recognition” when participants selected the non-presented words. 
The resulting data are presented in Table 8. The level of correct recognition of 
presented traits did not differ between conditions, F < 1, with participants in the 
memory condition correctly recognizing 76% of the presented traits and participants 
in the impression formation condition correctly recognizing 74% of the presented 
traits. Also, and replicating the standard recognition test, veridical recognition of the 
positive traits was no different between conditions, with participants in the memory 
condition recognizing 80% of the positive traits and participants in the impression 
formation condition recognizing 75% of the positive traits (F < 1). And also for the 
negative traits there were no differences (73% for memory participants and 72% for 
impression formation participants), F < 1. In similar fashion, correct recognition of 
the presented athematic words did not differ between conditions (M = .70 vs. M = .74 
for participants in the impression formation condition and for participants in the 
memory condition, respectively), F < 1. In addition, false recognition of athematic 
associates did not differ for participants in the memory condition (M = .40) and 
participants in the impression formation condition (M = .31), F(1, 97) = 2.46, p = .12, 
MSE = .10, η2 = .02. However, and replicating the standard recognition test, the level 
of false recognition of athematic associates was significantly different of the level of 
false recognition of athematic words non-presented and non-associated to the 
presented athematic words (M = .35 vs. M = .25, for associated athematic words and 
non-associated athematic words, respectively), F(1, 97) = 15.46, p = .00, MSE = .04, 
η2 = .14.  
 
Table 8. Mean proportions of trait hits, positive and negative trait hits, athematic hits, athematic 
false alarms and false alarms to positive and negative traits (for the list dimension) by type of 
list (dimension and predominant valence of the first half) and condition, for the gist recognition 
test in Experiment 3A. 
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Social List Social List Intellectual List Intellectual List
 First Half 
Positive
 First Half 
Negative
 First Half 
Positive
 First Half 
Negative
Impression Formation
Hits
Trait words (List) .82 .73 .70 .70
Positive Traits .86 .71 .75 .70
NegativeTraits .78 .75 .65 .70
Athematic words .65 .67 .78 .71
False alarms
Positive Traits                                                    
(same dimension) .64 .38 .67 .46
Negative Traits                                      
(same dimension) .60 .37 .30 .54
Athematic associates .31 .24 .33 .35
Memory
Hits
Trait words (List) .81 .74 .81 .68
Positive Traits .84 .75 .85 .73
NegativeTraits .77 .73 .77 .63
Athematic words .70 .74 .78 .76
False alarms
Positive Traits                                                    
(same dimension) .45 .51 .82 .54
Negative Traits                                      
(same dimension) .58 .50 .53 .51
Athematic associates .39 .35 .51 .36
Presented List
 
 
For the false recognition of personality traits, we failed to replicate the pattern 
of results obtained in the standard recognition test, not obtaining the triple interaction 
between processing goal, predominant valence of the first half of the list, and valence 
of the false memories (see Figure 15). Thus, the mean proportion of positive false 
alarms did not differ significantly from the mean proportion of negative false alarms 
depending on the preponderant valence of the first half of the list either for 
participants in the impression formation condition or in the memory condition, F(1, 
97) = 1.32, p = .25, MSE = .08, η2 = .01. Nevertheless, the pattern of results obtained 
was very similar to the pattern obtained in the standard recognition test, with 
impression formation condition participants producing more positive false alarms than 
negative false alarms (M = .65 vs. M = .45, respectively) when the first half of the list 
was mostly positive, but slightly the same proportion of positive and negative false 
alarms when the first half of the list was predominantly negative (M = .42 vs. M = .45, 
for positive and negative false alarms, respectively); and participants in the memory 
 126 
condition revealing no impact of the predominant valence of the first half of the list in 
the valence of their false alarms (M = .64 vs. M = .56 for positive and negative false 
alarms, respectively, when the first half of the list was mostly positive; and M = .53 
vs. M = .51 for positive and negative false alarms, respectively, when the first half of 
the list was mostly negative). When comparing the overall proportion of false alarms 
relative to the dimension of the list, independently of their valence, with the false 
recognition of irrelevant traits, we replicate the difference obtained previously (M = 
.53 vs. M = .43, respectively, F(1, 97) = 16.43, p = .00, MSE = .03, η2 = .14). 
 
 
Figure 15. Mean proportion of positive and negative false alarms, in the gist recognition test in 
Experiment 3A, as a function of condition and predominant valence of the first half of the list. Error 
bars display standard errors of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
In this Experiment 3A we tried to replicate the classic primacy effect initially 
described by Asch (1946), according to which two identical lists of personality traits 
can lead to the formation of opposite impressions of personality just by manipulating 
the traits that are presented earlier in the list. Following the procedure used in the 
previous experiments, we presented participants with lists of personality traits and 
either asked them to memorize those traits or to form an impression about the 
personality of someone described by those traits and later we measured the levels of 
veridical recognition and false recognition. Results from previous experiments 
pointed to the importance of the organization of the semantic representation of the 
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implicit theory of personality in the replication of classic impression formation effects 
reflected in memory biases. Thus, we tried to replicate the primacy effect by using 
lists of traits belonging to one of the dimensions of personality (social or intellectual) 
and manipulating the predominant valence of the traits presented in the first half of 
the list (positive vs. negative). This manipulation should induce a primacy effect 
within the dimension of the list reflected in a higher level of false alarms to critical 
non-presented personality traits from the same valence of the traits mostly represented 
in the first half of the list than to critical non-presented personality traits from the 
same valence of the traits mostly represented in the second half of the list. We 
expected that this effect occurred independently of veridical memory effects 
regarding traits from one valence or the other and only in the case of impression 
formation processing goals due to the conditional nature of the activation of the 
implicit theory of personality. The obtained results partially supported our 
predictions. As predicted, we obtained a higher proportion of false alarms from the 
valence majorly represented in the first half of the list but only when that valence was 
positive. Also, this effect occurred only under impression formation instructions. In 
the case of memory participants there were no effects of the predominant valence 
represented in the first half of the list, indicating the absence of a primacy effect. As 
referred, participants in the impression formation condition revealed a primacy effect 
only when the first half of the list was mostly positive, as there were no differences 
between positive and negative false alarms relative to the list dimension when the first 
half of the list was mostly negative. Thus, it seems that the obtained primacy effect 
was moderated by the valence of the traits. However, this effect was not obtained in 
the gist test. As the gist test is used to clarify if the results obtained in the standard 
recognition test are due to activation patterns or to monitoring processes, it may be 
assumed that the obtained primacy effect moderated by valence is specially due to 
monitoring processes that do not need to operate in a gist test. However, as we 
referred, although not significant, the pattern of results was similar to the pattern 
obtained in the standard recognition test and thus we cannot make strong inferences 
about the role of monitoring in the obtained effects. 
In any case, our results seem congruent with Asch’s (1946) idea that the first 
presented personality traits guide the impression formed about a given target, giving a 
“direction” to the meaning of the latest traits. However, we can point a constraint to 
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this idea – only positive traits are able to guide the inferential process through which 
the impression is formed. Despite this, Asch’s proposal seems more in accordance 
with our data than Anderson (1967; 1969) hypothesis, according to which the earlier 
traits in the stimulus set are weighted more heavily than the later traits because the 
attention progressively diminishes, as we did not find differences between the 
veridical recognition of traits from the first and the second half of the lists. This lack 
of veridical memory effects indicates that all the presented traits must have received 
the same attention, and as it was also replicated in the gist test, we can assume that it 
is not due to monitoring processes. 
This constrained primacy effect is congruent with a “positivity effect”, 
reflecting the possibility that stronger trait inferences are made from positive stimulus 
traits than from negative stimulus traits. This idea has already been developed by 
Hamilton, Holmes, Wyer, Thakkar, and Zanna (unpublished manuscript) based on the 
re-examination of results reported in several papers offering replications of Asch’s 
effects (e.g., Mensh & Wishner, 1947; Zanna & Hamilton, 1972). Plus, Hamilton and 
colleagues report a study in which they examined impressions formed based uniquely 
in one trait. The authors found that participants tended to make stronger trait 
inferences from positive than from negative traits, regardless the extremity and the 
dimension (social or intellectual) of the cue-trait. Thus Hamilton and colleagues 
propose that there is a generalized expectancy that participants bring with them to the 
trait inference task and that in absence of specific knowledge about a target those 
generalized expectancies play a role in the trait inference process that guides the 
impression formation. As suggested by Wyer and Lambert (1994) these generalized 
expectancies are positively valenced and therefore perceivers expect that a given 
target always possesses moderately positive characteristics. Of course, this idea is in 
accordance with our results, showing a strong primacy effect when the majority of the 
first presented traits is positive and thus both the valence of the traits and the 
generalized positive expectancy are congruent, increasing the weight of positive traits 
that should guide the inferential process. But when the majority of the first presented 
traits is negative, the valence of those traits and the generalized positive expectancy 
have opposite effects on the inferential process, leading to the absence of primacy 
effects. These results thus seem to indicate that Asch (1946) was correct when 
thinking that the first presented traits in a target description guide the entire 
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impression formation process but he neglected the importance of a generalized 
positive expectancy about others personality that should also guide the impression 
formation process.  
Nevertheless, because we used traits belonging to the same dimension, we can 
argue that the positive valence of the first presented traits from a given dimension will 
influence the evaluation of a target in that same dimension but we do not know what 
should occur when we also change the dimension of the second half of the list. 
According Brown’s (1986) Evaluative Consistency Theory, the primacy effect 
obtained when the first half of the list is predominantly positive can be explained by a 
change of evaluative meaning of the negative traits presented, in order to maximize 
the evaluative consistency of the impression. On the contrary, Peabody (1990) would 
explain these results by a change of descriptive meaning of the negative traits, defined 
by the descriptive meaning of the earliest presented traits, what would be possible 
because all the presented traits belonged to the same dimension. The way to pit these 
two theories against each other and thus clarify the primacy effect and the possible 
existence of a generalized positive expectancy is by manipulating not only the 
predominant valence of each half of the list, but also the dimension. To do so, we 
designed Experiment 3B.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3B 
The results of Experiment 3A point to a primacy effect that is moderated by 
valence, i.e., primacy seems to occur only when the valence of the first presented 
traits is positive. This effect occurred when participants were presented with traits 
belonging to the same dimension and thus can be equally explained by Brown’s 
(1986) Evaluative Consistency Theory or Peabody’s (1990) alternate view. According 
to Brown’s theory, the obtained effects can be explained by a change of evaluative 
meaning of the latest presented traits, defined by the valence of the earliest presented 
traits, in order to maximize the evaluative consistency of the impression. On the other 
hand, Peabody (1990) would explain these results by a change of descriptive meaning 
of the latest presented traits, defined by the descriptive meaning of the earliest 
presented traits; and this would be possible because the presented traits all belonged 
to the same dimension. Thus, if the presented traits did not belong to the same 
dimension, according to Peabody (1990) we should not expect any sort of primacy 
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effect – positive or negative – as the first presented traits would not have an effect on 
the descriptive meaning of the following traits. On the contrary, according to Brown 
(1986), we should still expect a slight primacy effect, as the valence of the first 
presented traits would select the valence of the following traits. So, we designed 
Experiment 3B to pit these two theories against each other. In Experiment 3B, we 
varied both the valence and the dimension of the personality traits presented in each 
half of the study list. Besides being a test for these theories, this design also allowed 
us to identify constraints to the primacy effect and determine if it would hold across 
dimensions and if the “positivity effect” obtained in Experiment 3A could be 
replicated when impressions based on traits from the social and intellectual 
dimensions were implied.  
Method 
Participants. Two-hundred and seventeen undergraduate students from The 
Egas Moniz Higher Education School of Health (Lisbon) voluntarily participated. 
Materials. We created to be presented lists from the same material we used in 
the previous experiments. Again, the identified clusters originating the four presented 
lists were: a social positive, a social negative, an intellectual positive, and an 
intellectual negative. The five words closest to the central trait were used as critical 
words, never being presented to participants in the study phase. The following four 
words plus the central trait from each cluster were used to form the lists. Each list was 
formed by the traits from the two clusters from opposite dimensions and valences. 
Thus, each list combined five traits either from the social negative cluster or the social 
positive cluster with five traits from the intellectual positive cluster or the intellectual 
negative cluster, respectively. And the order in which the traits from each of the two 
clusters in a list were presented was manipulated. More specifically, we created four 
lists: one social positive/intellectual negative; another one social negative/intellectual 
positive; another intellectual negative/social positive; and finally an intellectual 
positive/social negative list. So, the social positive/intellectual negative and the 
intellectual negative/social positive list were composed of the exact same words but 
the cluster of each half varied. And the same was true for the social 
negative/intellectual positive list and the intellectual positive/social negative list. The 
order of presentation of the traits was kept the same within each list so that, for each 
half, the traits were presented in ascending distance to the centroid of their cluster. To 
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each list, six athematic words (nontraits) were also added (e.g. telephone, closet, 
rose), in the same positions for every list. Each study list was therefore composed of 
sixteen words, and we obtained a total of four lists. 
The standard recognition test was composed of the same words as the gist 
recognition test, and the sequence of presentation was randomized but kept the same 
for each test and each participant. Each test contained 44 words: the twenty critical 
traits (five from each cluster), six nonpresented athematic words associated with the 
presented ones, four nonpresented and non-associated athematic words, five irrelevant 
nonpresented traits, six presented traits (which varied according to the presented list: 
three social positive and three intellectual negative traits if the list was social positive 
and intellectual negative; and three social negative and three intellectual positive if 
the list was social negative and intellectual positive), and three presented athematic 
words. Except for the six presented traits, the tests were equal for every participant 
(for the study lists and tests, see Appendix 6). 
Design. The design was a 2 encoding goals (memory vs. impression 
formation) X 2 dimension of the first half of the  list (social vs. intellectual) X 2 
valence of the first half of the list (positive vs. negative), with all factors between 
participants. Please note that the dimension and valence of the first half of the list 
automatically determined the dimension and valence of the second half (opposite 
dimension and valence of the first half). The number of participants assigned to each 
of the eight cells of the design varied between 25 and33. A standard recognition test 
and a gist recognition test were used. Dependent measures for each test included the 
difference between false alarms to critical traits from the cluster of the first half of the 
list and false alarms to critical traits from the cluster of the second half of the list; 
difference between veridical recognition of traits of the first half of the list and 
veridical recognition of traits of the second half of the list; the proportion of athematic 
words correctly recognized; and the proportion of athematic associates falsely 
recognized. 
Procedure. The procedure used was in all similar to the procedure used in 
Experiment 1 and 2A. In this case, and contrary to Experiment 3A, we kept the 
instruction to revise the impression formed or to recapitulate the presented list to 
better memorize it for 90 seconds, because the traits presented despite having opposite 
valences were not contradictory because they did not belong to the same dimension.  
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Results 
We report veridical recognition of list traits separated into list traits total 
recognition, veridical recognition of athematic words, and false recognition separated 
into total false recognition of traits. For veridical recognition, the variable of interest 
is the difference between veridical recognition of traits from the first half of the list 
and traits from the second half of the list; and for false recognition, the difference 
between false alarms to traits from the cluster represented in the first half of the 
studied list and false alarms to traits from the cluster represented in the second half of 
the list.  
Results for the standard recognition test and the gist recognition test are 
presented separately. For each test multi-factorial ANOVAs with 2 encoding goals 
(memory vs. impression formation) X 2 valence of the first half of the list (positive 
vs. negative). We did not include the dimension of the first half of the list as an 
independent variable in the analysis because we did not expect an effect of this 
variable.  
All data are presented in terms of proportions. The denominators from which 
proportions were calculated for each item type are as follows. For veridical 
recognition: list traits out of 6 (the number of traits presented in the study list and in 
the test); first half list traits out of 3 (the number of first half traits presented in the 
study list and in the test); second half list traits out of 3 (the number of negative traits 
presented in the study list and in the test); athematic words out of 3 (the number of 
athematic words presented in the study list and in the test). For false recognition: first 
half cluster false alarms calculated out of 5 (the number of critical words in the test 
from each of the four clusters or combinations dimension-valence) and second half 
cluster false alarms also out of 5; irrelevant traits out of 5 (number of irrelevant traits 
included in the test) and athematic associated words out of 6 (the number of athematic 
associates in the test).   
Standard Recognition Test. The proportions of veridical and false recognition for 
each dependent measure split by presented list and processing goal are presented in 
Table 9. The level of correct recognition of presented traits did not differ between 
conditions, F(1, 213) = 3.69, p = .06, MSE = .04, η2 = .02, with participants in the 
memory condition correctly recognizing 73% of the presented traits and participants 
in the impression formation condition correctly recognizing 78% of the presented 
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traits. The difference between veridical recognition of traits presented in the first half 
of the list and traits presented in the second half of the list was not influenced by the 
processing goal or the valence of the first half of the list,  F(1, 213) = 2.59, p = .11, 
MSE = .16, η2 = .01 (M = -.01 vs. M = .15 for participants in the memory condition 
presented with the first half positive list and the first half negative list, respectively; 
and M = -.02 vs. M = - .03 for participants in the impression formation condition 
presented with the first half positive list and the first half negative list, respectively). 
In the same manner, correct recognition of the presented athematic words was not 
different between conditions (M = .67 vs. M = .71 for participants in the impression 
formation condition and for participants in the memory condition, respectively), F < 
1. Furthermore, false recognition of athematic associates did not differ for participants 
in the memory condition (M = .10) and participants in the impression formation 
condition (M = .11), F < 1. However, and accordingly to what occurred in previous 
experiments, the level of false recognition of athematic associates was significantly 
different of the level of false recognition of athematic words non-presented and non-
associated to the presented athematic words (M = .11 vs. M = .08, for associated 
athematic words and non-associated athematic words, respectively), F(1, 213) = 
60.68, p = .00, MSE = .00, η2 = .22.  
 
Table 9. Mean proportion of trait hits, mean difference between the proportions of first half trait 
hits and second half trait hits, mean proportions of athematic hits, athematic false alarms and 
mean difference between the proportions of false alarms from the first half of the list cluster and 
false alarms from the second half of the list cluster by type of list (dimension and valence of the 
first and the second half) and condition, for the standard recognition test in Experiment 3B. 
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First half Social Positive Social Negative Intellectual Positive Intellectual Negative
Second half Intellectual Negative Intellectual Positive Social Negative Social Positive
Impression 
Formation
Hits
Total Trait words .71 .82 .80 .81
Difference between 
traits from the first half 
and traits from the 
second half 
.09 .03 -.13 .08
Athematic words .51 .75 .73 .70
False alarms
Difference between 
traits from first half 
cluster and traits from 
second half cluster 
.00 -.33 .09 .07
Athematic associates .09 .09 .09 .14
Memory
Hits
Total Trait words .76 .76 .76 .64
Difference between 
traits from the first half 
and traits from the 
second half 
.23 -.01 -.32 .32
Athematic words .72 .65 .74 .72
False alarms
Difference between 
traits from first half 
cluster and traits from 
second half cluster 
-.10 -.07 .03 .27
Athematic associates .10 .11 .13 .12
Presented List
 
 
Regarding false recognition of personality traits, our interest is to compare false 
recognition of traits belonging to the cluster of the first half of the list (same 
dimension and same valence) with false recognition of traits belonging to the cluster 
of the second half of the list (same dimension and same valence). Because the 
intellectual and social dimensions are orthogonal we do not expect effects of the 
dimension of the first half of the list on the difference between the proportion of false 
alarms to traits from the cluster of the first half of the list and the proportion of false 
alarms to traits from the cluster of the second half of the list, so we did not include the 
dimension of the first half of the list as an independent variable in the analysis. Thus, 
concerning the mean difference between the proportion of false alarms to traits from 
the cluster of the first half of the list and the proportion of false alarms to traits from 
the cluster of the second half of the list, we obtained an interaction between the 
processing goal and the valence of the first half of the list (depicted in Figure 16), 
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F(1, 213) = 11.93, p = .00, MSE = .10, η2 = .05. Planned comparisons indicated that, 
for participants in the memory condition the difference between false alarms from the 
cluster of the first half of the list and false alarms from the cluster of the second half 
of the list was more positive when the first half of the list was negative (M = .09) than 
when it was positive (M = -.04), F(1, 213) = 5.05, p = .03, MSE = .10, η2 = .02. This 
result indicates that participants under memorization processing goals falsely 
recognized more personality traits of the cluster of the first half of the list when the 
first half of the list was negative than when it was positive. On the contrary, for 
participants in the impression formation condition the difference between false alarms 
from the cluster of the first half of the list and false alarms from the cluster of the 
second half of the list was more positive when the first half of the list was positive (M 
= .05) than when it was negative (M = -.12), F(1, 213) = 6.93, p = .01, MSE = .10, η2 
= .03. This result indicates that participants under impression formation processing 
goals falsely recognized more personality traits of the cluster of the first half of the 
list when the first half of the list was positive than when it was negative, and falsely 
recognized more personality traits of the cluster of the second half of the list when the 
second half was positive than when it was negative. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that we obtained an interaction between the 
instructional set used and the false recall of critical traits relative to false recall of  
irrelevant traits, F(1, 213) = 7.46, p = .01, MSE = .02, η2 = .03. This interaction 
indicates that even using lists composed of solely five traits from a cluster and five 
traits of a different cluster, false alarms to traits from the clusters of the list were more 
frequent relative to false recognition of irrelevant traits, i.e., traits that are farther apart 
from the centroids of each cluster; and, by performing planned comparisons, we 
verify that, false alarms to irrelevant traits did not differ between conditions (M = .16 
both for participants in the memory and in the impression formation conditions), F < 
1, whereas false alarms to critical traits were more frequent for participants in the 
impression formation condition (M = .33) than for participants in the memory 
condition (M = .25), F(1, 213) = 10.01, p = .00, MSE = .04, η2 = .04.  
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Figure 16. Mean difference between the proportion of false alarms to traits from the cluster of 
the first half of the list and the proportion of false alarms to traits from the cluster of the second half of 
the list, in the standard recognition test in Experiment 3B, as a function of condition and valence of the 
first half of the list. Error bars display standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
Gist Recognition Test. For the gist test and as we have been doing, for the sake of 
clarity we will still call “correct recognition” when participants selected the presented 
words and “false recognition” when participants selected the non-presented words. 
The resulting data are presented in Table 10. Four participants were discarded because 
they did not follow the instructions of the test and performed a standard recognition 
test instead, leaving us with a total of one hundred and thirteen participants. Contrary 
to what occurred in the standard recognition test, the level of correct recognition of 
presented traits differed between conditions, F(1, 209) = 8.77, p = .00, MSE = .03, η2 
= .04, with participants under impression formation instructions correctly recognizing 
88% of the presented traits and participants under memorization instructions correctly 
recognizing 81% of the presented traits. Concerning the difference between veridical 
recognition of traits presented in the first half of the list and traits presented in the 
second half of the list, we obtained an interaction between the instructional set and the 
valence of the first half of the list, F(1, 209) = 6.22, p = .01, MSE = .18, η2 = .03 (M = 
-.08 vs. M = .08 for participants in the memory condition presented with the first half 
positive list and the first half negative list, respectively; and M = .05 vs. M = -.07 for 
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participants in the impression formation condition presented with the first half 
positive list and the first half negative list, respectively). However, this is a small 
effect and it is congruent with a tendency of participants in the memory condition to 
encode negative information better than positive information, whereas participants in 
the impression formation condition would show, if any, a tendency to emphasize 
positive information. 
Different from expected, also correct recognition of the presented athematic 
words revealed a significant interaction between the instructional set and the valence 
of the first half of the list, F(1, 209) = 8.71, p = .00, MSE = .07, η2 = .04, (M = .74 vs. 
M = .64 for participants in the memory condition presented with the first half positive 
list and the first half negative list, respectively; and M = .66 vs. M = .77 for 
participants in the impression formation condition presented with the first half 
positive list and the first half negative list, respectively). Furthermore, we also 
obtained an interaction between processing goal and valence of the first half of the list 
for false recognition of athematic associates, F(1, 209) = 13.09, p = .00, MSE = .06, 
η2 = .06, (M = .67 vs. M = .45 for participants in the memory condition presented with 
the first half positive list and the first half negative list, respectively; and M = .34 vs. 
M = .37 for participants in the impression formation condition presented with the first 
half positive list and the first half negative list, respectively).  
.  
Table 10. Mean proportion of trait hits, mean difference between the proportions of first half 
trait hits and second half trait hits, mean proportions of athematic hits, athematic false alarms 
and mean difference between the proportions of false alarms from the first half of the list cluster 
and false alarms from the second half of the list cluster by type of list (dimension and valence of 
the first and the second half) and condition, for the gist recognition test in Experiment 3B. 
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First half Social Positive Social Negative Intellectual Positive Intellectual Negative
Second half Intellectual Negative Intellectual Positive Social Negative Social Positive
Impression 
Formation
Hits
Total Trait words .82 .90 .92 .87
Difference between 
traits from the first half 
and traits from the 
second half 
.13 -.17 -.03 .02
Athematic words .56 .84 .76 .71
False alarms
Difference between 
traits from first half 
cluster and traits from 
second half cluster 
.25 -.32 .04 -.07
Athematic associates .30 .41 .38 .34
Memory
Hits
Total Trait words .81 .79 .85 .78
Difference between 
traits from the first half 
and traits from the 
second half 
.06 -.13 -.27 .31
Athematic words .74 .65 .73 .64
False alarms
Difference between 
traits from first half 
cluster and traits from 
second half cluster 
.10 -.06 -.16 .36
Athematic associates .65 .41 .69 .48
Presented List
 
 
Regarding false recognition of personality traits, we replicated the interaction 
obtained in the standard recognition test, represented in Figure 17. More specifically, 
for the mean difference between the proportion of false alarms to traits from the 
cluster of the first half of the list and the proportion of false alarms to traits from the 
cluster of the second half of the list, we obtained an interaction between the 
processing goal and the valence of the first half of the list, F(1, 209) = 14.32, p = .00, 
MSE = .22, η2 = .06. Performing planned comparisons, we found that for participants 
in the memory condition the difference between false alarms from the cluster of the 
first half of the list and false alarms from the cluster of the second half of the list 
when the first half of the list was negative (M = .14) was not different from when it 
was positive (M = -.01), F(1, 209) = 2.76, p = .10, MSE = .22, η2 = .01. On the 
contrary, for participants in the impression formation condition the difference 
between false alarms from the cluster of the first half of the list and false alarms from 
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the cluster of the second half of the list was more positive when the first half of the 
list was positive (M = .15) than when it was negative (M = -.19), indicating that 
participants under impression formation processing goals falsely recognized more 
personality traits of the cluster of the first half of the list when the first half of the list 
was positive than when it was negative, F(1, 209) = 13.52, p = .00, MSE = .22, η2 = 
.06. 
Finally, we also replicated the interaction between the instructional set used and 
the false recall of critical traits relative to false recall of  irrelevant traits obtained in 
the standard recognition test, F(1, 209) = 22.31, p = .00, MSE = .04, η2 = .10. This 
interaction indicates that despite irrelevant traits are always less falsely recognizable 
than critical traits, participants instructed to form impressions of personality falsely 
recalled more critical traits than participants instructed to memorize the list (M = .74 
vs. M = .59, for impression formation participants and memory participants, 
respectively), F(1, 209) = 24.96, p = .00, MSE = .04, η2 = .11; but both groups 
roughly recalled the same proportion of irrelevant traits (M = .42 vs. M = .44, for 
impression formation participants and memory participants, respectively), F < 1. 
 
 
Figure 17. Mean difference between the proportion of false alarms to traits from the cluster of 
the first half of the list and the proportion of false alarms to traits from the cluster of the second half of 
the list, in the gist recognition test in Experiment 3B, as a function of condition and valence of the first 
half of the list. Error bars display standard errors of the mean. 
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Discussion 
In Experiment 3B, we replicated the main effects obtained in Experiment 3A. 
More specifically, we obtained a primacy effect but only when the initial traits 
presented were positive and when participants were forming impressions of 
personality. It must be noted that, just as what occurred in Experiment 3A, we did not 
obtain any differences between veridical recognition of traits presented in the first 
half or in the second half of the list, in the standard recognition test, i.e., between 
veridical recognition of positive or negative traits and thus it is fair to say that the 
false recognition results are not due to differential veridical recognition of a certain 
type of traits. However, contrary to what happened in Experiment 3A, for participants 
in the impression formation condition, we obtained the same pattern of results both in 
the standard and in the gist recognition tests. This difference may be due to the nature 
of the constitution of the lists – in experiment 3A, the traits belonged to the same 
dimension and their valence was intermixed whereas in Experiment 3B, the traits 
belonged to different dimensions and had different valences, being presented in a 
blocked fashion. We hypothesize that a different pattern of results in both tests may 
indicate that monitoring processes play an important role in the obtained effects while 
a similar pattern of results indicate that activation processes are guiding the obtained 
effects. So, because in Experiment 3B there was not direct contradiction between the 
traits as they belonged to different dimensions, maybe monitoring processes based on 
distinctive features of the traits (for a review see, Schacter & Wiseman, 2006) were 
harder to apply and thus the effects obtained arose only due to activation processes. 
However, we do not think this distinction is important in the case of these two 
experiments, as the pattern of differences is roughly the same for the recognition and 
gist tests in both experiments and the differences only did not reach significance in 
the gist test of Experiment 3A. 
However, in the case of Experiment 3B it became clear that, the primacy effect 
only occurred when the first traits were positive and, when the positive traits were the 
last ones to be presented, primacy was substituted by a recency effect. The fact that 
we did not obtain a primacy effect but what can be called a positivity effect in 
Experiment 3B goes against Brown’s (1986) Evaluative Consistency Theory. We 
used lists divided in two blocks of traits from opposite dimension and valence and 
thus, according to Brown (1986), the valence of the earliest traits should select the 
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valence of the later traits, does not matter the dimension, in order to maintain the 
evaluative consistency. Given the results in experiment 3A, we would not expect such 
a clear primacy effect when the first traits were negative but the actual reversal of a 
primacy expect clearly contradicts the Evaluative Consistency Theory. When thinking 
of the predictions made by Peabody’s (1990) Alternative Theory, we see that our data 
from both experiments can more easily fit in. Peabody’s Theory would predict that 
the latest presented traits would suffer a change of descriptive meaning, defined by 
the descriptive meaning of the earliest traits but only if earliest and latest traits 
belonged to the same dimension, as the dimensions are orthogonal. As mentioned, we 
obtained a primacy effect and a lack of effect only when the presented traits belonged 
to the same dimension (Experiment 3B). However, across dimensions, a valence 
effect seemed to overpower the primacy effect. Thus, our data from Experiment 3A 
could partially fit in both Peabody’s (1990) or Brown’s (1986) theories, but our data 
from Experiment 3B go against the predictions made by Brown (1986). However, our 
results also do not offer clear support to Peabody’s theory. The reported effects are 
always more like a “positivity effects” than primacy effects. And it should be noted 
that in case of Experiment 3B, where there was a reversal of a primacy effect when 
the first presented traits were negative, we gave participants 90 s to mentally 
recapitulate the impression formed. We altered this part of the procedure because we 
did not use completely contradictory traits as we did in Experiment 3A and thought 
that participants would not make an extra effort in integrating and reinterpreting the 
personality traits, but this effort cannot be completely ruled out, and it may be 
responsible for the absence of a primacy effect when the first presented traits were 
negative. 
However, taking the two experiments’ results together, it seems fair to assume 
that participants weight more heavily the positive information than the negative 
information and, therefore, only allow the first presented information to guide the 
impression formation process when it is positive; if it is negative, the weight given to 
the positive information will compensate for the tendency of first information to guide 
the impression formation process. So, it seems that the positivity effect is stronger 
than a primacy effect and thus primacy only occurs when the first presented traits 
contribute to a positive impression. As mentioned in Experiment 3A discussion, this 
result is consistent with Hamilton and colleagues’ idea that positive information plays 
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a more important role in the impression formation process than negative information. 
Regarding the performance of participants instructed to memorize the information, we 
should note that contrary to the absence of primacy or valence effects obtained in 
Experiment 3A, in Experiment 3B we obtained a negativity effect, indicating that 
participants in the memory condition falsely recognized more negative than positive 
traits, in the standard recognition test. Plus, we also obtained a similar negativity 
effect regarding the acceptance of presented traits in the gist test, with participants in 
the memory condition tending to accept more negative than positive traits. This effect 
has already been described in the literature (e.g., Kensinger, 2009; D’Argembeau & 
Van der Linden, 2004). But, it makes the positivity effect obtained when the 
processing goal active is to form an impression of personality even more intriguing 
and clearly supporting the notion that the activation of the implicit theory of 
personality is conditional to the impression formation processes and that certain 
effects occur only when that goal is active, despite the stimuli presented are the same 
and the final task/test is also the same. It is also worth mention the obtained 
interaction between processing goal and type of false recognition (critical traits vs. 
irrelevant traits). The results indicated that despite critical traits are more frequently 
intruded than irrelevant traits for participants in both conditions, participants in the 
impression formation condition intrude more critical traits than participants in the 
memory condition, but participants in both conditions intrude a similar proportion of 
irrelevant traits. This provides more evidence supporting our claim that the activation 
of an impression formation goal actually activates the conditional associative 
structure underlying the implicit theory of personality. 
For now, it should be highlighted that in three sets of experiments we were able 
to: 1) obtain false recognition of personality traits under impression formation 
processing goals; 2) replicate two of the classic impression formation effects – 
centrality and primacy (even if the primacy effect seems to be overridden by a 
positivity effect); 3) identify some constraints to the centrality and primacy effects; 
and 4) show different patterns of effects in the same type of memory tests, depending 
on the processing goal activated at the time of encoding, which points to a conditional 
nature of the activation of the semantic structure underlying the implicit theory of 
personality. In the next two studies we will set out to show the effects of serial 
reproduction of personality traits, either under simple memorization instructions or 
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under impression formation goals. So, we will study a socially relevant process of 
information transmission, using socially relevant materials and manipulating the 
social relevance of the processing goal activated. 
 
STUDY 4: SERIAL AND REPEATED REPRODUCTION OF PERSONALITY TRAITS 
 In the previous three studies we have successfully showed that impressions of 
personality are grounded in an associative memory structure, which reflects the 
implicit theory people hold about others’ personalities (Rosenberg et al., 1968). 
More importantly, we have showed that this associative memory structure which 
serves the goal of forming impressions of personality is prone to the same memory 
biases that other associative memory structures (e.g., semantic memory). 
Interestingly, the activation of this associative memory structure that reflects the 
implicit theory of personality is conditional to the goal of forming impressions of 
personality and the memory biases derived of its activation, although similar in 
nature, are different from the biases that occur when a simple memorization goal is 
active. These biases can be classified as false memories, as we obtained them in 
memory tests in a variation of the DRM paradigm, but the most interesting about 
them is that they reflect the structure of the implicit theory of personality and thus 
replicate the classic effects obtained in impression formation literature, such as the 
centrality effect (Study 2) and the primacy effect (Study 3). Given these new data 
about the implicit theory of personality and its representation in memory along the 
comparison between the biases derived of the activation of personality traits under 
memorization processing goals with the biases due to the activation of the same 
traits but under impression formation processing goals, we can assume that the 
social transmission of information about personality traits may have some 
differences from the social transmission of other socially irrelevant information. 
Thus, in this Study 4 and the next Study 5, we propose to investigate what happens 
to information about personality when it is subject to serial reproduction. As we 
mentioned in the introduction, serial reproduction is a technique introduced by 
Bartlett (1932) supposed to mimic the transmission of information that usually 
occurs in social environments. More specifically, the serial reproduction technique 
consists in having the original information presented to a participant and then having 
them reproducing it; his protocol should then be used as the input information for 
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the next participant, who will be the second link in a serial reproduction chain; the 
second link’s protocol should then be used as the study list for the third link in the 
serial reproduction chain, and so on, until a chain is complete. It has been suggested 
that the biases derived from serial reproduction techniques reflect individual 
memory biases (Bartlett, 1932) like the ones we have been showing that personality 
traits are subject to. So, we now test the idea that these individual memory biases 
will also have an impact in the way information about personalities is transmitted, 
and we set out to directly compare repeated reproduction of traits used in forming 
impressions of personality with serial reproduction of the same traits, under 
memorization or impression formation processing goals. To do so, we will be using 
the paradigm that successfully provided a direct comparison between the effects of 
an individual repeatedly retrieving information with the effects of the same 
information being serially transmitted between different individuals (Roediger et al., 
2009). As this paradigm has been used with lists of semantic associates, which are 
socially irrelevant information, we will also be able to see if the fact that personality 
traits are socially relevant information causes differences in the pattern of results 
obtained with socially irrelevant information. Given the results obtained in the three 
previous studies, we expect differences to emerge only under impression formation 
processing goals. Plus, we will also be able to identify the personality traits that tend 
to remain longer in a serial reproduction chain and check if that characteristic is 
correlated with other characteristics of those traits (Study 5). 
 
EXPERIMENT 4 
This Experiment was designed to investigate the social transmission of 
information related to personality traits, in the context of impression formation or 
memorization processing goals. Using a serial reproduction paradigm and extending 
the procedure used by Roediger and colleagues (2009), we directly compared 
repeated and serial reproduction. The main differences between our procedure and the 
one used by Roediger and colleagues (2009) are that we used lists of related 
personality traits instead of DRM lists and manipulated the type of instructions, 
creating one condition in which subjects were asked to memorize the words and 
another condition in which subjects were asked to form an impression about the 
personality of someone described by the presented list of traits.   
 145 
As we have shown (Studies 1, 2, and 3), lists of related personality traits seem 
to elicit false recognition of associated non-presented personality traits, especially 
under impression formation goals, so we could expect them to also lead to false recall 
of associated personality traits, like DRM lists do. For this experiment, as important 
as the level of non-presented personality traits produced, is the number of presented 
personality traits that survive the social process of information transmission, as well 
as a comparison with the number of personality traits that survive the repeated 
reproduction process. The impact of processing goal – impression formation or 
memory – on the amount of veridical and false recall is also assessed. Following 
Bartlett (1932) and Roediger and colleagues (2009), we expect that one person 
recalling four times (repeated reproduction) should be more accurate than four people 
recalling one time each (serial reproduction); and that intrusions should occur, 
replicating our previous experiments, but those should be constant across links in the 
serial reproduction chain and also across each subject’s repeated reproduction 
episodes. Also taking into account our previous results, we expect to replicate the 
differences between impression formation and memory conditions, but with the 
overall pattern of effects of serial and repeated reproduction being the same. 
 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-four Washington University undergraduates participated 
in the experiment for course credit or payment. The subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions (memory social positive, 
memory social negative, impression formation social positive, or impression 
formation social negative), resulting in 16 subjects per condition. 
Materials. Two study lists of 16 words – 10 personality traits plus six 
athematic words not related to personality traits – were constructed. Each list was 
composed of personality traits from the social dimension, varying in their valence, so 
one of the lists was positive and the other was negative. The six athematic words were 
common to both lists. For selecting the personality traits for each list, we first 
conducted the normative study described in Appendix 7. Because we did not obtain 
four distinct clusters of personality traits, we used only traits from the social 
dimension, so we could still manipulate their valence. Taking into account the results 
of the cluster analysis, we selected the 15 words of each cluster closest to its centroid. 
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The five words closest to each centroid were used as the critical traits (never to be 
presented to subjects) and the 10 next words formed the two lists to be presented (i.e., 
social positive and social negative). We also selected six athematic words not related 
to personality traits and included them in each list, obtaining two lists of 16 words 
each (ten personality traits and six athematic words). The athematic words were 
common to every presented list.  
Design. The design used was a 2 types of processing goal (memory vs. 
impression formation) X 2 valences of the list (positive vs. negative) X 4 positions in 
the serial reproduction chain (link 1, link 2, link 3, or link 4).  X 4 recall episodes 
(recall 1, recall 2, recall 3, and recall 4), with all factors between subjects, except for 
the recall episodes, that was manipulated within subjects. The measured variables 
were the overall level of correct recall, the level of correct recall of personality traits 
and of the athematic words, and the level of false recall of critical traits. 
Procedure. Subjects were tested in small groups of no more than four. Each 
group of participants either received impression formation or memorization 
instructions, which were maintained for each set of four groups. The impression 
formation instructions told subjects to form an impression of personality of a target 
person described by a set of words provided by people who were well acquainted with 
the target. Subjects were alerted to the fact that those words could be adjectives or 
athematic nouns because these were words that “people who know the target well 
associate with him”. The following example was given to subjects “Mark Smith was 
described by the words: forgetful, guitar, colleague, and office, because he always 
forgets the names of people he meets, plays guitar, is a nice colleague and works in an 
office.”. Memorization instructions asked participants to memorize a list of words, in 
preparation for an upcoming memory test. After the instructions, the procedure was 
similar for both conditions. The first group of each set of four groups always studied 
the original study list. The list was presented visually at a rate of 2 sec per word. After 
studying the list, subjects were given one minute to revise the formed impression or 
memorize the words, if they were in the impression formation condition or 
memorization condition, respectively. After this, all subjects performed one minute of 
math problems, and after the math, they were asked to recall as many words as they 
could from the presented list. Subjects did this sequence of math and free recall for 
four times. This procedure was the same for all subjects, with the exception of the 
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studied list. As said before, subjects from the first group of a set of four studied the 
original list; but subjects from the second group studied each one the first recall 
protocol of each subject from the first group; subjects from the third group studied 
each one the first recall protocol of each subject from the second group; and subjects 
from the fourth group studied each one the first recall protocol of each subject from 
the third group. In total, there were four of these sets of four groups – one set received 
memory instructions and its first group received the social positive list; other set 
received impression formation instructions and its first group received the social 
positive list; a third set received memory instructions and its first group received the 
social negative list; and other set received impression formation instructions and its 
first group received the social negative list. The experiment lasted approximately 30 
minutes, and after its completion subjects were thanked and debriefed. Please see 
Figure 18 for a schematic representation of the procedure. 
 
Figure 18. Serial reproduction procedure for each serial reproduction chain of four elements 
(links). L1 through L4 represent the four links, i.e., subjects, in a chain; R1 through R4 represent 
the four repeated free recall for each link; m stands for the math operations performed between 
recall attempts; inside the circles there is the indication of the list each link studied initially. 
 
 
Results 
We report the results organized in two sections: one concerning veridical recall 
and another one concerning false recall. For veridical recall, we report proportions of 
personality traits veridical recall and athematic words veridical recall. For each type 
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of item we report two types of proportions – out of number of items presented in the 
original study list built by us (10 personality traits; and 6 athematic words); or out of 
the number of actually studied items which varied from participant to participant 
(links 2 to 4). For false recall we calculate the proportions of critical personality traits 
belonging to the same dimension and valence of the list out of the number of possible 
critical traits (i.e., five), out of the studied critical traits (and, in this case, the recall of 
those traits is only considered a false recall relatively to the original study list), and 
also the proportion that critical traits comprise of the total recall output. For each type 
of veridical and false memory variable, we computed multi-factorial ANOVAs with 2 
encoding goals (memory vs. impression formation) X 2 valences of the list (positive 
vs. negative) X 4 positions in the serial reproduction chain (link 1, link 2, link 3, or 
link 4). When we were interested in solely evaluating the effects of serial 
reproduction we considered only the first recall episode of each participant; when we 
were interested in comparing serial to repeated reproduction, we computed repeated 
measures ANOVAs, considering the four recall episodes of each participant as 
dependent variables.  
Veridical Recall. Considering veridical recall as a function of the original study 
list built by us, we verify that, as expected, there is a main effect of the position in the 
serial reproduction chain on the proportion of correctly recalled personality traits, 
with participants recalling successively less personality traits across the links (M = .41 
for participants in the first position, M = .26 for participants in the second position, M 
= .20 for participants in the third position, and M = .18 for participants in the fourth 
position), F(3, 48) = 10.87, p = .00, MSE = .00, η2 = .18. 
We also obtained an interaction between repeated recall and the position in 
serial reproduction chain, F(9, 144) = 3.23, p = .00, MSE = .00, η2 = .06. By 
examining Table 11, where the mean proportions of veridical recall of personality 
traits considering the original study list are depicted, one can see that across recalls, 
the mean proportion of traits recalled tends to diminish but only for the first link in 
the chain. 
 
Table 11. Mean proportion of personality traits correctly recalled out of the original list 
presented to Link 1 in Experiment 4, by recall episode (recall 1 through 4) and position in the 
serial reproduction chain (link 1 through 4). 
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Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M
Recall 1 .46 .27 .19 .18 .28
Recall 2 .39 .26 .20 .18 .26
Recall 3 .38 .25 .21 .18 .25
Recall 4 .39 .25 .19 .18 .25
M .41 .26 .20 .18 .26
 
  
Examining the results obtained when we consider only the first recall episode 
by each participant we obtain a better measure of serial reproduction of the original 
information. Performing an ANOVA with the first recall as the only dependent 
measure, we obtained an interaction between the processing goal (memory vs. 
impression formation) and the position in the serial reproduction chain, F(3, 48) = 
3.05, p = .04, MSE = .02, η2 = .06. The respective means are presented in Table 12, 
showing that the loss of information is greater under memory instructions than under 
impression formation instructions, despite the overall mean of correct recall of 
personality traits across the two conditions not being different (M = .28 for 
participants in the impression formation condition and M = .27 for participants in the 
memory condition). 
 
Table 12. Mean proportion of personality traits correctly recalled out of the original list 
presented to Link 1 in the first recall episode of each participant in Experiment 4, by position in 
the serial reproduction chain (link 1 through 4) and condition (memory vs. impression 
formation). 
Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M
Impression Formation .40 .25 .25 .23 .28
Memory .53 .29 .14 .13 .27
 
 
Concerning veridical recall of the athematic words relatively to the number of 
athematic words included in the original study list, we obtained a main effect of the 
position in the serial reproduction chain, F(3,48) = 10.81, p = .00, MSE = .00, η2 = 
.18. A similar effect was also the only obtained when only the first recall of each 
participant was considered (F(3,48) = 7.87, p = .00, MSE = .03, η2 = .14). The mean 
proportions of veridical recall of athematic words, relatively to the ones included in 
the original list, are represented in Table 13, showing that veridical recall of the 
athematic words decreases across the serial reproduction chain but no differences 
occur across repeated reproduction. 
 
 150 
Table 13. Mean proportion of athematic words correctly recalled out of the original list 
presented to Link 1 in Experiment 4, by recall episode (recall 1 through 4) and position in the 
serial reproduction chain (link 1 through 4). 
Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M
Recall 1 .57 .41 .31 .30 .40
Recall 2 .63 .42 .29 .30 .41
Recall 3 .60 .40 .30 .30 .40
Recall 4 .60 .40 .30 .30 .40
M .60 .40 .30 .30 .40
 
When considering the proportions of veridical recall out of the actually studied 
lists, which were different for each participant except for the first links in the serial 
reproduction chain, we expect the direction of results to be the opposite of the 
direction obtained when we consider the veridical recall out of the original list. More 
specifically, participants in the last link of the serial reproduction chain should have a 
better performance, recalling a higher proportion of words, because they studied 
fewer words. So, concerning the veridical recall of personality traits of those actually 
studied by participants, we only obtained a significant interaction between the 
processing goal and the position in the serial position chain, F(3,48) = 3.98, p = .01, 
MSE = .01, η2 = .08. Table 14 shows the mean proportions of veridical recall of 
presented personality traits out of the actually studies ones, split by the links in the 
serial reproduction chain and their four repeated recall. If we consider now only the 
first recall of each participant, we can clarify the interaction obtained when analyzing 
the four recalls. So, as Table 15 depicts, the proportion of correctly recalled 
personality traits increases across links in the serial reproduction chain, but more for 
participants forming impressions of personality than for participants memorizing the 
words, F(3,48) = 4.24, p = .01, MSE = .08, η2 = .08. Plus, in the impression formation 
condition the overall performance in a chain of serial reproduction is better than in the 
memory condition (M = .72 vs. M = .56, respectively), t (62) = 2.01, d = .50. 
 
 Table 14. Mean proportion of personality traits correctly recalled out of the actually studied list 
in Experiment 4, by recall episode (recall 1 through 4) and position in the serial reproduction 
chain (link 1 through 4). 
Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M
Recall 1 .46 .62 .63 .86 .64
Recall 2 .39 .60 .66 .86 .63
Recall 3 .38 .59 .68 .89 .64
Recall 4 .39 .59 .63 .89 .62
M .41 .60 .65 .88 .63
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Table 15. Mean proportion of personality traits correctly recalled out of the actually studied 
listin the first recall episode of each participant in Experiment 4, by position in the serial 
reproduction chain (link 1 through 4) and condition (memory vs. impression formation). 
Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M
Impression Formation .40 .67 .92 .91 .72
Memory .53 .56 .34 .81 .56
 
 
Concerning the proportions of athematic words correctly recalled out of those 
actually studied (see Table 16), there were no effects of position in serial position 
chain, repeated recall, or processing goal, F < 1.  
 
Table 16. Mean proportion of athematic words correctly recalled out of the actually studied list 
in Experiment 4, by recall episode (recall 1 through 4) and position in the serial reproduction 
chain (link 1 through 4).  
Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M
Recall 1 .63 .73 .76 .88 .74
Recall 2 .69 .76 .71 .85 .75
Recall 3 .66 .71 .73 .85 .74
Recall 4 .66 .72 .73 .85 .74
M .66 .73 .73 .85 .74
 
 
False Recall. In what concerns false recall, contrary to our hypothesis we did not 
obtain false recall of the critical traits from any of the participants but those who 
studied the social positive list and were instructed to form impressions of personality. 
Because the number of false recall of the critical traits in other conditions was zero, 
we will only report the results for participants in the impression formation condition, 
presented with the social positive list (N = 16). Table 17 depicts the mean proportions 
of false recall of the critical traits out of five possible critical traits to be falsely 
recalled, across the four links in the serial reproduction chain and the four recall 
episodes each link. A ANOVA with 2 encoding goals (memory vs. impression 
formation) X 4 positions in the serial reproduction chain (link 1, link 2, link 3, or link 
4) X 4 recall episodes (recall 1, recall 2, recall 3, and recall 4) was computed and 
indicated no impact of the recall episode or the position in the serial reproduction 
chain, F(9,36) = 1.23, p = .31, MSE = .01, η2 = .03. Table 18 depicts the mean 
proportions that false recall of the critical traits comprise out of total output word in 
the free recall protocol, across the four links in the serial reproduction chain and the 
four recall episodes each link performed. An ANOVA similar to the abovementioned 
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performed on these data also indicated no effects of the position in the serial 
reproduction chain or the number of recalls, F(9,36) = 1.35, p = .25, MSE = .00, η2 = 
.04. 
Table 17. Mean proportion of personality traits falsely recalled out of the five  nonpresented 
critical traits from the studied  lists’ cluster in Experiment 4, by recall episode (recall 1 through 
4) and position in the serial reproduction chain (link 1 through 4). 
Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M
Recall 1 .30 .25 .20 .10 .21
Recall 2 .30 .30 .20 .10 .23
Recall 3 .25 .25 .20 .10 .20
Recall 4 .20 .40 .20 .10 .23
M .26 .30 .20 .10 .22
 
 
Table 18. Mean proportion that false recall of nonpresented critical traits comprises of  total 
recall output  in Experiment 4, by recall episode (recall 1 through 4) and position in the serial 
reproduction chain (link 1 through 4). 
Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M
Recall 1 .17 .18 .18 .08 .15
Recall 2 .16 .23 .18 .07 .16
Recall 3 .15 .20 .18 .07 .15
Recall 4 .12 .29 .18 .08 .17
M .15 .22 .18 .08 .16
 
 
 
Discussion 
In this Experiment 4 we intended to study the effects of repeatedly recalling 
information related to personality traits and the effects of serially reproducing that 
information in a process supposed to mimic the social transmission of information. 
Our main goal was to understand the changes in the information due to both repeated 
recall and serial recall processes but also to contrast the pattern of results for serial 
and repeated reproduction when participants are trying to simply memorize the 
information with the pattern of results for serial and repeated reproduction when 
participants are trying to form impressions about someone’s personality. To do this, 
we used an adaptation of the paradigm developed by Roediger and colleagues (2009) 
that allows a direct comparison between repeated recall and serial recall incorporating 
into a serial reproduction paradigm (Bartlett, 1932) repeated testing. Similarly to what 
we did in previous experiments, we presented participants with lists of personality 
traits and either instructed them to memorize those traits or to form an impression 
about the personality of someone described by those traits. The difference here was 
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that, after the study phase we asked each participant to repeatedly recall the presented 
words four times in a row and, in a serial reproduction fashion, we created chains of 
four links (participants) each and used the first recall protocol of each participant as 
the study list of the following participant in the chain, so that only the first link in a 
chain was presented with the original list created by us. Following the scarce studies 
using serial reproduction, we expected that information would progressively get lost 
and changed across the links in the serial reproduction chain. Comparing serial 
reproduction with repeated reproduction, we expected that one person recalling four 
times in a row would be more accurate than four people in a serial recall chain. We 
also expected intrusions to occur and to be constant across links in the serial 
reproduction chain and across each subject’s repeated reproduction episodes. 
Overall, we obtained the predicted effects. We replicated prior findings showing 
that serial reproduction produces greater forgetting over links than repeated 
reproduction over recall episodes (Bartlett, 1932; Roediger et al., 2009). Also the 
proportions of words correctly recalled across repeated recall episodes did not change 
thus indicating that one person repeatedly recalling the information four times is more 
accurate than four people recalling the same information one time each. We also 
found that the loss of information is greater under memory instructions than under 
impression formation instructions, despite there are no differences between the overall 
mean of correct recall of personality traits in the two conditions. This result is 
especially interesting because it points to the importance of transmitting socially 
relevant information under a socially relevant goal – although there is a loss of 
information when transmitting information encoded under impression formation 
goals, that loss occurs only for the first links in the serial reproduction chain and the 
stream of information transmitted tends to get stable after the first links whereas when 
transmitting information encoded under simple memory goals, it tends to get 
progressively shorter across links in the serial reproduction chain. Thus, it seems that 
the loss of information when it is serially transmitted occurs at a higher speed when 
that information is not encoded in a socially relevant way due to the characteristics of 
the information or to the processing goal active, which is congruent with previous 
studies (Bartlett, 1932; Roediger et al., 2009). The difference between serial 
reproduction of information encoded under impression formation goals and serial 
reproduction of information encoded under simple memorization goals is even more 
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salient when we consider the correct recall taking into account the actually studied 
lists and not the original ones. In this case, the overall accuracy is significantly higher 
for participants in the impression formation condition than for participants in the 
memory condition. These results support the idea that impression formation 
processing, i.e., a socially relevant processing, may decrease the negative effects of 
serially reproducing information. Also in accordance with this idea is the fact that the 
recall of athematic words included in the lists was not different between conditions, 
showing only the usual decrease of recall across serial reproduction links. Taken 
together the obtained results point to the importance of both the social nature of the 
processed information and the social relevance of the processing goal to decreasing 
loss of information when that information is being socially transmitted. However, due 
to the small extension of the presented lists and the fact that the serial reproduction is 
not the most perfect paradigm to mimic rumor transmission (Allport & Postman, 
1947) we cannot make much more inferences about the social implications of these 
results. But, the serial reproduction paradigm is supposed to be a good tool to 
investigate how individual memory biases tend to accumulate across transmission of 
information and taking that into account we can propose that socially relevant 
information and its transmission under social relevant goals seems less prone to 
deletions than socially irrelevant information or any information transmitted under a 
socially irrelevant processing goal. However, it does not seem correct to assume that 
encoding personality traits under impression formation goals leads to more accuracy 
in a serial transmission, because, as reported, we only obtained false recall of 
personality traits under impression formation processing goals. Therefore, we can 
assume that the fewer amounts of deletions of information encoded under a social 
relevant processing goal come with the cost of an increment of intrusions. This effect 
is expectable if we take into account that we need veridical recall and input stimuli to 
obtain activation of non-presented critical traits. And it is congruent with some studies 
that showed that increases in veridical recall lead to increases in false recall (e.g., 
McDermott, 2006). The fact that false recall occurred only for positive lists is 
congruent with the valence effects obtained in Studies 2 and 3, indicating a positivity 
effect in impression formation. It should be noted that the number of repeated recall 
episodes and position in the serial reproduction chain had no effects in false recall, but 
it is not interpretable as it may be due to a floor effect. 
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Finally, concerning repeated recall, we found no remarkable differences 
between repeated recall episodes. This absence of effects is consistent with Roediger 
and colleagues’ (2009) results. Although the absence of a benefit of repeatedly testing 
participants may seem at odds with studies showing that performance tends to 
improve after episodes of practice retrieval (i.e., testing) (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006; Experiment 2), we must bear in consideration that in the case of our experiment 
the test occurred without feedback, which has showed to, in certain situations, 
improve the benefits of testing (e.g., Kang, McDermott, & Roediger, 2007; Roediger 
& Butler, 2011) and, most importantly, the testing episodes were not spaced or 
delayed which has been shown to be an important factor for the occurrence of a 
testing effect (e.g., Whitten & Bjork, 1977). 
To further explore the idea that the nature of the studied information and the 
social relevance of the encoding goal influence the serial reproduction process, in the 
following study, we increased the length of the study lists and tried to identify the 
characteristics of the traits themselves, if any, that could influence their later 
probability of retrieval, i.e., their survival in a serial reproduction chain.  
 
STUDY 5: SURVIVAL RATES OF PERSONALITY TRAITS IN SERIAL AND REPEATED 
REPRODUCTION CHAINS 
 After successfully showing some differences between the effects of serial 
reproduction of socially relevant information under impression formation processing 
goals and memorization processing goals, we set out to study which characteristics 
could be influencing the survival of some traits across links in the serial chain and 
the decay of others. To do this we designed the following study, in which we used 
the same design used in Study 4, but increased the length of the study lists in order 
to each of them would contain all the traits represented within each one of the two 
clusters identified in the normative study. We decided to use all the traits because 
more than studying the effects of serial and repeated reproduction in the 
transmission of personality traits, depending on the activated processing goal, as we 
did in Study 4, we were now interested in studying which characteristics of the traits 
influenced their permanence or deletion in individual and collective memory. 
EXPERIMENT 5 
Method 
 156 
Participants. One hundred and sixteen Washington University 
undergraduates participated in the experiment for course credit or payment.  
Materials. From the normative study described in Appendix 7, we used the 94 
most commonly used personality traits. Those 94 personality traits were rated by a 
group of participants. For the serial reproduction study, the 20 traits closest to the 
centroid of the social positive cluster and the 20 traits closest to the centroid of the 
social negative cluster were used to build two study lists of 32 words each – 20 
personality traits plus 12 athematic words not related to personality traits. Each list 
was composed of personality traits from the social dimension, varying in their 
valence, so one of the lists was positive and the other was negative. The six athematic 
words were common to both lists.  
Design. For the serial reproduction experiment, the design was a 2 types of 
processing goals (memory vs. impression formation) X 2 valences of the list (positive 
vs. negative) X 4 positions in the serial reproduction chain (link 1, link 2, link 3, or 
link 4).  X 4 recall episodes (recall 1, recall 2, recall 3, and recall 4), with all factors 
between subjects, except for the recall episodes, that was within subjects. 
Procedure. A group of 52 participants, divided in small groups of two to eight 
participants, received a list of the 94 personality traits and was instructed to rate those 
personality traits on the basis of their informative value for the formation of an 
impression of personality, using a scale of six points, in which 1 meant “not 
important” and 6 meant “very important”. The presentation of the traits was 
sequential and randomized afresh for each participant. When each trait came up in the 
monitor, participants had to make their rating within 5 seconds, using the numbers 1 
to 6 in the keyboard. After 5 seconds, a new personality trait was presented. While 
making their ratings participants had the trait and the scale present in the monitor. 
After the rating of the 94 personality traits, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Another group of sixty-four participants participated in the serial reproduction 
part of the experiment. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental conditions (memory social positive, memory social negative, impression 
formation social positive, or impression formation social negative), resulting in 16 
subjects per condition. The procedure was in all similar to the procedure used in 
Experiment 4. 
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Results 
We will present the results divided by results of the free recall test and results of the 
correlational study, in which the correlations between the importance ratings of each 
trait, their position in the corresponding cluster (i.e., distance to the centroid), and 
their survival index (i.e., the mean number of links and recalls each trait survived to) 
were calculated. 
Free Recall. We will present the results of the free recall tests split into veridical 
recall and false recall. For veridical recall, we report proportions of personality traits 
veridical recall and athematic words veridical recall. For each type of item we report 
two types of proportions – out of number of items presented in the original study list 
built by us (20 personality traits; and 12 athematic words); or out of the number of 
actually studied items which varied from participant to participant. For false recall we 
report the number of intrusions that were identified as personality traits by us in a post 
hoc analysis. For each type of veridical and false memory variable, we computed 
multi-factorial ANOVAs with 2 encoding goals (memory vs. impression formation) X 
4 positions in the serial reproduction chain (link 1, link 2, link 3, or link 4). When we 
were interested in solely evaluating the effects of serial reproduction we considered 
only the first recall episode of each participant; when we were interested in comparing 
serial to repeated reproduction, we computed repeated measures ANOVAs, 
considering the four recall episodes of each participant as dependent variables.  
Veridical Recall. Considering veridical recall as a function of the original study 
list, we failed to replicate the main effect of the position in the serial reproduction 
chain on the proportion of correctly recalled personality traits, obtained in Study 4, F 
< 1. But we obtained an interaction between the position in the serial reproduction 
chain and the recall episode, F(9, 168) = 2.28, p = .02, MSE = .00, η2 = .01. These 
results are depicted in Table 19, and seem to indicate, just like what occurred in Study 
4, that participants recalled successively less personality traits across the links but not 
across repeated recall episodes. 
 
Table 19. Mean proportion of personality traits correctly recalled out of the original list 
presented to Link 1 in Experiment 5, by recall episode (recall 1 through 4) and position in the 
serial reproduction chain (link 1 through 4). 
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  Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M 
Recall 1 .38 .24 .19 .15 .24 
Recall 2 .33 .24 .20 .15 .23 
Recall 3 .34 .24 .20 .15 .23 
Recall 4 .36 .24 .20 .15 .24 
M .36 .24 .20 .15 .24 
 
To examine the results obtained when we consider only the first recall episode 
by each participant, we performed an ANOVA with the first recall as the only 
dependent measure.  We thus obtained a predictable main effect of the position in the 
serial position chain, F(3, 56) = 19.96, p = .00, MSE = .01, η2 = .26, with participants 
in the first position of the chain recalling 38% of the presented traits, participants in 
the second position recalling 24% of the traits, participants in the third position 
recalling 19% of the traits, and participants in the fourth position recalling 15% of the 
presented personality traits. This result is thus congruent with the loss of information 
across links in the serial reproduction chain. However, we also obtained a main effect 
of the processing goal, F(3, 56) = 14.24, p = .00, MSE = .01, η2 = .20. Surprisingly, 
participants in the memory condition overall links recalled more personality traits 
than participants in the impression formation condition (M = .29 vs. M = .20, 
respectively). These results are represented in Table 20. 
 
Table 20. Mean proportion of personality traits correctly recalled out of the original list 
presented to Link 1 in the first recall episode of each participant in Experiment 5, by position in 
the serial reproduction chain (link 1 through 4) and condition (memory vs. impression 
formation). 
  Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M 
Impression Formation .38 .19 .14 .10 .20 
Memory .39 .30 .25 .20 .29 
 
Results concerning veridical recall of the athematic words relatively to the 
number of athematic words included in the original study list are presented in Table 
21. We did not obtain any remarkable effect, F < 1, although the pattern of results is 
consistent with loss of information across links in the serial reproduction chain. When 
only the first recall of each participant was considered, a main effect of processing 
goal was obtained, F(1,56) = 11.89, p = .00, MSE = .01, η2 = .18. Contrary to what 
occurred for the personality traits, participants instructed to form impressions of 
personality correctly recalled more athematic words than participants instructed to 
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simply memorize the list (M = .22 vs. M = .13, respectively). These results are sown 
in Table 22. 
 
Table 21. Mean proportion of athematic words correctly recalled out of the original list 
presented to Link 1 in Experiment 5, by recall episode (recall 1 through 4) and position in the 
serial reproduction chain (link 1 through 4). 
  Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M 
Recall 1 .22 .18 .17 .14 .17 
Recall 2 .21 .18 .14 .14 .17 
Recall 3 .22 .18 .14 .14 .17 
Recall 4 .22 .18 .14 .14 .17 
M .22 .18 .14 .14 .17 
 
Table 22. Mean proportion of athematic words correctly recalled out of the original list 
presented to Link 1 in the first recall episode of each participant in Experiment 5, by position in 
the serial reproduction chain (link 1 through 4) and condition (memory vs. impression 
formation). 
 
  Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M 
Impression Formation .27 .23 .19 .18 22 
Memory .17 .14 .13 .09 .13 
 
Concerning the veridical recall of personality traits of those actually studied by 
participants (see Table 23), we only obtained a significant main effect of the position 
in the serial reproduction chain, F(3,56) = 3.60, p = .02, MSE = .01, η2 = .06. This 
effect indicated that performance was increasingly better across links in the serial 
chain, with participants in the first link recording 59% of the studied traits, 
participants in the second link recording 62% of the studied traits, participants in the 
third link recording 86% of the studied traits, and participants in the fourth link 
recording 77% of the studied traits.  
 
Table 23. Mean proportion of personality traits correctly recalled out of the actually studied list 
in Experiment 5, by recall episode (recall 1 through 4) and position in the serial reproduction 
chain (link 1 through 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 160 
  Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M 
Recall 1 .64 .63 .86 .76 .72 
Recall 2 .56 .62 .88 .78 .71 
Recall 3 .57 .62 .86 .76 .70 
Recall 4 .60 .62 .86 .76 .71 
M .59 .62 .86 .77 .71 
 
Considering only the first recall of each participant (Table 24), the proportion of 
correctly recalled personality traits is higher for participants in the memory condition 
(M = .80) than for participants in the impression formation condition (M = .64), 
F(1,56) = 4.97, p = .03, MSE = .08, η2 = .08. Contrary to the expected, we did not 
obtain an effect of position in the serial reproduction chain, F < 1, although the values 
respect the expected pattern of improving performance across links. 
 
Table 24. Mean proportion of personality traits correctly recalled out of the actually studied list 
in the first recall episode of each participant in Experiment 5, by position in the serial 
reproduction chain (link 1 through 4) and condition (memory vs. impression formation). 
  Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M 
Impression Formation .63 .52 .74 .70 .64 
Memory .66 .74 .98 .83 .80 
 
Concerning the proportions of athematic words correctly recalled out of those 
actually studied, represented in Table 25, a main effect of the position in the serial 
reproduction chain was obtained, F(3,56) = 7.69, p = .00, MSE = .01, η2 = .12, 
indicating, as predicted that performance gets increasingly better across positions in 
the serial reproduction chain. If we consider now only the first recall episode of each 
participant, besides a main effect of the position in the serial reproduction chain 
F(3,56) = 6.61, p = .00, MSE = .14, η2 = .11, indicating precisely the improvement in 
performance across links, we also obtained a main effect of condition, with 
participants in the memory condition correctly recalling fewer athematic words (M = 
.49) than participants in the impression formation condition (M = .75), F(1,56) = 7.83, 
p = .01, MSE = .14, η2 = .12. These results are presented in Table 26. 
 
Table 25. Mean proportion of athematic words correctly recalled out of the actually studied list 
in Experiment 5, by recall episode (recall 1 through 4) and position in the serial reproduction chain 
(link 1 through 4). 
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  Link 1 Link 2 Link 3     Link 4      M 
Recall 1 .26 .73 .71 .76 .64 
Recall 2 .26 .71 .65 .76 .60 
Recall 3 .26 .73 .65 .82 .62 
Recall 4 .26 .73 .65 .82 .62 
M .26 .73 .67 .79 .61 
 
Table 26. Mean proportion of athematic words correctly recalled out of the actually studied list 
in the first recall episode of each participant in Experiment 5, by position in the serial 
reproduction chain (link 1 through 4) and condition (memory vs. impression formation). 
  Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M 
Impression Formation .33 .86 .83 .96 .75 
Memory .20 .60 .58 .56 .49 
 
Interestingly, when considering only the first recall of each participant, and 
considering as dependent variables the proportion of veridical recall of personality 
traits and the proportion of veridical recall of athematic words (out of the original 
study list), we obtained a significant interaction between processing goal and type of 
veridical recall (personality traits vs. athematic words), F(1,56) = 32.24, p = .00, MSE 
= .01, η2 = .37. This interaction is represented in Figure 19, and, after paired 
comparisons, we verify that participants in the memory condition correctly recalled a 
higher proportion of personality traits (M = .29) than athematic words (M = .13), 
F(1,56) = 52.93, p = .00, MSE = .01, η2 = .49; whereas participants in the impression 
formation condition recalled roughly the same proportion of personality traits (M = 
.20) and athematic words (M = .22), F < 1. 
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Figure 19. Mean proportion of personality traits and athematic words correctly recalled in the 
first recall episode of all the participants, in Experiment 5, as a function of condition. Error bars 
display standard errors of the mean. 
 
False Recall. Finally, in what concerns false recall, we must remind you that the 
falsely recalled personality traits were defined after the data were obtained and we did 
not have any prior hypothesis about the level of false recall of personality traits. 
Especially because we gave participants study lists big enough to represent almost the 
entire clusters of the implicit theory of personality we were not expecting a large 
number of intrusions, namely false memories due to inferential processes occurring in 
impression formation. However, we verified that the overall mean number of 
personality traits falsely recalled in the first recall episode of each participant, 
collapsing across conditions and positions in the serial reproduction chain, was 
different from zero, t(63) = 6.60, p = .00, d = 1.66. We aggregated the data of both 
conditions because we found no differences between conditions concerning the mean 
number of personality traits intruded (F < 1), with participants in the memory 
condition intruding a mean of .97 traits and participants in the impression formation 
condition intruding a mean of .88 personality traits. Considering now the four recalls 
of each participant, we did not obtain effects of position in the serial reproduction 
chain on the mean number of traits intruded, F < 1; but we obtained a marginal effect 
of the recall episode, F(3,168) = 2.57, p = .06, MSE = .13, η2 = .02. As depicted in 
Table 27, the mean number of intruded traits showed a tendency to slightly increase 
across recall episodes. 
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Table 27. Mean number of personality traits intruded (falsely recalled) in Experiment 5, by 
recall episode (recall 1 through 4) and position in the serial reproduction chain (link 1 through 
4). 
  Link 1 Link 2 Link 3 Link 4 M 
Recall 1 1.00 .75 1.06 .88 .92 
Recall 2 1.25 .88 1.31 .94 1.10 
Recall 3 1.00 .94 1.25 .94 1.03 
Recall 4 1.06 .88 1.19 .94 1.02 
M 1.08 .86 1.20 .92 1.02 
 
Correlations. After the free recall part of the experiment, we computed the survival 
indexes for each one of the personality traits included in the studied lists, split by type 
of list and condition – memory or impression formation. We computed different 
indexes for serial and repeated reproduction. For serial reproduction indexes, we 
calculated the proportion of links (i.e., participants in each position of the serial 
reproduction chain) that successfully retrieved each trait in their first recall attempt, 
out of 16 possible links (four possible links times four serial reproduction chains). For 
repeated reproduction indexes, we calculated the proportion of recall episodes in 
which participants in the first position (link) in the serial reproduction chain 
successfully retrieved each trait, out of 16 possible episodes (four possible recall 
episodes times four participants that were in the first position in the serial 
reproduction chain). We also calculated the proportion of last links in the chains’ last 
recall episode each trait survived, out of four possible (four links in each condition 
and each one having one fourth recall episode), and this can be seen as the ultimate 
trait survival measure as it would indicate that a trait did not only survive the serial 
reproduction but also a later repeated reproduction process. These indexes, along with 
the importance ratings obtained and the distance of each trait to its cluster’s centroid 
can be found in Appendix 11. 
Table 28 depicts the correlations between each of the referred measures. 
Pearson product–moment correlations were calculated between each measure 
(importance rating, distance to the centroid, and each of the survival indexes split by 
memory and impression formation processing goal). Not surprisingly, the survival 
measures within the impression formation condition all correlated with each other – 
repeated and serial survival (r = .85, p < .05), repeated survival and last links’ last 
recall survival (r = .43, p < .05), serial survival and last links’ last recall survival (r = 
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.73, p < .05). The same occurred for the measures within the memory condition – 
repeated and serial survival (r = .60, p < .05), repeated survival and last links’ last 
recall survival (r = .42, p < .05), serial survival and last links’ last recall survival (r = 
.90, p < .05). But, besides these expectable positive correlations, we only obtained one 
more significant correlation, a negative correlation between the distance to the 
centroid and the last links’ last recall survival in the memory condition (r = -.35, p < 
.05). This result is more unexpected because impression formation survival measures 
failed to negatively correlate with distance to centroid. Also, against what we would 
have predicted, the importance ratings failed to achieve a significant correlation to 
any of the survival measures or to distance to centroid. 
 
Table 28. Correlations between importance ratings of personality traits, their distance to the 
centroid of their cluster represented in the implicit theory of personality, and their survival 
indexes calculated for serial and repeated recall for each one of the conditions (memory and 
impression formation) and for the last recall (recall 4) of the last link in the serial reproduction 
chain (link 4) for each condition. Significant correlations are on bold. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
In this final study, our main goals were to replicate the effects of serial 
reproduction obtained in Study 4 and explore the relationship between the positioning 
of each trait within the implicit theory of personality, their importance rating, and 
their longevity in a serial reproduction chain and in individual repeated recall 
episodes. Relative to the replication of Study 4, we obtained converging results in this 
study, as we showed that information loss occurs across links in a serial reproduction 
Importance Rating Distance to Centroid Serial Survival (Imp Form)
Serial Survival 
(Memo)
Repeated Survival 
(Imp Form)
Repeated Survival 
(Memo)
Link 4- Recall 4 
Survival (Imp Form)
Link 4- Recall 4 
Survival (Memo)
Importance Rating --
Distance to Centroid .03 --
Serial Survival (Imp 
Form) .20 -.24 --
Serial Survival 
(Memo) .16 -.28 .20 --
Repeated Survival 
(Imp Form) .17 -.29 .85 .26 --
Repeated Survival 
(Memo) .26 -.18 .24 .60 .26 --
Link 4- Recall 4 
Survival (Imp Form) .04 -.06 .73 .27 .43 .29 --
Link 4- Recall 4 
Survival (Memo) -.12 -.35 .15 .90 .18 .42 .29 --
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chain whereas the same does not occur in repeated reproduction. Thus, we assembled 
more evidence showing that four people recalling information one time each are less 
accurate than only one person recalling information four times in a row. Again, we 
replicated Bartlett’s (1932) and Roediger and colleagues’ (2009) results. However, in 
this study we obtained a significant difference between conditions that was not 
expected and may seem contradictory in relation to our Study 4 results. Contrary to 
what occurred in Study 4, in which participants instructed to form impressions of 
personality had a better performance than participants instructed to simply memorize 
the words. In this study, participants instructed to memorize the words were better 
than participants who formed impressions of personality, when considering veridical 
recall of personality traits. Conversely, when considering veridical recall of athematic 
words, impression formation participants performed better than memory participants. 
This pattern of results seems incompatible with our previous experiments’ results 
showing that participants in the impression formation condition should perform 
equally or better than participants in the memory condition. Even more discordant 
with our results is the fact that a posteriori identified false recall of personality traits 
was not higher for participants in the impression formation condition than for 
participants in the memory condition.  
According to our theory, participants in the impression formation condition 
should activate the goal of forming an impression of personality and thus activate the 
associative memory structure of the implicit theory of personality, which would lead 
to more false memories relative to participants in the memory condition that should 
only activate the default semantic network and thus have only false memories based 
on the associative strength between items. But, this Study 5 presents a remarkable 
methodological difference relative to the previously presented studies. As we were 
interested in analyzing correlations between several personality traits characteristics, 
we presented twenty personality traits of the same cluster instead of only ten as we 
did in other experiments. Plus, these twenty presented traits included the centroid of 
the cluster and the traits that were used as critical traits in the previous experiments. 
Basically, we used the twenty most representative traits of each cluster. But how 
would this lead to such an unexpected and contradictory pattern of results? Based in 
Brown (1986) ideas, we assumed that the impression formation processing implies the 
placing of the target in the semantic space that underlies the implicit theory of 
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personality by an inferential process; and it is this inferential process that leads to the 
later occurrence of false memories congruent with the presented personality traits. In 
other words, participants forming impressions of personality will make inferences in 
the study phase, resulting in more false memories than the ones participants 
memorizing will produce, as they will only have false memories due to automatic 
dispersion of activation. In the case of this Study 5, the inferential process is 
constrained because we already provided all the most diagnostic and accessible 
information about the target’s personality, resulting in the same level of false 
memories for participants forming impressions and for participants memorizing the 
information. Also, the veridical memory differences can be explained by the reduction 
of inferences about personality traits. As the presented personality traits only provide 
redundant information about the target, participants who are trying to form an 
impression will try to get more information using the athematic words, using them for 
the inferential processing that is usually based on the personality traits. On the other 
hand, participants only concerned with memorizing the information will pay equal 
attention to the personality traits and to the athematic words. Therefore, although the 
obtained pattern of results may seem at odds with the proposed theory, it actually may 
provide evidence for the theory. These results show that the inferential process that 
occurs during impression formation is crucial for the occurrence of the classic results 
reported in impression formation literature. If too much information about the target is 
provided the benefit of impression formation processing in memory relative to 
memorization does not occur. This provides some evidence against the idea that 
impression formation processing is simply a deeper level of processing, and supports 
the notion that impression formation processing may be a deeper level of processing 
but also is a very specific process, which activates conditional memory structures (the 
implicit theory of personality) and has special characteristics, including dedicated and 
specialized brain structures (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2004).  
 Concerning the lack of correlations between the permanency of the traits in the 
serial reproduction chain or in the repeated recall episodes and their distance to their 
cluster’s centroid or their mean importance rating, especially for participants forming 
impressions of personality, it can be due to the just referred lack of inferential 
processing that seems to be occurring not only for participants in the memory 
condition but also for participants in the impression formation condition. However, if 
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this is the case, how can the negative correlation between serial survival in the 
memory condition and distance to the centroid be explained? Taking into 
consideration the veridical memory results obtained, it seems fair to assume that 
participants in the memory condition encoded the personality traits better than 
participants in the impression formation condition, as the veridical recall of 
personality traits indicates. Moreover, participants in the memory condition encoded 
personality traits better than they encoded the athematic words whereas participants in 
the impression formation condition encoded both types of stimuli equally well (see 
Figure 19), which may point to more importance given to the athematic words by the 
impression formation participants relative to memory participants. If so, the athematic 
words presence could prevent the normal impression formation processing that 
recruits the implicit theory of personality semantic representation to occur and thus, 
eliminate the influence that the referred structure could have in the transmission of 
information relative to impressions of personality. On the other hand, for participants 
in the memory condition the presence of almost all the personality traits of a given 
cluster made them neglect the athematic words and recreate the usual configuration of 
those personality traits in the implicit theory of personality representation in memory 
and thus the most typical traits (i.e., the traits closest to the centroid of a cluster) were 
better recalled and tended to be more transmitted in the serial reproduction chain than 
traits that were less typical of their cluster (i.e. the most distant traits to the centroid of 
a cluster). 
Taken together, the results of this final study despite showing the opposite 
pattern of the results obtained in studies 1 to 3, provide further evidence for our 
hypothesis that the impression formation processing activates the semantic structure 
that underlies the implicit theory of personality. The activation of this semantic 
memory structure is conditional to the goal of forming an impression of personality 
but, according to this study, it also depends on the ability of the inferential processing 
that guides the placement of the target in the implicit theory of personality to occur. 
If, by manipulations such as providing too much redundant information or highly 
contradictory information (Nunes & Garcia-Marques, unpublished data), the 
inferential processing implied by the impression formation goal is blocked, 
individuals will try to gather other information that can lead their impression 
formation process, such as finding mean in athematic words that otherwise would be 
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negligible. Of course, these implications will further influence the social transmission 
of information relative to impressions of personality and, even if subsequent links in a 
social chain receive less information, that information will already be filtered by the 
individual processes applied by the first link who received the original information. 
The nature of these processes and their interrelations will be further discussed in the 
following section that should provide an integrated view of the results discussed so far 
as well as their theoretical implications. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The study of impressions of personality and the way they form dates back from 
the 1920’s (Thorndike, 1920) but only after Asch’s 1946 study this issue gathered 
more attention. And this attention lead to a focus on the cognitive processes 
underlying impression formation, which in turn, lead to some inconclusive debates 
(e.g. Asch vs. Anderson). Asch (1946) viewed the process of forming an impression 
as a holistic process by which the perceiver tried to combine all the information 
available about the target into a coherent impression, just like a gestaltic process. On 
the other hand, authors such as Anderson (1965; 1967; 1969) posited that the process 
of forming an impression of personality was mainly an elementaristic one, in which 
each trait was weighted independently of the context, i.e., the other presented traits. 
But, despite the importance of this theoretical debate and its contribution to the 
identification of some of the most important effects in impression formation literature 
(e.g., centrality and primacy effects; Asch, 1946), we are more interested in the 
approaches that conceive the process of forming an impression of personality as the 
placement of the target in a bidimensional space in which the personality traits are 
represented and their location reflects their characteristics and the relations they have 
with each other (Bruner and Tagiuri, 1954; Rosenberg et al., 1968), just like the 
possible representation of other associative memory structures. These approaches 
make possible to explain the classical impression formation effects without requiring 
a positioning in the gestaltic – elementaristic debate. According to Bruner and Tagiuri 
(1954), the beliefs we hold about which personality traits tend to co-occur in the same 
individual and our expectations about other’s personalities form an implicit theory of 
personality that will guide the impression formation process. Following this idea, 
Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) used multidimensional scaling techniques and 
cluster analysis to identify the possible representation of this structure. The authors 
then identified a bi-dimensional semantic space, formed by two largely independent 
dimensions – a social and an intellectual – each one with two poles – a positive and a 
negative – resulting in four different clusters: a social positive, a social negative, an 
intellectual positive, and an intellectual negative. For each cluster, it is also possible 
to determine which traits compose it and how distant they are from one another as 
well as which traits are more central (i.e., which traits are closest to all the traits 
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forming the cluster). If we consider, just like Brown (1986) that forming an 
impression of personality implies the placement of the target in this semantic space 
and that people usually go beyond the information given when forming an impression 
about someone’s personality (e.g. Asch, 1946), the architecture of this bi-dimensional 
structure and the organization of traits within each cluster must have effects on the 
impression formation process. This idea is not entirely new, as  Wishner (1960) and 
Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) had already suggested that Asch’s (1946) reported 
effects could be explained by the relations between the traits used to describe the 
target and the traits presented in checklists used to measure the impression formed. 
However, we go beyond this by suggesting that Asch’s effects are determined by the 
configuration of the implicit theory of personality which, in turn, represents the 
organization of personality traits in memory and the associative links between them. 
Thus, we set out to study these classical impression formation effects by using 
paradigms developed to study semantic memory and the associations between 
semantic representations. We thus draw a parallel between the implicit theory of 
personality and other associative memory structures, suggesting that they should be 
equally flexible and, as a cost, prone to the same type of errors. And it is precisely by 
studying the type of errors that the implicit theory of personality elicits when 
activated under the goal of impression formation or when the words that constitute it 
are activated under a general memorization goal that we propose to further understand 
the impression formation processing. More specifically, we suggested that just as 
what occurs with memory for lists of semantic associates, if an individual is presented 
with a number of traits used to describe a given target, the subsequent activation of 
these traits would gradually converge on their non-presented semantic neighbors that 
share the same dimension and valence, originating the false attribution of these traits 
to the target and, if in a memory test, to their false retrieval. Moreover, as we 
hypothesized that impression formation encoding processes involved the assemblage 
of the specific semantic trait space underlying the implicit theory of personality, not 
available under memorization goals, we expected certain effects would be maximized 
under impression formation processing goals. Also, besides the positioning in the 
implicit theory of personality, we considered the importance of descriptive and 
evaluative aspects of each personality trait, as Brown (1986) and Peabody (1967; 
1990) suggested and incorporated their idea that consistency (either evaluative or 
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descriptive) plays a role in the process of forming an impression of personality. Of 
course, we expected these qualities of the personality traits to play a role only when 
impression formation processing goals were active. 
So, our focus on memory errors derived from the impression formation 
processing lead us to use the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). The DRM paradigm has been used to successfully demonstrate the flexible and 
error-prone nature of associative memory structures, such a semantic memory 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995), phonological memory (Sommers & Lewis, 1999), or 
numerical memory (Pesta et al., 2001). The DRM paradigm usually implies the study 
of lists of words associated to a certain non-presented critical word and later memory 
tests show that the non-presented critical word is falsely recalled or recognized at the 
same extent of the actually presented words. So, we developed three studies to test 
these ideas. First, we tested the idea that the implicit theory of personality could be 
seen as an associative memory structure prone to associative memory errors and if its 
activation was conditional to impression formation goals. To do this (Experiment 1), 
we developed an adaptation of the DRM paradigm, using lists of personality traits 
from a given personality cluster instead of semantic associates and manipulating the 
type of instructions (either giving memorization goals or impression formation goals). 
We then tested the levels of veridical and false recognition in a standard recognition 
test and in an inclusive recognition test. Then, we tried to replicate two of the main 
effects obtained in the impression formation literature – the centrality effect and the 
primacy effect, identified by Asch (1946), using similar procedures to the ones used 
in Experiment 1, but manipulating the constitution of the study lists so that they 
reflected Asch’s manipulations (Experiments 2a and 2b; and Experiments 3a and 3b). 
Moreover, and as we succeeded in showing that the implicit theory of personality can 
behave as an associative memory structure highly flexible and thus prone to errors, as 
we’ll further discuss, we also tested what tends to happen to this highly socially 
relevant information when it is subject to serial reproduction. According to Bartlett 
(1932), serial reproduction of information should reflect the accumulation of 
individual memory biases (Bartlett, 1932), and therefore, information especially prone 
to those individual biases should also suffer changes across a serial reproduction 
chain. The effects of serial transmission of information had already been showed with 
semantically related materials (Roediger et al., 2009) or with other materials (e.g., 
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Bartlett, 1932) but to our knowledge, our studies were the first using impressions of 
personality. So, as impressions of personality contain socially relevant information, 
we were able to assess if the effects of repeatedly transmitting socially relevant 
information were similar to the effects of transmitting socially irrelevant information, 
such as lists of semantic associates (Roediger et al., 2009). Plus, we used a paradigm 
that allowed us to compare the effects of repeated and serial reproduction of formed 
impressions as well as measure the survival rate of personality traits with different 
characteristics, i.e., to check which personality traits do not vanish across repeated 
and/or serial reproduction and evaluate their positioning within the implicit theory of 
personality structure. So, in two experiments, we adopted a paradigm that combined 
the serial reproduction technique and the repeated reproduction technique and 
evaluated the loss of information across links in the serial reproduction chain and 
across recall episodes within each individual. We also identified the traits most prone 
to survive the repeated and serial reproduction procedure and correlated their 
probability of surviving with their other characteristics, such as importance rating and 
position in the implicit theory of personality. After completing these five studies, we 
can say that our main hypothesis received empirical support and that it seems that the 
implicit theory of personality behaves as other associative memory structures being 
prone to the same errors but, moreover, it shows some unique errors that derive of its 
unique constitution. Plus, the activation of the implicit theory of personality as a 
memory structure seems conditional to the activation of an impression formation goal. 
Finally, the impressions of personality suffer the same type of alterations that other 
information when they are socially transmitted, although the intrusions seem to reflect 
different characteristics of the processing. But we will now review these results in 
more detail. 
 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In our first study, we combined memory research with impression formation 
research. These two fields have developed separately and whereas impression 
formation research tended to focus on the errors made and on the judgments derived, 
memory research focused on accuracy. It was only after the development of the DRM 
paradigm by Roediger and McDermott (1995), based on a forgotten paradigm by 
Deese (1959) that memory researchers started to concern about memory errors and a 
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convergence between memory research and impression formation research was more 
obvious. So, beginning with Brown’s (1986) idea that the impression formation 
process implies the positioning of the target in the semantic space that underlies the 
implicit theory of personality (Rosenberg et al., 1968), we developed the hypothesis 
that the impression formation processing goal entails the assemblage of the specific 
semantic trait space defined by Rosenberg and colleagues (1968), i.e., the associative 
memory structure of the implicit theory of personality. Thus, the activation of this 
structure should have specific effects in a later memory task, related to its 
organization, but also similar in nature to the effects obtained with other flexible 
associative memory structures. So, by dispersion of activation and active inference, 
we should obtain false memories in a paradigm implying the presentation of trait 
words and later memory tests. This was precisely what we obtained in Study 1. A 
strong effect of false recognition of personality traits belonging to the same cluster of 
those presented in the study list was obtained (more false alarms to non presented 
personality traits matching the list than to irrelevant personality traits or traits 
belonging to other clusters). The most remarkable about this effect is that it was 
significantly stronger when participants encoded the presented list under impression 
formation processing goals relative to when the presented list had been encoded under 
simple memorization goals. Besides these results in the standard recognition test, we 
replicated the same pattern of results in the gist recognition test. The gist recognition 
test is an inclusive test (Brainerd et al., 2002) in which participants are asked to select 
not only the actually presented words in the study phase, but also the non presented 
words that shared some characteristics (e.g., the theme) with the presented ones. Thus, 
the gist test minimizes monitoring requirements and allows for the clarification of the 
contribution of monitoring processes for the results obtained in the standard 
recognition test (Brainerd et al., 2002). Therefore, an equal pattern of results in the 
standard test and in the gist test would indicate a predominance of influence of 
encoding processes whereas a different pattern of results would indicate that 
monitoring processes were playing an important role in the results obtained in the 
standard test. We ended up obtaining the same pattern of results in both tests, 
indicating differences between the two conditions, memory and impression formation 
in the standard test, with more false alarms for participants in the impression 
formation condition relative to participants in the memory condition.  If we had 
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obtained a different pattern of results in the gist test, it would imply that memory 
participants had more efficient monitoring processes operating in the standard test 
than participants in the impression formation condition; but our similar pattern of 
results in the gist test indicated that participants in the memory condition had a real 
specific relational deficit in encoding personality traits, indicating that the associative 
structure underlying the implicit theory of personality was not active, being 
conditional to impression formation goals. Because, as predicted, we obtained the 
exact same pattern of results in both tests, we assume that memory participants 
encoded the presented information in a different way of impression formation 
participants, showing fewer false alarms even when tested under conditions that 
minimized monitoring requirements. However, we should mention that although we 
believe that the comparison between results from the standard and the gist recognition 
tests is suggestive, because test order was not manipulated, performance in the 
standard recognition test may have contaminated performance in the subsequent gist 
test and thus future research should discard this possibility.  In any case, these results 
point to the critical importance of impression formation goals in the activation of a 
specialized semantic structure, suggesting that different encoding goals can lead to the 
activation of a somewhat different semantic structure.  
The pattern of results obtained suggests that the Implicit Theory of Personality 
may function as a specialized semantic structure that is activated when the goal of 
impression formation is operative which is in accordance with studies suggesting that 
social cognition may involve the participation of specialized brain structures and 
dedicated cognitive processes that are activated whenever a social cognitive goal 
(e.g., impression formation) is active (Mitchell et al., 2004).  Also, although there 
have been previous attempts to characterize the cognitive nature of the implicit theory 
of personality (Cantor & Mischel, 1977; 1979), we believe that both the present 
characterization of the Implicit Theory of Personality as a conditional associative 
structure and its exploration in an experimental paradigm allowing for systematic 
comparison with other associative structures is a step forward to our understanding of 
the processes underlying impression formation.   
But the obtained results also have an impact in memory research. The 
conditional nature of the implicit theory of personality associative structure provides 
further developments on the nature of false memories and associative memories in 
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general.  Study 1 results suggest that, whereas in the standard DRM paradigm 
unconditional or, at least, default associative structures are activated, in some 
adaptations of the paradigm, false memories are obtained depending on the adequacy 
of the instructions, or the level of false memories is moderated by this adequacy. 
However, this is not entirely new, as some false memory effects have been already 
shown to occur only when the stimuli are studied under appropriate instructions – for 
instance, false memories of numeric associates only occur if participants are carrying 
the appropriate arithmetic operations at encoding (Pesta et al., 2001). But, despite the 
referred research (Pesta et al., 2001), the systematic comparison of the characteristics 
of what we call conditional and unconditional associative structures is an important 
endeavor that has been largely ignored. We hope to have contributed with a first step 
to change this state of affairs. 
After this successful adaptation of the DRM paradigm to the study of 
impression formation, we set out to replicate classic effects in impression formation. 
In Study 2 we tested how the centrality effect (Asch, 1946) reflects the organization 
of personality traits in memory and how traits supposed to be central impact false 
memories. Given the Study 1 results, we expected to obtain a centrality effect 
translated into false memories when adding a central trait to the study list, but only 
when participants were instructed to form impressions of personality, as the 
characterization of a trait as central would only make sense when the associative 
structure underlying the implicit theory of personality was activated. So, following 
Asch (1946) procedure, we added a central trait (i.e., the closest trait to a given 
cluster’s centroid) from a different dimension and same or different valence relatively 
to the other traits in the study list. In a first experiment (Experiment 2A), we 
replicated the results obtained in Study 1 – a higher level of false memories matching 
the dimension and valence of the majority of studied traits than of false memories 
from the opposite valence, especially for participants in the impression formation 
condition. But, regarding the dimension of the central trait, we failed to obtain false 
recognition of traits sharing its dimension relative to traits from the opposite 
dimension. On the contrary, this predicted effect occurred in the gist recognition test, 
for participants in the impression formation condition, suggesting that monitoring 
processes recruited for the standard recognition test prevented this effect to occur. 
Interestingly, we noticed that this central trait was more correctly recognized for 
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participants in the impression formation condition than for participants in the memory 
condition. We then suggested that this better recognition of the central trait was 
driving the absence of false memories relative to its associated traits. More 
specifically, it seemed that a disqualifying monitoring strategy was taking place, with 
the vivid recollection of the central trait being used to disqualify the associated traits 
as being presented (Gallo, 2004),. This pattern of results is actually consistent with 
the centrality effect described by Asch (1946) suggesting that a central trait is highly 
recognizable because it is more distinctive as it does not share the main characteristics 
of the other traits, being the only one providing information about its dimension. So, 
the added central trait possesses a type of secondary distinctiveness because its 
properties deviate from the properties of the other presented traits, by an inherent 
characteristic that is its position in the semantic space underlying the implicit theory 
of personality (Schmidt, 1991; Park, Arndt, & Reder, 2006). But if we were correct 
and the distinctive nature of the central trait was being used to avoid false alarms to 
its associated traits via a disqualifying monitoring strategy we would be able to obtain 
the predicted centrality effect on false memories as long as we could prevent 
monitoring to occur. Dodson and Hege (2005) showed that the typical false 
recognition suppression due to item’s distinctiveness occurs only when the 
recognition test is self-paced. By asking their participants to make their recognition 
decision within one second, Dodson and Hege (2005) were able to obtain false 
recognition of distinctive information and considered this as evidence for a 
distinctiveness heuristic account that assumes that a time-consuming retrieval strategy 
is used to reduce false recognition responses. Also Benjamin (2001) found that false 
alarms increase when participants are tested under time pressure and especially if the 
study lists were presented three times, and attributed it to a less effective monitoring 
under time pressure. On the other hand, Heit and colleagues (2004) manipulated the 
time pressure at the test and did not find any differences in the level of false 
recognition of the related lures between slower and faster responses. However, the 
Heit and colleagues (2004) study did not manipulate distinctiveness of the presented 
words. Thus, we designed Experiment 2B in which we added time pressure at the test. 
By forcing participants to give their response rapidly, we obtained the predicted 
centrality effect in false memories. Under time pressure, not only the added central 
trait was highly recognized but also the level of false recognition of traits from the 
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same cluster of the added traits was significantly higher than the level of false 
recognition of traits from the opposite cluster. So, the results obtained in Study 2 are 
compatible with a high distinctiveness of the central trait - a secondary distinctiveness 
as Schmidt (1991) conceptualizes it – but these results also point to the possibility of 
obtaining false memories due to the activation of only one word. The personality 
traits referred to as central traits (Asch, 1946; Wishner, 1960) may simply be 
personality traits that are more distinctive from a memory point of view, given their 
intrinsic characteristics, but the specificity of the impression formation processing 
makes those traits so special that their activation can spread by a divergent process to 
the associated traits. Then, the reported result is not only important for the impression 
formation literature, as it sheds some light into the processes involved in the centrality 
effect, but also for the memory literature as we were able to obtain a strong false 
memory effect by presenting only one word. As referred, this effect suggests that it is 
possible to obtain false memories by active inferential processes that lead to divergent 
dispersion of activation, i.e. the activation of a single word can spread to its multiple 
associates, as long as that word is important for the processing goal active at the time 
and the inferred words are all associated. 
After having successfully showed that the centrality effect in impression 
formation impacts memories about personality traits and reflects the activation of the 
conditional and specific associative structure underlying the implicit theory of 
personality, we tried to study the primacy effect in impression formation. Again, we 
borrowed Asch’s (1946) definition of primacy in impression formation as the 
“direction” of the impression defined by the first presented traits about the target. 
More specifically, according to Asch (1946), the first presented traits about a target 
are more influential in the impression formation process because they will select the 
meaning of the following traits and set the valence of the impression. Taking this 
idea, we proposed that these initial traits would also lead to more related false 
memories than the following traits. Thus, in Experiment 3A we manipulated the 
predominant valence of the traits presented in the first half of the study list, keeping 
the dimension of the entire list constant. Relative to the list dimension, we expected 
more false alarms to traits with the same valence of the predominant traits in the first 
half of the study list, relative to traits with the same valence of the predominant traits 
in the second half of the list. In other words, we expected that false alarms to positive 
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traits from the list dimension would be more frequent than false alarms to negative 
traits from the same dimension, when the first half of the list was predominantly 
positive and the contrary when the first half of the list was predominantly negative. 
Taking into account the previous experiences and our hypothesis that the implicit 
theory of personality is an associative memory structure which activation is 
conditional to impression formation processing goals, this primacy effect in false 
memories should be higher for participants in the impression formation condition. 
Our results only partially supported our hypothesis. Actually, we did obtain the 
referred primacy effect but only when the first half of the list was predominantly 
positive. So, when the first half of the studied list was predominantly positive, 
participants in the impression formation condition produced more positive false 
alarms than negative ones; but, when the first half of the list was negative, 
participants in the impression formation condition produced roughly the same 
proportion of positive and negative false alarms. For participants in the memory 
condition, as predicted, there were no differences between positive and negative false 
alarms, regardless the predominant valence in the first half of the studied list. Thus, it 
seems we were able to recreate another one of the classic impression formation 
effects, using an adaptation of a paradigm usually used to study memory. However, 
we obtained a novel and somehow unexpected valence effect. The obtained valence 
effect indicates that a positivity effect imposes a constraint to the primacy effect. This 
result is congruent with Hamilton and colleagues idea that individuals tend to make 
stronger trait inferences from positive traits than from negative traits, regardless the 
extremity and dimension of the traits. Also congruent with our results is the 
suggestion that people hold a general positive expectancy about others (Wyer & 
Lambert, 1994), congruent with a more generalized positivity bias that affects the 
human evaluation system (Gardner, 1996). The existence of a general positive 
expectancy about others would explain why we only obtained a primacy effect when 
the first presented information was positive. So, if the first presented information of a 
target is positive it will be compatible with the general expectancy about the target 
that is also positive, leading to more positive inferences about the target that reflects 
in more positive false alarms; on the other hand, if the first presented information 
about the target is negative, it will be incongruent with the general expectancy and 
thus the presented information and the general expectancy will be opposed, 
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generating a more neutral impression reflected in the absence of a primacy effect of 
false memories. This pattern of results is compatible to Asch’s (1946) view that the 
first presented traits about a given target guide the inferential process of forming an 
impression of personality about that target but it suggests that there are constraints to 
this effect posed by a general expectancy that people hold about others. So, the 
primacy effect occurs depending on the congruence of the first presented traits with 
the general belief about the target. 
Nevertheless, we showed again that the organization of information about 
personality traits in memory plays a role in the classic impression formation effects 
and that the recruitment of that specific semantic space is conditional to the activation 
of the impression formation goal. These results are especially interesting if we take 
into account that they were replicated in the inclusive recognition test and were 
obtained in the absence of any veridical memory effects. The fact that the same 
pattern of results occurred for both the standard test and the inclusive test indicates 
that differential encoding of the data occurred between conditions, with participants in 
the impression formation condition activating more nonpresented traits congruent 
with the predominant valence of the first half of the list relative to participants in the 
memory condition. The absence of veridical memory effects, i.e., even for 
participants in the impression formation condition, although they produced more false 
alarms relative to traits sharing the valence of the most represented traits in the first 
half of the list, they did not have better veridical recognition for traits predominant in 
the first half of the list or traits predominant in the second half of the list. This 
indicates that the obtained results reflect inferences made at the time of encoding and 
conditional to the activation of the associative structure underlying the implicit theory 
of personality via the activation of an impression formation goal. Plus it also indicates 
that the primacy effect, as it has been reported by Asch (1946), could not be a mere 
effect of differential attention paid to the first presented traits in the target’s 
description as Anderson (1967; 1969) suggested. Therefore, the presented results 
contribute to clarify the nature of the processes involved in the impression formation 
primacy effect, suggesting that Asch’s hypothesis was more correct than Anderson’s 
hypothesis. However, these results also show that Asch (1946) neglected the 
importance of a general positive expectancy in the impression formation processing 
(Wyer & Lambert, 1994). But, despite this contribution to the primacy effect 
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understanding, our data did not allow us to test two important theories of impression 
formation – the Evaluative Consistency Theory (Brown, 1986) and the alternate 
theory proposed by Peabody (1990). One can argue that the obtained primacy effect 
was due to a change of evaluative meaning (valence) of the last presented traits, 
selected by the evaluative meaning of the first presented traits in order to maximize 
the evaluative consistency, as suggested by the Evaluative Consistency Theory 
(Brown, 1986); but one can also argue that, because all the presented traits belonged 
to the same dimension, the obtained primacy effect was due to a change of descriptive 
meaning of the last presented traits, defined by the descriptive meaning of the traits 
presented in the first half of the study list. So, to further explore the nature of the 
primacy effect in impression formation, we developed Experiment 3B in which we 
manipulated not only the valence of each half of the list but also the dimension of 
each half of the list. According to the Evaluative Consistency Theory (Brown, 1986), 
we should expect the occurrence of a primacy effect by which there would be more 
false alarms sharing the valence of the first half of the list than false alarms sharing 
the valence of the second half of the list, regardless de dimension of the false alarms, 
i.e., the valence of the first half of the list would change the evaluative meaning of the 
traits presented in the second half of the list even if they belonged to the opposite 
dimension, in order to maximize the evaluative consistency, regardless the descriptive 
meaning of the traits (their dimension). On the other hand, according to Peadody’s 
(1990) alternate theory, we should not expect any type of primacy effect because the 
traits presented in the first half of the list belonged to a different dimension, 
orthogonal to the dimension of the traits presented in the second half of the list and 
thus would not be able to select the descriptive meaning of those traits. So, in 
Experiment 3B, Peabody (1990) would predict the same proportion of positive and 
negative false alarms independently of the valence of the first presented traits, i.e. no 
differences between the number of false alarms to traits belonging to the cluster of the 
traits presented in the first half of the list and false alarms to traits belonging to the 
cluster of the traits presented in the second half of the list. On the other hand, Brown 
(1986) would predict a higher level of false alarms to traits matching the cluster of the 
first presented traits than to traits matching the cluster of the following traits, 
reflecting an impact of the valence of the first presented traits across dimensions. 
However, according to Experiment 3A results, we would expect the referred primacy 
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effect to occur only when the first presented traits were positive; when the first 
presented traits were negative, we would expect more of a recency effect, with more 
false alarms to traits from the cluster presented in the second half of the list (i.e., the 
positive cluster). And these were precisely the obtained results – there was an effect 
of maximization of evaluative consistency, as suggested by Brown (1986), but always 
in the direction of the positive information, which does not support either Brown 
(1986) or Peabody (1990). Taken together, the results of this third study represent an 
important step towards a better understanding of the primacy effect in impression 
formation and, most importantly, shed some light into valence effects in impression 
formation and how they occur across dimensions. More specifically, we identified an 
important constraint to the primacy effect – valence and congruence of the first 
presented personality traits with a more general commonly shared positive expectancy 
about others’ personalities. First, the primacy effect only seems to occur when the 
first traits are positive, indicating that the evaluative meaning of the following traits 
can be changed but only in a positive direction. So, we suggest an adaptation of 
Brown’s (1986) theory to reflect the effect of a previous general positive expectancy 
and a trend of maximizing the evaluative consistence of an impression towards the 
most positive possible impression. Thus, we propose a Positive Consistency Theory, 
according to which, there are not the first traits that select the evaluative meaning of 
the following traits but the positive traits regardless their position in the description of 
the target. According to our adaptation of Brown’s theory, the primacy effect obtained 
in impression formation is not a primacy effect but a positivity effect, which is in line 
with Hamilton and colleagues’ suggestion that some of the effects reported by Asch 
(1946) are actually positivity effects. Nevertheless, we should emphasize that, once 
again, we obtained false memories related to personality traits and a dissociation 
between memory and impression formation processing goals, with false memories 
under impression formation goals replicating the effects found in impression 
formation literature and indicating the activation of the associative structure 
underlying the implicit theory of personality whereas false memories under 
memorization goals replicate effects usually obtained in memory experiments and that 
are even opposite to those obtained in impression formation experiments (in this case, 
the negativity effect), indicating the activation of a default semantic associative 
structure that does not reflect the expectancies people hold about personality traits 
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associations. 
The results of our three first studies clearly indicate that the implicit theory of 
personality can be conceptualized as an associative memory structure that is activated 
conditionally to the activation of the social processing goal of forming impressions 
about others personalities. Moreover, the dissociation between memory participants 
and impression formation participants obtained in the three studies point to the 
importance of the processing goal to the associative structure activated, indicating that 
the same concept may be connected to other concepts and positioned in a given 
network differently, depending on which type of network is activated by the 
processing goal active at the time of encoding. It seems that a regular memorization 
processing goal at encoding will activate a default semantic network determined by 
the common associations between concepts and that is similar to the semantic 
structures that give rise to false memories in the classic DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995); but, a socially relevant processing goal of forming 
impressions of personality will activate an associative structure that reflects the 
implicit theory of personality and the connections between personality traits and their 
positioning within that structure are regulated by the beliefs people hold about other 
people’s personalities. The importance of the social relevance of the processing goal 
active during encoding to the structure activated and consequently to the type of 
effects obtained directed our attention to another question, related to the social 
transmission of social and non-social information. So, we set out to study the serial 
transmission of personality traits under a socially relevant processing goal 
(impression formation) and under a not so socially relevant processing goal (simple 
memorization). As serial transmission of information is by itself a socially relevant 
process, involved in social issues like rumor propagation (Allport & Postman, 1947), 
we thought that using personality traits would lead to different results than using 
athematic words like previous experiments did (e.g., Roediger et al., 2009). 
Moreover, we used an adaptation of a simple serial reproduction procedure, i.e. we 
used a paradigm that combines serial reproduction with repeated reproduction in order 
to directly compare them. This paradigm was developed by Roediger and colleagues 
(2009) and allows for the systematic study and comparison of the alterations that 
information suffers when it is transmitted from person to person and when it is 
successively recalled by the same person. The serial reproduction technique is 
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supposed to reflect the accumulation of individual biases in the transmission of 
information, and its study can be done using a serial chain of reproduction, in which 
the first link receives the complete information and its recall is used as the input 
information for the second link, which recall is going to be the input information for 
the third link and so on until the chain is complete (Bartlett, 1932). The repeated 
reproduction technique, on the other hand should reflect only the changes that 
information suffers when it is repeatedly retrieved by the same person. In the 
paradigm we used, serial and repeated reproduction are combined and we used 
socially relevant material – lists of personality traits built accordingly to the implicit 
theory of personality – and similarly to what we did in the previously reported studies, 
we manipulated the social relevance of the encoding goal active (memory vs. 
impression formation). Basically, we used the basic impression formation and false 
memory paradigm developed in Experiment 1 and changed the memory test to free 
recall instead of recognition, plus, we included four repeated recall episodes (without 
restudy) for each participant and instead of using the standard lists of personality 
traits, we created chains of four links and used the previous link’s first recall output as 
the study list for the following link (except for the first link in each chain who was 
presented with the original study list). According to the scarce studies dealing with 
serial reproduction (e-g., Bartlett, 1932; Roediger et al., 2009) we expected greater 
changes in the information when it was recalled by four different people than when it 
was recalled four times by the same person. The main changes we expected were loss 
of information and addition of new information nonpresented but associated to the 
presented one (Allport & Postman, 1947). In Study 4, we obtained the expected 
greater loss of information in serial reproduction than in repeated reproduction. 
Relatively to expectable additions in serial and repeated reproduction, we failed to 
obtain any effects, except for participants instructed to form impressions of 
personality and presented with positive lists. This result is actually in line with our 
results in the previous studies, indicating that under impression formation processing 
goals, participants form more false memories relatively to personality traits congruent 
with a given target’s description than under memorization processing goals; plus, 
positive traits are more falsely remembered than negative traits due to a positivity bias 
in impression formation (see Study 3). Relatively to the pattern of transmission of the 
intruded traits, there was not an impact of the position in the serial reproduction chain 
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or of the recall episode, indicating that intrusions occurred as soon as the first recall 
episode of the first link in the serial reproduction chain and did not tend to increase or 
diminish across links or recall episodes. Also interesting is the pattern of veridical 
memory, according the processing goal activated: the loss of information in a serial 
reproduction chain is greater under memory instructions than under impression 
formation instructions and only for the personality traits, as athematic words were 
equally affected by the serial reproduction regardless the processing goal. This result 
seems to indicate that, under a real socially relevant processing goal and using 
socially relevant information, the typical degradation of information due to its serial 
transmission can be lessened. However, the loss of information due to its serial 
transmission cannot be entirely avoided. Taking the obtained data into account, we 
believe that Study 4 provides a relevant contribute to the understanding of how 
information is transmitted in social networks, especially depending on the goal behind 
the reproduction of that information. We successfully showed how a deeper, more 
socially relevant processing goal could reduce the loss of information that usually 
occurs when it is transmitted from person to person. However, other alterations that 
information usually suffers when it is serially transmitted such as a crescent number 
of intrusions could not be correctly evaluated in Study 4, mainly because the material 
we used did not seem to elicit as many intrusions as the DRM lists used in previous 
studies with serial reproduction (Roediger et al., 2009).  
After the replication of Bartlett (1932) and Roediger and colleagues (2009) in 
Study 4, we set out to further investigate the characteristics of the personality traits 
that could influence their permanence or elimination in the serial reproduction chain 
or in the individual repeated recall episodes. To do this, we simply included all the 
traits from the two previously identified clusters from the implicit theory of 
personality – one social negative and another social positive – and used the same 
method used before and that allowed to directly comparing repeated and serial 
reproduction. We then calculated four types of survival indexes for each personality 
trait, considering the combinations of the two possible processing goals (memory and 
impression formation) with the two types of recall (repeated and serial). After this, we 
calculated the correlations between these indexes and two defining characteristics of 
each trait – their distance to the centroid of their cluster and a previously collected 
importance rating. Our prediction would be negative correlations between distance to 
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the centroid and survival indexes for the impression formation condition and positive 
correlations between importance rating and survival indexes for the impression 
formation condition. We did not have strong predictions for the correlations between 
survival indexes for the memory condition and other variables. However, our results 
were not the expected ones, and the only interesting correlation was the unpredicted 
negative correlation between the distance to the centroid and the last links’ last recall 
survival in the memory condition. These results are counter-intuitive and unexpected 
considering all the set of results reported so far. We have been collecting a set of data 
that consistently points to the importance of the impression formation processing goal 
in the activation of a highly specific and conditional associative structure that 
underlies the implicit theory of personality and which organization is responsible for 
the classic effects obtained in the impression formation literature and that can be 
replicated with the use of false memory paradigms. So, if there were any positive 
correlations between characteristics of the personality traits reflecting their 
positioning within the implicit theory of personality, such as their distance to their 
centroid, they should be with survival indexes obtained when participants were 
forming impressions of personality. However, if we look at the recall data obtained in 
Study 5, this highly counter-intuitive correlation may be understandable. Looking at 
the recall data, we again replicated Bartlett’s (1932) and Roediger and colleagues’ 
(2009) results. But contrary to what occurred in Study 4, in which participants 
instructed to form impressions of personality had a better performance than 
participants instructed to simply memorize the words, in this study, participants 
instructed to memorize the words performed better than participants instructed to 
form impressions of personality. More specifically, veridical recall of personality 
traits was higher for participants memorizing the lists than for participants forming 
impressions about the target’s personality. And, when considering veridical recall of 
the athematic words, impression formation participants performed better than memory 
participants. In line with this unexpected pattern of veridical recall results is the a 
posteriori identified false recall of personality traits, which was roughly the same for 
participants in the impression formation condition and participants in the memory 
condition. We would have expected that participants in the impression formation 
condition activated the goal of forming an impression of personality and thus 
activated the associative memory structure of the implicit theory of personality, which 
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would have lead to more false memories relative to participants in the memory 
condition that should only activate the default semantic network and thus have only 
false memories based on the associative strength between items. So, if we believe that 
the impression formation processing implies the placing of the target in the semantic 
space that underlies the implicit theory of personality by an inferential process 
(Brown, 1986) and this inferential process is the key process in impression formation 
that leads to the later occurrence of false memories congruent with the presented 
personality traits, in Study 5, the inferential process is constrained because we had 
already provided all the most diagnostic and accessible information about the target’s 
personality. Thus, the prevented inferential processing in impression formation lead to 
the same level of false memories for participants forming impressions and participants 
memorizing the information. Moreover, the results regarding the athematic words also 
support this hypothesis. As the presented personality traits provided redundant 
information about the target, participants who were trying to form an impression 
relied on the athematic words to get extra information about the target, using them for 
the inferential processing that is usually based on the personality traits; whereas 
participants only concerned with memorizing the information paid equal attention to 
the personality traits and to the athematic words. So, despite seeming hard to integrate 
with the results reported for Studies 1 to 4, Study 5 results actually show that the 
inferential process occurring during impression formation is crucial for the occurrence 
of the classic results reported in impression formation literature, and if too much 
information about the target is provided the benefit of impression formation 
processing relative to memorization processing does not occur. Taken together, Study 
5 results actually provide strong evidence against the idea that impression formation 
processing is simply a deeper level of processing, and supports the notion that 
impression formation processing may be a deeper level of processing but is also a 
very specific process, which activates conditional memory structures (the implicit 
theory of personality) and has special characteristics, including dedicated and 
specialized brain structures (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2004). So, despite seeming at odds 
with our previous results and the hypothesis we advanced and that guided the 
conduction of the presented studies, Study 5 results actually offer more evidence to 
our hypothesis and open a possible way to study differences between impression 
formation and memory processes, by allowing or disabling the inferential process 
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related to impression formation. 
Taken together, the five studies reported provided strong evidence for the 
existence of a specialized associative memory structure that underlies the implicit 
theory of personality and which activation is conditional to the activation of an 
impression formation goal. Besides this, we also enlightened the biases that the 
memory for concepts represented in this associative structure are subject to and were 
able to trace a parallel between this associative memory structure and the default 
semantic network, activated whenever a simple memorization goal is active. We will 
now point some limitations to the presented work and provide an integrated 
conclusion that may guide some future research. 
 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS   
The presented set of five studies are part of a new line of research that combines 
impression formation and memory paradigms and theories in order to enlighten both 
the impression formation classic effects and some memory effects. The effort to 
combine these two areas of research is by no means concluded. We successfully 
showed that a paradigm typically used to study memory can be adapted to the study of 
impression formation and that the beliefs that people hold about others’ personalities 
can be represented by an associative memory structure that is susceptible to the same 
memory biases that other associative memory structures also are, such as false 
memories. Plus, we gathered information suggesting that the organization of this 
semantic space is responsible for classic impression formation effects, such as the 
centrality effect and the primacy effect. Also, by manipulating the instructional set for 
participants, we obtained evidence for the conditional nature of the activation of the 
referred associative memory structure underlying the implicit theory of personality. 
Actually, certain types of false memories, which prediction derived from the classic 
impression formation effects, occurred only when the encoding of the personality 
traits presented was done under an impression formation goal. Then, we went further 
to study the importance of the processing goal and the organization of the associative 
semantic structure by using another paradigm that is supposed to mimic the effects of 
social transmission of information. So, we incorporated personality traits in a serial 
and repeated reproduction paradigm and also manipulated the encoding goals, bearing 
in mind that an impression formation processing goal is a socially relevant processing 
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goal whereas a memorization processing goal does not have such a high social 
relevance. Again, we obtained results pointing to the conditional nature of the 
activation of the associative memory structure. But, the novelty of the presented 
studies did not come without associated costs. It is always hard to combine such 
different lines of research and some future investigations may help to clarify some of 
our effects and the processes that we set out to study. For instance, the fact that in our 
three first studies the inclusive recognition test always followed the standard 
recognition test may have influenced the obtained results. It is a fact that we were 
interested in comparing impression formation with memory participants and not the 
results of each test and, therefore, the test order must have had the same effects for 
both types of participants; but, in a future research the two tests cold be done between 
participants, so we would have a condition in which the inclusive recognition test was 
certainly not contaminated. Also regarding controls, Study 2 would have benefited 
from a condition in which the included trait, from a different dimension, was not a 
central one but a peripheral one. This would be a better manipulation to clearly show 
the importance of central traits as no effects of the peripheral trait would be expected. 
However, we were more interested in showing the impact that the presentation of only 
one trait may have in the later production of false memories and, as we defined 
centrality, it is the relation between the “central” trait and the presented traits that 
should define its centrality. So, the suggested experiment would be a good way to 
further understand what centrality of a trait actually is – a more intrinsic characteristic 
or a context-related characteristic? But again, that definition of centrality was out of 
the scope of the present work, although very interesting. Regarding Study 3, it would 
have been interesting to present personality traits from the four clusters and check if a 
cluster would promote more primacy comparatively to others (i.e., more false alarms 
relative to traits from a given cluster relative to traits from other clusters); and it 
would also be striking to create a manipulation in which recency effects would be the 
opposite of primacy effects and try to obtain a dissociation between impression 
formation and memory conditions. In a different vein, the valence effects that 
unexpectedly arose in Study 3 deserve a further exploration and the paradigm we used 
might be a good tool to understand why positive information seems to be more 
relevant for impression formation and how that effect can be diminished or even 
reversed. Finally, Studies 4 and 5 provide a compelling motivation to the study of 
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serial reproduction processes, which has been very limited. A more complete set of 
materials should be used to test the social transmission of information and the 
repeated reproduction of socially relevant information. Study 5 results deserve more 
investigation, as they provided a highly counter-intuitive pattern; they should be 
replicated and the question they raise about the importance of the inferential 
processing that occurs while positioning the target in the semantic space that underlies 
the implicit theory of personality, as a central process for impression formation and 
that conveys part of its uniqueness should be addressed in future investigations. 
 Summing up, our results pointed to the existence of an associative memory 
structure, which can be called “the implicit theory of personality” and underlies the 
impression formation processing. The activation of this specific associative structure 
is conditional to the activation of an impression formation processing goal and this 
suggests that, although being a memory structure prone to the same biases as other 
memory structures, the implicit theory of personality is a highly specific memory 
structure which is active only when there is a purpose for its usage. More interestingly 
we were able to replicate two classic impression formation effects – the centrality and 
the primacy effects – and show that, even using exactly the same stimuli, these effects 
would arise only when there is an impression formation goal activated. Again, this 
supported the idea that the implicit theory of personality is highly specialized and the 
activation of its specific configuration depends on the processing goal activated. 
Moreover, we were able to show how the serial transmission of socially relevant 
information seems to occur, which biases have an effect on this type of information, 
and what does it have in common with the serial transmission of socially irrelevant 
information. 
 Given our results, let us go back to the story we used to introduce the questions 
we tried to answer in this project and actually answer them – “You are meeting with 
your friend Jane and she starts describing her childhood friend, Mike. Almost 
immediately you form an impression about Mike who you have never met. You will 
take the information Jane is giving you and make some inferences in order to achieve 
a coherent impression about Mike’s personality”. We wanted to know how does the 
way Jane conveys you the information influence the impression you are forming, and 
it seems that the order by which she presented the positive and negative traits within 
the description will have an impact on your impression about Mike, as well as the 
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traits she decides to use – central traits will have a bigger impact than peripheral 
traits. We also wanted to know if you would be a passive receiver or does the 
previous representation you hold about people’s personalities play a role in the 
shaping of the impression, and the answer to this seems clear – the beliefs you hold 
about which personality traits share characteristics and are more or less representative 
of a given dimension (social vs. intellectual) and valence (positive vs. negative). So, 
your memory for the description about Mike would probably manifest a centrality and 
a primacy effect and thus not being entirely accurate. Then, we asked you to imagine 
that you wanted to tell your own childhood friend, John, about Mike. By now, you 
already know that you would probably not transmit the actual information you have 
received, due to the reconstructive nature of memory. And it also seems fair to 
assume that you could incorrectly add some details to the description, especially 
because you would be talking about someone’s childhood friend with your own 
childhood friend. Then, of course, if John also wanted to share the same information 
about Mike with someone else, he would make his own changes, in part because of 
the context in which he received the information and mostly because of his own 
memory biases derived from the shared implicit theory of personality and his personal 
experiences. Thus, the last person in this social chain, John’s friend, probably, would 
receive very inaccurate information about Mike. But would probably get a simplified 
impression that would preserve the most basic and informative personality traits Mike 
possesses. So, this last person would be able to make a snap decision about Mike and, 
for instance, know right away if they should trust him or not. So, the adaptive nature 
of false memories within impression formation processes is similar to the adaptive 
nature of other types of false memories. Plus, there are great chances that the final 
impression about Mike would be more positive than negative, as positive information 
seems to be given more weight to than negative information. 
 To summarize, we gathered some information about the interplay between 
representations in memory, memory processes and impression formation and the 
transmission of socially relevant information and the associated biases. This allowed 
us to answer a few questions about how we form impressions of personality and 
transmit them. However, and as we mentioned, this line of research is far from being 
completed and this project should be considered a small step towards an integration of 
memory and impression formation processes and a better understanding of social 
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cognition processes as recruiting specific associative networks and originating 
specific effects. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Implicit Theory of Personality – Portuguese personality traits  
(Ferreira et al., 2011; Experiment 2) 
 
 
The bidimensional representation of the Implicit Theory of Personality, with two 
orthogonal dimensions: one intellectual and another social; identified after a 
multidimensional scaling of the personality traits most commonly used to describe 
others. 
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Table representing the four clusters within the Implicit Theory of Personality, 
identified after a 4-Way Cluster Analysis on the personality traits most commonly 
used to describe others. 
Cluster 1                         
Social Negative
Distance to 
the cluster's 
centroid
Cluster 2                         
Intellectual Positive
Distance to 
the cluster's 
centroid
Cluster 3                         
Social Positive
Distance to 
the cluster's 
centroid
Cluster 4                         
Intellectual Negative
Distance to 
the cluster's 
centroid
arrogante 2.07 culto 2.41 compreensivo 2.08 irresponsável 2.51
invejoso 2.10 hábil 2.44 caloroso 2.12 desmotivado 2.58
interesseiro 2.18 motivado 2.51 generoso 2.12 inculto 2.60
antipático 2.23 organizado 2.52 afectuoso 2.13 incompetente 2.61
maldoso 2.26 determinado 2.53 divertido 2.14 lento 2.65
vingativo 2.27 competente 2.55 amigo 2.17 preguiçoso 2.67
intolerante 2.32 esperto 2.56 sensível 2.23 incapaz 2.81
desonesto 2.38 dinâmico 2.57 amável 2.24 limitado 2.86
intriguista 2.40 regrado 2.59 teimoso 2.36 desatento 2.86
egoísta 2.40 eficaz 2.59 simpático 2.36 desorganizado 2.95
frio 2.44 atlético 2.63 fiável 2.47 dependente 3.02
agressivo 2.49 rápido 2.66 sociável 2.64 indeciso 3.02
manipulador 2.53 criativo 2.71 alegre 2.69 conflituoso 3.09
egocêntrico 2.66 perspicaz 2.76 prestável 2.75 burro 3.15
calculista 2.68 racional 2.77 honesto 2.78 rotineiro 3.37
insensível 2.70 independente 2.77 extrovertido 2.79 conservador 3.53
futil 2.75 lutador 2.79 falador 3.13 calado 3.60
sovina 2.77 corajoso 2.80 altruísta 3.13 autoritário 3.69
falso 2.79 tolerante 2.81 flexível 3.16
estúpido 2.80 responsável 2.84 sincero 3.27
cínico 2.81 inteligente 2.91 espiritual 3.50
cobarde 2.90 prudente 2.93
convencido 3.07 pontual 3.19
idiota 3.24 confuso 3.28
concentrado 3.63 trabalhador 3.38
astuto 3.47
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APPENDIX 2 
Study 1 – Presented lists and tests 
 
 Lists of personality traits presented in Experiment 1. 
 
 
Social Positive Social Negative Intellectual Positive Intellectual Negative
1 Compreensivo Arrogante Culto Irresponsável
2 Sensível Intolerante Esperto Incapaz
3 Amável Desonesto Dinâmico Limitado
4 Relógio* Relógio* Relógio* Relógio*
5 Simpático Intriguista Eficaz Desatento
6 Conta* Conta* Conta* Conta*
7 Rosa* Rosa* Rosa* Rosa*
8 Fiável Egoísta Rápido Desorganizado
9 Telefone* Telefone* Telefone* Telefone*
10 Sociável Frio Criativo Dependente
11 Alegre Agressivo Perspicaz Indeciso
12 Azul* Azul* Azul* Azul*
13 Prestável Manipulador Racional Burro
14 Honesto Egocêntrico Independente Rotineiro
15 Armário* Armário* Armário* Armário*
16 Extrovertido Calculista Lutador Conservador
 
Note: Items marked with (*) are the athematic words added and traits in italics are the 
traits included in the recognition test. 
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Constitution of the Recognition and Gist tests used in Experiment 1. 
WORD TYPE CLUSTER OLD vs. NEW
Caloroso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Generoso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Afectuoso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Divertido Critical Trait Social Positive New
Amigo Critical Trait Social Positive New
Invejoso Critical Trait Social Negative New
Interesseiro Critical Trait Social Negative New
Antipático Critical Trait Social Negative New
Maldoso Critical Trait Social Negative New
Vingativo Critical Trait Social Negative New
Hábil Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Motivado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Organizado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Determinado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Competente Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Desmotivado Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Inculto Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Incompetente Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Lento Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Preguiçoso Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Amarelo Associated Athematic ----- New
Margarida Associated Athematic ----- New
Verde Associated Athematic ----- New
Roupeiro Associated Athematic ----- New
Móvel Associated Athematic ----- New
Mesa Associated Athematic ----- New
Pudim Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Pulseira Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Barco Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Calendário Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Altruísta Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Calado Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Concentrado Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Pontual Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Trabalhador Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Compreensivo Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Sensível Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Simpático Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Sociável Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Prestável Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Arrogante Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Intolerante Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Intriguista Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Frio Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Manipulador Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Culto Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Esperto Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Eficaz Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Criativo Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Racional Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Irresponsável Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Incapaz Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Desatento Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Dependente Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Burro Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Relógio Presented Athematic ----- Old
Conta Presented Athematic ----- Old
Telefone Presented Athematic ----- Old
 
Note: The presented traits included were only the ones corresponding to the cluster of 
the studied list. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Standard Recognition Test Instructions and Gist Recognition Test Instructions  
 
1. Standard Recognition Test Instructions 
“You will be presented with a number of words.  Some of these words were 
included in the audio recording you previously listened to, others are new.  Please 
read each word as it appears in the screen and indicate whether that was included in 
the audio recording or not.  If you recognize the word press the green key (indicating 
that you consider that the word was included in the audio recording you listened to), 
but if you think the word is new, press the red key (indicating that you consider that 
the word was not included in the audio recording).  Please press the green key only if 
you are reasonably certain that the word was included in the audio recording.” 
 
2. Gist Recognition Test Instructions 
 “You will be presented with a number of words.  Some of these words were 
included in the audio recording you previously listened to, others are new.  When you 
recognize a word that was presented before or you think that the word could be 
considered an example of a theme or concept included in the audio recording you 
listened to previously (even the word itself was not included in the audio recording) 
press the green key.  If you consider the word to be new because it was not included 
in the audio recording and does not exemplify any theme or concept included in the 
recording, please press the red key.” 
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APPENDIX 4 
Study 2 – Presented lists and tests  
 
Lists of personality traits presented in Experiments 2A and 2B (same lists). 
LIST Negative List (Social)
Positive List 
(Intellectual)
Positive List 
(Social)
Negative List 
(Intellectual)
TRAIT Positive Central Trait (Intellectual)
Negative Central 
Trait (Social)
Negative Central 
Trait (Intellectual)
Positive Central 
Trait (Social)
1 Intolerante Esperto Sensível Incapaz
2 Desonesto Dinâmico Amável Limitado
3 Relógio* Relógio* Relógio* Relógio*
4 Intriguista Eficaz Simpático Desatento
5 Conta* Conta* Conta* Conta*
6 Rosa* Rosa* Rosa* Rosa*
7 Culto Arrogante Irresponsável Compreensivo
8 Egoísta Rápido Fiável Desorganizado
9 Telefone* Telefone* Telefone* Telefone*
10 Frio Criativo Sociável Dependente
11 Agressivo Perspicaz Alegre Indeciso
12 Azul* Azul* Azul* Azul*
13 Manipulador Racional Prestável Burro
14 Egocêntrico Independente Honesto Rotineiro
15 Armário* Armário* Armário* Armário*
16 Calculista Lutador Extrovertido Conservador
Different Valence
LIST Negative List (Social)
Positive List 
(Intellectual)
Positive List 
(Social)
Negative List 
(Intellectual)
TRAIT Negative Central Trait (Intellectual)
Positive Central 
Trait (Social)
Positive Central 
Trait (Intellectual)
Negative Central 
Trait (Social)
1 Intolerante Esperto Sensível Incapaz
2 Desonesto Dinâmico Amável Limitado
3 Relógio* Relógio* Relógio* Relógio*
4 Intriguista Eficaz Simpático Desatento
5 Conta* Conta* Conta* Conta*
6 Rosa* Rosa* Rosa* Rosa*
7 Irresponsável Compreensivo Culto Arrogante
8 Egoísta Rápido Fiável Desorganizado
9 Telefone* Telefone* Telefone* Telefone*
10 Frio Criativo Sociável Dependente
11 Agressivo Perspicaz Alegre Indeciso
12 Azul* Azul* Azul* Azul*
13 Manipulador Racional Prestável Burro
14 Egocêntrico Independente Honesto Rotineiro
15 Armário* Armário* Armário* Armário*
16 Calculista Lutador Extrovertido Conservador
Same Valence
 
Note: Items marked with (*) are the athematic words added; traits in italics are the traits 
included in the recognition test; the bold and underlined traits are the central traits added to 
the list (from the opposite dimension), which were also included in the test. 
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Constitution of the Recognition and Gist tests used in Experiments 2A and 2B (same 
constitution).
WORD TYPE CLUSTER OLD vs. NEW
Caloroso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Generoso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Afectuoso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Divertido Critical Trait Social Positive New
Amigo Critical Trait Social Positive New
Invejoso Critical Trait Social Negative New
Interesseiro Critical Trait Social Negative New
Antipático Critical Trait Social Negative New
Maldoso Critical Trait Social Negative New
Vingativo Critical Trait Social Negative New
Hábil Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Motivado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Organizado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Determinado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Competente Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Desmotivado Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Inculto Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Incompetente Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Lento Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Preguiçoso Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Amarelo Associated Athematic ----- New
Margarida Associated Athematic ----- New
Verde Associated Athematic ----- New
Roupeiro Associated Athematic ----- New
Móvel Associated Athematic ----- New
Mesa Associated Athematic ----- New
Pudim Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Pulseira Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Barco Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Calendário Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Arrogante Presented Central Trait Social Negative Old
Compreensivo Presented Central Trait Social Positive Old
Culto Presented Central Trait Intellectual Positive Old
Irresponsável Presented Central Trait Intellectual Negative Old
Sensível Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Simpático Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Sociável Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Prestável Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Extrovertido Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Intolerante Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Intriguista Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Frio Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Manipulador Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Calculista Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Esperto Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Eficaz Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Criativo Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Racional Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Lutador Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Incapaz Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Desatento Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Dependente Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Burro Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Conservador Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Relógio Presented Athematic ----- Old
Conta Presented Athematic ----- Old
Telefone Presented Athematic ----- Old
 
Note: For the presented central traits only one was old, depending on the studied list; 
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and the presented traits included were only the ones from the cluster of the studied 
list. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Study 3A – Presented lists and tests 
 
Lists of personality traits presented in Experiment 3A. 
 
Intellectual Negative-Positive Intellectual Positive-Negative Social Positive-Negative Social Negative-Positive
1 Irresponsável Culto Compreensivo Arrogante
2 Incapaz Esperto Sensível Intolerante
3 Lutador Conservador Egocêntrico Extrovertido
4 Conta* Conta* Conta* Conta*
5 Limitado Dinâmico Amável Desonesto
6 Racional Conflituoso Manipulador Prestavel
7 Rosa* Rosa* Rosa* Rosa*
8 Desatento Eficaz Simpático Intriguista
9 Perspicaz Indeciso Agressivo Alegre
10 Desorganizado Rápido Fiavel Egoísta
11 Telefone* Telefone* Telefone* Telefone*
12 Dependente Criativo Sociavel Frio
13 Criativo Dependente Frio Sociavel
14 Rápido Desorganizado Egoísta Fiavel
15 Indeciso Perspicaz Alegre Agressivo
16 Relógio* Relógio* Relógio* Relógio*
17 Eficaz Desatento Intriguista Simpático
18 Conflituoso Racional Prestavel Manipulador
19 Dinâmico Limitado Desonesto Amável
20 Armário* Armário* Armário* Armário*
21 Conservador Lutador Extrovertido Egocêntrico
22 Esperto Incapaz Intolerante Sensível
23 Culto Irresponsável Arrogante Compreensivo
 
 
Note: Items marked with (*) are the athematic words added; traits in italics are the 
traits included in the recognition test. 
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Constitution of the Recognition and Gist tests used in Experiment 3A. 
WORD TYPE CLUSTER OLD VS. NEW
Invejoso Critical Trait Social Negative New
Interesseiro Critical Trait Social Negative New
Antipático Critical Trait Social Negative New
Maldoso Critical Trait Social Negative New
Vingativo Critical Trait Social Negative New
Hábil Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Motivado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Organizado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Determinado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Competente Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Caloroso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Generoso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Afectuoso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Divertido Critical Trait Social Positive New
Amigo Critical Trait Social Positive New
Desmotivado Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Inculto Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Incompetente Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Lento Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Preguiçoso Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Amarelo Associated Athematic ----- New
Margarida Associated Athematic ----- New
Verde Associated Athematic ----- New
Roupeiro Associated Athematic ----- New
Móvel Associated Athematic ----- New
Mesa Associated Athematic ----- New
Pudim Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Pulseira Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Barco Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Calendário Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Altruísta Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Calado Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Concentrado Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Pontual Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Trabalhador Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Relógio Presented Athematic ----- Old
Conta Presented Athematic ----- Old
Telefone Presented Athematic ----- Old
Incapaz Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Desatento Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Dependente Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Conflituoso Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Esperto Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Eficaz Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Criativo Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Racional Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Sensível Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Simpático Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Sociavel Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Prestavel Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Intolerante Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Intriguista Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Frio Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Manipulador Presented Traits Social Negative Old
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Note: The presented traits included were only the ones from the dimension of the 
studied list (i.e., social positive and social negative traits if the list was social or 
intellectual positive and intellectual negative traits if the list was intellectual). 
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APPENDIX 6 
Study 3B – Presented lists and tests 
 
Lists of personality traits presented in Experiment 3B. 
1st half     
2nd half
Social Positive       
Intellectual Negative
Social Negative      
Intellectual Positive
Intellectual Negative            
Social Positive 
 Intellectual Positive                           
Social Negative
1 Compreensivo Arrogante Irresponsável Culto
2 Sensível Intolerante Incapaz Esperto
3 Amável Desonesto Limitado Dinâmico
4 Relógio* Relógio* Relógio* Relógio*
5 Simpático Intriguista Desatento Eficaz
6 Conta* Conta* Conta* Conta*
7 Rosa* Rosa* Rosa* Rosa*
8 Fiável Egoísta Desorganizado Rápido
9 Telefone* Telefone* Telefone* Telefone*
10 Irresponsável Culto Compreensivo Arrogante
11 Incapaz Esperto Sensível Intolerante
12 Azul* Azul* Azul* Azul*
13 Limitado Dinâmico Amável Desonesto
14 Desatento Eficaz Simpático Intriguista
15 Armário* Armário* Armário* Armário*
16 Desorganizado Rápido Fiável Egoísta
 
Note: Items marked with (*) are the athematic words added; traits in italics are the traits 
included in the recognition test. 
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Constitution of the Recognition and Gist tests used in Experiment 3B. 
WORD TYPE CLUSTER OLD VS. NEW
Invejoso Critical Trait Social Negative New
Interesseiro Critical Trait Social Negative New
Antipático Critical Trait Social Negative New
Maldoso Critical Trait Social Negative New
Vingativo Critical Trait Social Negative New
Hábil Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Motivado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Organizado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Determinado Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Competente Critical Trait Intellectual Positive New
Caloroso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Generoso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Afectuoso Critical Trait Social Positive New
Divertido Critical Trait Social Positive New
Amigo Critical Trait Social Positive New
Desmotivado Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Inculto Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Incompetente Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Lento Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Preguiçoso Critical Trait Intellectual Negative New
Amarelo Associated Athematic ----- New
Margarida Associated Athematic ----- New
Verde Associated Athematic ----- New
Roupeiro Associated Athematic ----- New
Móvel Associated Athematic ----- New
Mesa Associated Athematic ----- New
Pudim Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Pulseira Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Barco Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Calendário Non-Associated Athematic ----- New
Altruísta Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Calado Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Concentrado Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Pontual Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Trabalhador Irrelevant Traits ----- New
Relógio Presented Athematic ----- Old
Conta Presented Athematic ----- Old
Telefone Presented Athematic ----- Old
Incapaz Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Desatento Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Irresponsável Presented Traits Intellectual Negative Old
Esperto Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Eficaz Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Culto Presented Traits Intellectual Positive Old
Sensível Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Simpático Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Compreensivo Presented Traits Social Positive Old
Arrogante Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Intriguista Presented Traits Social Negative Old
Intolerante Presented Traits Social Negative Old
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Note: The presented traits included were only the ones from the two clusters included 
in the studied list (i.e., social positive and intellectual negative traits if the list was 
social positive/intellectual negative or intellectual negative/social positive; or 
social negative and intellectual positive traits if the list was social 
negative/intellectual positive or intellectual positive/social negative). 
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APPENDIX 7 
Personality traits currently used - Multidimensional Scaling and Cluster Analysis 
 
Method 
Participants. Fifty Washington University undergraduates participated in the 
experiment for course credit. Twenty-five undergraduates participated in the 
collection of personality traits and a different sample of twenty-five undergraduates 
participated in the assembling of traits that usually tend to co-occur in the same 
individual. 
 
Materials. The first part of this study consisted of a generation task, so no 
materials were provided. For the second part of the study, 94 of the traits generated in 
the first part of the study were used. 
 
Procedure. A first sample of 25 students was asked to provide short trait-
based descriptions of liked and disliked persons (both personal acquaintances and 
persons they did not know personally). From these descriptions we chose the most 
frequent 42 positive and 42 negative traits and added 10 neutral traits. Following 
Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) and Ferreira and colleagues (2011), then a different 
sample of 25 students sorted the 94 traits in 12 sets according to what traits more 
often co-occur in the same person. These participants were instructed to use at least 
10 sets to sort the traits and if there were any traits that they did not think that could 
go together with other traits they should include them in a different category called 
miscellaneous. A Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis was performed on the 
obtained data and a K-means Cluster Analysis was also performed to identify both the 
implicit theory of personality and the clusters that personality traits tend to form. 
 
Results 
The MDS analysis failed to reproduce the bidimensional structure identified 
by Rosenberg and colleagues (1968) and Ferreira and colleagues (2011). See Figure 1 
for the representation of the implicit theory of personality obtained. 
The 4-Way Cluster Analysis identified only three of the four clusters that 
should have resulted from the combination of the two denotative dimensions with the 
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two evaluative dimensions – this is not surprising because, as above mentioned we 
failed to obtain two denotative and two orthogonal evaluative dimensions. Instead of 
obtaining a social-positive (e.g., friendly, generous, kind), a social-negative (e.g., 
rude, vain, selfish), an intellectual-positive (e.g., intelligent, smart, creative), and an 
intellectual-negative (e.g., incompetent, lazy, irresponsible), we only found the two 
social clusters and an intellectual positive cluster. Please note that, the intellectual 
negative dimension was represented but only six traits fell clearly on that dimension. 
The presented table depicts the obtained clusters of personality traits and the distance 
of each trait to the centroid of its cluster. 
 
 
The dimensional representation of the Implicit Theory of Personality, obtained after a 
multidimensional scaling of personality traits.  
Scatterplot 2D
Final Configuration, dimension 1  vs. dimension 2
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Table representing the clusters within the Implicit Theory of Personality, identified after a 4-
Way Cluster Analysis on the personality traits used in this study. 
Cluster 1 Distance Cluster 2 Distance Cluster 3 Distance Cluster 4 Distance
irresponsible 0.95 worldly 2.57 unselfish 2.18 rude 2.44
lazy 1.10 independent 2.62 generous 2.19 stubborn 2.48
disorganized 1.13 mature 2.70 helpful 2.28 snobby 2.54
unmotivated 1.49 confident 2.70 giving 2.31 obnoxious 2.55
unstable 2.45 idealistic 2.71 kind 2.53 insensitive 2.56
secure 2.72 caring 2.55 hypocrite 2.59
open-minded 2.73 nice 2.56 argumentative 2.62
open 2.81 understanding 2.63 disrespectful 2.64
dependable 2.84 agreeable 2.64 hostile 2.65
positive 2.91 polite 2.66 vain 2.65
witty 2.91 humble 2.68 inconsiderate 2.66
smart 2.94 sweet 2.69 picky 2.70
hard-working 2.95 friendly 2.71 condescending 2.70
creative 3.02 considerate 2.71 prideful 2.71
happy 3.06 thoughtful 2.71 arrogant 2.72
imaginative 3.09 warm 2.73 unfriendly 2.73
honest 3.10 genuine 2.75 selfish 2.74
intelligent 3.14 supportive 2.82 judgemental 2.77
outgoing 3.16 encouraging 2.87 cocky 2.79
restful 3.16 altruistic 2.90 manipulative 2.80
talkative 3.16 closed-minded 2.80
spontaneous 3.18 aggressive 2.82
easy-going 3.21 annoying 2.82
serious 3.22 narcissistic 2.84
truthful 3.22 ignorant 2.89
funny 3.24 mean 2.91
punctual 3.30 angry 2.93
responsible 3.32 narrow-minded 2.96
organized 3.35 fake 2.97
fun 3.47 cold 2.97
selfcentered 2.97
proud 2.97
deceptive 2.97
egotistical 3.09
loud 3.13
weird 3.18
pessimistic 3.19
negative 3.23
conservative 3.39
 
Legend: Cluster 1 = Intellectual Negative; Cluster 2 = Intellectual Positive; Cluster 3 = Social 
Positive; Cluster 4: Social Negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 224 
APPENDIX 8 
Study 4 – Originally presented lists  
Social Positive Social Negative
1 unselfish rude
2 nice argumentative
3 pane* pane*
4 understanding selfish
5 town* town*
6 web* web*
7 agreeable hostile
8 polite vain
9 toe* toe*
10 humble inconsiderate
11 warm picky
12 hill* hill*
13 friendly condescending
14 considerate prideful
15 shirt* shirt*
16 thoughtful arrogant
 
Note: The trait warm substituted sweet (16th position in the social positive cluster instead of 
12th) and the trait selfish substituted disrespectful (17th position in the social negative cluster 
instead of 8th) because we did not want to use words with multiple meanings or that were a 
negation of another trait commonly used.  
Items marked with (*) are the athematic words added. 
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APPENDIX 9 
Study 5 – Originally presented lists  
Social Positive Social Negative
1 unselfish rude
2 generous stubborn
3 helpful snobby
4 giving obnoxious
5 kind insensitive
6 caring hypocrite
7 nice argumentative
8 understanding disrespectful
9 agreeable hostile
10 polite vain
11 humble inconsiderate
12 sweet picky
13 friendly condescending
14 considerate prideful
15 thoughtful arrogant
16 warm unfriendly
17 genuine selfish
18 supportive judgemental
19 encouraging cocky
20 altruistic manipulative
21 pane pane
22 town town
23 web web
24 toe toe
25 hill hill
26 shirt shirt
 
Note: The presentation was randomized for each participant. 
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APPENDIX 10 
Study 5 – Complete importance ratings (94 personality traits) 
 
N TYPE TRAIT RATING (mean)
51 SOC Pos friendly 4.92
52 SOC Pos kind 4.75
51 SOC Pos considerate 4.73
52 SOC Pos genuine 4.71
50 SOC Pos caring 4.70
52 SOC Pos understanding 4.67
52 SOC Pos nice 4.46
50 SOC Pos supportive 4.40
51 SOC Pos warm 4.35
52 SOC Pos agreeable 4.33
51 SOC Pos thoughtful 4.31
51 SOC Pos unselfish 4.29
50 SOC Pos helpful 4.22
50 SOC Pos encouraging 4.12
50 SOC Pos humble 4.10
50 SOC Pos polite 4.10
52 SOC Pos sweet 4.04
51 SOC Pos generous 3.98
50 SOC Pos altruistic 3.94
52 SOC Pos giving 3.92
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N TYPE TRAIT RATING (mean)
50 SOC Neg manipulative 4.12
50 SOC Neg judgemental 4.00
51 SOC Neg deceptive 3.98
52 SOC Neg selfcentered 3.96
50 SOC Neg arrogant 3.96
51 SOC Neg fake 3.94
48 SOC Neg condescending 3.94
50 SOC Neg cocky 3.92
52 SOC Neg narcissistic 3.88
51 SOC Neg annoying 3.88
51 SOC Neg mean 3.88
49 SOC Neg disrespectful 3.88
52 SOC Neg aggressive 3.81
51 SOC Neg egotistical 3.80
52 SOC Neg argumentative 3.79
52 SOC Neg cold 3.75
51 SOC Neg hostile 3.75
52 SOC Neg hypocrite 3.71
52 SOC Neg obnoxious 3.71
49 SOC Neg selfish 3.69
52 SOC Neg unfriendly 3.69
51 SOC Neg rude 3.57
51 SOC Neg narrow-minded 3.55
52 SOC Neg closed-minded 3.54
50 SOC Neg inconsiderate 3.50
52 SOC Neg snobby 3.48
52 SOC Neg stubborn 3.48
51 SOC Neg negative 3.45
51 SOC Neg pessimistic 3.45
51 SOC Neg proud 3.41
51 SOC Neg weird 3.37
49 SOC Neg insensitive 3.29
51 SOC Neg ignorant 3.27
50 SOC Neg prideful 3.26
52 SOC Neg angry 3.19
48 SOC Neg vain 3.19
49 SOC Neg conservative 3.10
52 SOC Neg picky 2.90
52 SOC Neg loud 2.77
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N TYPE TRAIT RATING (mean)
51 INT Pos honest 4.96
52 INT Pos open-minded 4.90
51 INT Pos truthful 4.78
51 INT Pos easy-going 4.76
51 INT Pos dependable 4.71
52 INT Pos fun 4.69
50 INT Pos funny 4.64
52 INT Pos happy 4.63
52 INT Pos outgoing 4.58
51 INT Pos responsible 4.41
52 INT Pos positive 4.37
50 INT Pos confident 4.36
51 INT Pos open 4.27
50 INT Pos mature 4.26
51 INT Pos hard-working 4.22
51 INT Pos intelligent 4.20
51 INT Pos smart 4.16
52 INT Pos witty 3.90
50 INT Pos independent 3.86
51 INT Pos spontaneous 3.80
50 INT Pos secure 3.60
49 INT Pos creative 3.59
51 INT Pos talkative 3.59
51 INT Pos imaginative 3.47
52 INT Pos serious 3.44
52 INT Pos idealistic 3.29
49 INT Pos organized 3.24
51 INT Pos worldly 3.16
50 INT Pos punctual 2.92
49 INT Pos restful 2.55
51 INT Neg irresponsible 3.53
52 INT Neg unstable 3.29
50 INT Neg lazy 3.16
49 INT Neg unmotivated 3.10
51 INT Neg disorganized 2.76
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APPENDIX 11 
Study 5 – Full results of importance ratings, distance to its cluster’s centroid, and 
survival indexes for the 40 traits analyzed 
 
Tables represent importance ratings, distance to centroid, and survival indexes 
calculated for: serial recall for each one of the conditions (memory and impression 
formation) – Imp L1-4 (R1) and Mem L1-4 (R1); and repeated recall for each one of 
the conditions – Imp R1-4 (L1) and Mem R1-4 (L1). 
TRAIT Importance Distance to Centroid Imp_L1-4 (R1) Mem_L1-4 (R1) Imp_R1-4 (L1) Mem_R1-4 (L1)
agreeable 4.33 2.64 1 2 1 5
altruistic 3.94 2.90 4 14 4 16
caring 4.70 2.55 3 8 5 8
considerate 4.73 2.71 1 0 4 0
encouraging 4.12 2.87 1 1 4 4
friendly 4.92 2.71 8 0 5 0
generous 3.98 2.19 7 10 13 12
genuine 4.71 2.75 4 5 10 5
giving 3.92 2.31 3 4 5 8
helpful 4.22 2.28 4 5 7 5
humble 4.10 2.68 7 0 5 2
kind 4.75 2.53 11 5 16 6
nice 4.46 2.56 0 12 0 10
polite 4.10 2.66 1 0 2 0
supportive 4.40 2.82 1 0 4 0
sweet 4.04 2.69 1 4 4 4
thoughtful 4.31 2.71 2 4 5 4
understanding 4.67 2.63 1 1 4 1
unselfish 4.29 2.18 4 7 8 10
warm 4.35 2.73 7 3 12 4
 
 
 
TRAIT Importance Distance to Centroid Imp_L1-4 (R1) Mem_L1-4 (R1) Imp_R1-4 (L1) Mem_R1-4 (L1)
argumentative 3.79 2.62 1 7 4 8
arrogant 3.96 2.72 10 8 15 11
cocky 3.92 2.79 1 7 4 12
condescending 3.94 2.70 0 5 0 2
disrespectful 3.88 2.64 4 1 8 7
hostile 3.75 2.65 4 0 6 20
hypocrite 3.71 2.59 4 8 10 8
inconsiderate 3.50 2.66 1 4 4 4
insensitive 3.29 2.56 0 2 0 8
judgemental 4.00 2.77 1 6 3 11
manipulative 4.12 2.80 0 0 0 0
obnoxious 3.71 2.55 4 5 4 5
picky 2.90 2.70 0 5 0 6
prideful 3.26 2.71 5 3 5 4
rude 3.57 2.44 8 14 12 11
selfish 3.69 2.74 6 6 9 14
snobby 3.48 2.54 1 8 4 3
stubborn 3.48 2.48 4 3 6 5
unfriendly 3.69 2.73 2 0 8 0
vain 3.19 2.65 1 6 4 8
 
 
 
